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1. Introduction 
Competition authorities and litigants worldwide have increased the use of 
economic quantitative methods and economic expert witnesses as a means to produce 
and support evidence in merger and antitrust cases. By quantitative techniques we 
refer to techniques ―designed to test an economic hypothesis to the exclusion of 
exploratory data analysis‖3. The latter refer to descriptive statistics of industry data 
(retail scanner data, consumer panel data) or descriptive analysis of company data 
(transaction level data, bidding data, descriptive event analysis) that are often 
employed in antitrust and merger analysis. However, the issues raised by these 
industry data for causal inference are much less complex than econometrics or other 
inferential quantitative techniques, which will form the main object of this study. 
 Innovations in computing power and in econometric techniques have gradually 
transformed most areas of economics, including industrial organization, the area 
dedicated to understand and analyse the workings of markets and industries and the 
way firms compete with each other. The application of quantitative techniques to 
antitrust has arisen naturally from the need to answer the central questions of antitrust 
analysis, such as, market definition and market structure issues, analysis of pricing 
and non-pricing behaviour by firms, quantification of damages and efficiencies and 
dynamic issues of entry and product reallocation
4
. 
Quantitative techniques are those designed to test a hypothesis formulated based on 
economic theory. These techniques can range from simple statistical tests to complex 
structural econometric estimation models of demand and supply (e.g. demand system 
estimation). However, rarely will quantitative techniques alone decide matters on a 
particular case. Quantitative analysis interacts with qualitative analysis in a complex 
way and generally these two can be seen more as complements rather than substitutes. 
In any case, the weighting and sifting of evidence will always involve expert 
judgment on the part of the competition authorities. 
The aim of this chapter is, on the one hand, to briefly describe the main aspects of 
the most commonly used quantitative techniques in antitrust analysis, and on the other 
hand, to quantify their use in EU merger and antitrust decisions from 2004 until 2011. 
Moreover, we also codify the Commission‘s opinion on the techniques utilized.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of 
the most commonly used quantitative techniques in competition law analysis in the 
EU
5
. Section 3 discusses the methodology used to collect data from EU merger and 
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antitrust decisions and some data considerations. Section 4 explores the substantive 
law framework for the assessment and evaluation of this quantitative evidence in EU 
competition law by the European Commission and the Courts, in particular topics 
relating to the standard of proof and evidential cogency and the interaction between 
the different concepts of causation in law and econometrics, whereas Section 5 
provides a unique empirical analysis of the probative value of different kinds of 
econometric evidence, by performing for the first time a quantitative analysis of the 
opinion of the European Commission for the particular techniques used and their 
average evidential weight. The final part concludes. 
 
2. Summary Description of Quantitative Techniques Used in Antitrust 
Analysis 
 
There is a wide range of quantitative methods that have been used as a means to 
produce or support evidence in antitrust cases. As mentioned above, these can vary 
from fairly uncomplicated descriptive statistics to advanced structural econometric 
models of demand and supply. We classify quantitative techniques in four main 
categories: (a) statistical tests, (b) demand analysis, (c) accounting or stock market 
analysis and (d) any other technique. Below, we summarize the main elements of the 
most commonly used techniques in antitrust analysis.  
 
2.1. Statistical Tests 
2.1.1. Price Correlations 
Correlation analysis rests on the intuitive assumption that the prices of goods that are 
substitutes should move together. It is a very popular technique mainly because of its 
simplicity and ease of calculation. Price correlation is frequently used to determine 
whether two products or two geographic areas belong to the same market. However, it 
is important to remember that correlation analysis does not allow causal inferences 
about a relationship between two variables to be made, but only provides suggestive 
evidence on their degree of association. 
Correlation analysis is a statistical technique used to measure the degree of 
interdependence between two variables. Two variables are said to be correlated if a 
change in one variable is associated with a change in the other. When the changes in 
the two variables are in the same direction (for example, they both become positive or 
negative) then the correlation will be positive. When the two variables move in 
opposite direction, then the correlation will be negative. Lastly, there is the possibility 
that two variables are independent from each other in which case their correlation 
would be zero. 
The degree of association between two variables is sometimes measured by a 
statistical parameter called covariance, which is dependent on the unit of 
measurement used. The correlation coefficient between two variables, x1 and x2, is, 
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however, a standardized measure of association between two variables: ρ=σ12/σ1σ2, 
where σ12 is the covariance between x1 and x2 and σ1 and σ2 are the square roots of the 
variances of x1 and x2 respectively. The correlation coefficient is a number ranging 
between -1 and 1. A coefficient of -1 implies perfect negative correlation, a 
coefficient of 1 implies perfect positive correlation, and a coefficient of zero implies 
no correlation. 
The implementation of the price correlation test requires time series data with at 
least 20 observations. It is customary to compute the correlation coefficient using the 
natural logarithm (log) of the price series, both due to efficiency reasons and because 
the first log difference is an approximation of the growth rate. All statistical and 
econometric packages have in-built routines to compute correlation coefficients. 
The intuition behind the price correlation test is that the price movements of goods 
that are considered ―close‖ substitutes in the eyes of the consumers should be closely 
interrelated. Put it simply, the underlying idea is that prices of close substitutes will 
move together. However, there are a number of important limitations that one must 
keep in mind when trying to interpret a particular correlation. 
First, even if the correlation coefficient is statistically different from zero, the 
economic interpretation of the test is not straightforward. As Stigler and Sherwin 
(1985) emphasize, this is due to the lack of an obvious cut-off point where it can be 
decided whether the estimated degree of interdependence between the prices can be 
taken as an indication of price uniformity.
6
 Second, there can be many common 
factors influencing prices that could lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, 
assume that you find a high positive price correlation between breakfast cereals Rice 
Krispies and the rice brand Uncle Ben‘s. Most likely, this would not be because these 
two goods are close substitutes, but because both their prices are influenced by the 
common input price of rice. Unless the influence of common factors is purged, the use 
of the correlation coefficient as a test of price interdependence leads to wrong 
conclusions, regardless of the size or the statistical significance of the estimate. Third, 
price responses for some products or areas might be delayed due to the nature of the 
contracts signed. Contracts or prices among wholesalers are usually negotiated at 
discrete time intervals which may not be synchronised. That means that the analyst 
may find a low correlation using short run data, while in fact the two price series are 
highly correlated if you look at the long run. Finally, but very importantly, correlation 
does not imply a causal relationship between the two variables and great caution 
should be exercised in interpreting correlation results in an economic meaningful way. 
 
2.1.2. Price Determinant Regressions 
Moving beyond simple price correlations, the next most popular empirical method 
used is a price regression framework, where prices of products in a particular industry 
are regressed on a set of exogenous variables. The aim here is either to purge prices of 
effects other than competition, or to study the response of prices (and hence measure 
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the intensity of competition) to an unpredictable event. An example of the first type of 
analysis is the so-called hedonic price regressions, where in a regression framework 
the analyst is trying to control for quality changes over time and over the product 
space due to either technological or subjective factors. Typical examples here would 
be products whose quality evolves dramatically over time, like cars or personal 
computers. An example of the second type of analysis would be the response of prices 
to new regulation or to an unpredictable input shock (like a spike in the price of oil). 
We will describe now a general regression framework that could encompass many 
applications in this area. Consider a multi-firm, multi-product market, where the price 
of product j can be expressed as a function of: 
 
where xjk is the k
th
 characteristic of product j, yjl is the l
th
 input for product j, Dt is a 
time dummy and Zjt is a exogenous event (for example, a new regulation). Product 
characteristics are included in order to control for quality differences over time, so 
that we can compare prices across products adjusted for quality improvements. For 
example, if the application is personal computers, product characteristics could 
include size of memory, speed, type of processor, weight, a DVD dummy etc. 
Similarly, inputs are there to control for common cost sources that will affect prices. 
Examples might be cost of labour and cost of basic inputs such as memory or type of 
processor. Time dummies are meant to capture any common influences over time 
across all products in the market (for example, impact of inflation, or the state of the 
economy overall). Finally, if an unexpected event (banking crisis or new product 
regulation) has occurred during our sample, we could also study its impact on prices. 
Computation of price regressions requires a combination of time series and cross-
sectional data on products‘ price, characteristics and inputs. It is advisable to have a 
large enough dataset (at least 30 observations plus as many observations as the 
number of regressors in the estimated equation). All econometric packages have in-
built routines to compute multivariate regressions. Perhaps, special care would be 
needed in handling problems such as heteroskedasticity, or non-constancy of the error 
term variance, but again most packages have commands that allow to correct for such 
problems. 
Typically the key output of a price regression exercise is to construct a price index 
(having control for quality, time and input effects) that would describe, for example, 
the evolution of average prices over time. This exercise, of course, requires detailed 
knowledge of the demand and supply conditions of the product and market for which 
the index is calculated, as any omitted variable would bias the results. Hence, a high 
adjusted-R
2
 is usually a good measure of how well the model explains the variability 
in prices. 
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2.1.3. Dynamic Price Regressions 
Dynamic price regressions and co-integrated analysis are sometimes used to 
determine the extent of a market and to examine the mechanisms by which price 
changes are transmitted across products or geographic areas. The way prices of a set 
of products adjust to either demand or supply shocks can be represented 
econometrically by what is known as error correction models (ECM). ECM can be 
used to test whether two or more series of price data exhibit stable long-term 
relationships and to estimate the time required for such relationships to be re-
established when a shock causes them to depart from equilibrium. ECM models are a 
powerful econometric tool (mainly used in international macroeconomics and 
financial economics), however, for the purposes of an antitrust investigation this 
method is largely atheoretical and as a result great caution should be exercised when 
applied and particularly with the interpretation of the results. 
Consider the following general-lag model (small letters indicate natural 
logarithms): 
 
Subtracting       from both sides and adding and subtracting  from the 
right-hand side, we get: 
 
where  and  and    is a random error term with 
zero mean and constant variance. The long term difference between the two prices is 
 and the last term, , is called the error-
correction term because it reflects the current ―error‖ in attaining long-run 
equilibrium, as it measures the extent to which the two prices have diverged. The 
parameter  has to be less than one for the system to be stable, that is, to ensure 
convergence towards the equilibrium. If  were equal to zero, the adjustment would 
be instantaneous. 
 
Error correction models are a powerful tool, as they allow the estimation of 
equilibrium relationships using time series of data that are non-stationary.
7
 Two non-
stationary time series are said to be co-integrated if they have a linear combination 
that is stationary. Engle and Granger
8
 have supplied many examples of non-stationary 
series that might have stationary linear combinations and among them, they cited the 
prices of ―close substitutes in the same market‖. Engle and Granger also showed that 
integrated series whose relationship can be expressed in the form of an ECM are co-
integrated. Hence, the speed of adjustment of price movements to their equilibrium 
                                                          
7
 Generally speaking, a stationary series has a mean to which it tends to return, while non-stationary 
series tend to wander widely; also, a stationary series always has a finite variance (that is, shocks only 
have transitory effects) and its autocorrelations tend to die out as the interval over which they are 
measured widens.  
8
 Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger, 1987, ―Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation and Testing‖, Econometrica, 55: 251-76. 
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levels can be estimated by an ECM even when prices are in levels rather than 
differences. 
The data requirements for an ECM model are basically a long enough time series 
of products‘ prices. However, estimation is much more complicated and typically 
proceeds in different steps. First, the analyst would want to purge prices from the 
influence of any common factors in much the same way as in ―price determinant 
regressions‖ discussed before. Second, the analyst would test for stationarity of the 
two price series using a unit root test. Third, provided that the data is non-stationary, 
then the analyst can test whether they are co-integrated. If evidence of co-integration 
is found, then we can conclude that the price movements tend to an equilibrium in the 
long run. If a simple ECM representation cannot be found, then co-integration 
analysis becomes even more sophisticated as a model that fits the particular data 
needs to be found. Specialized econometric packages like STATA have many in-built 
routines to compute ECM models.  
It is obvious that this method is much more complicated and difficult to estimate 
compared to the previous ones. There are many practical issues involved, besides the 
ones discussed already, having to do with the lag structure used in each case, tests for 
autocorrelation and how to solve it and the correct way to calculate standard errors. 
But besides these econometric problems, this methodology remains useful but should 
be used with extra care as it is not based on a clear economic model. To put it 
differently, the fact that prices of two goods move together is not sufficient proof of 
existence that these two goods belong to the same relevant market. To prove that we 
need to go beyond statistical techniques and have a more coherent theory as to how 
the price of one good might respond to a price increase in another and to be able to 
quantify this much more directly. 
 
2.2. Demand Analysis 
Most markets are characterized by products that are close, but not perfect, substitutes 
for each other. In markets like these with differentiated products, prices are set to 
balance the added revenue from marginal sales with the loss that would be incurred if 
they were to raise the prices. When two producers of close substitutes merge, for 
example, there is a strong incentive to raise unilaterally the price of at least one 
product above the pre-merger level. This is because those sales of one product that 
would be lost due to an increase in its price would be partly or totally recouped with 
increased sales of the substitute product. Whether such a price increase is profitable 
depends crucially on how close substitutes the products of the two producers are; the 
higher their substitutability, the higher is the likelihood that a unilateral post-merger 
price increase would be profitable.  
Antitrust authorities dealing with mergers (and other antitrust cases) in 
differentiated product markets need information about the substitutability of all the 
products in a market. Economists use two very basic ideas to characterize the 
responsiveness of product‘s sales to a potential price increase. The first one is the 
own-price elasticity, which is the percentage decrease in a product‘s demand due to a 
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percentage increase in its price given the prices of all other products remain the same. 
The second is the cross-price elasticity, which is the percentage increase in a 
product‘s demand due to a percentage increase in a substitute product‘s price given 
the prices of all other products remain the same. Hence, quantification of the own and 
cross price elasticities in a market is critical from the policy makers point of view in 
order to assess the profitability and the overall impact of firms‘ strategies. The 
techniques that we analyse below aim at doing precisely that using different 
methodologies. 
 
2.2.1. Survey and Experimentation Techniques 
There are many situations in which raw price, quantity or estimates of elasticities 
between products are not available. In this case, the firms involved might consider 
―creating‖ such datasets from scratch. There are two possible methods of doing that: 
to conduct interviews with consumers and to create an experiment.  
To carry out a survey, it is necessary to consider: (i) the objectives of the 
questionnaire, (ii) selecting a random sample of the population, (iii) test and pilot the 
survey before rolling it to the whole sample, and (iv) analyze the results. Let us focus 
the discussion here and assume that the objective is to get a sense of the own and 
cross price elasticities between a set of chosen products. With this objective in mind, 
the questions need to be phrased in the best possible way in order to elicit consumers‘ 
preferences. The main danger here of course is that consumers‘ responses might differ 
significantly from actual behaviour. Consumers often respond by projecting an 
―ideal‖ self (the one who exercises a lot, eats healthy food, etc), rather than the ―real‖ 
themselves (the ones who actually doesn‘t do all the above). Sample selection is also 
crucially important, as we try to infer how the whole population would behave from a 
small sample of people. Given these considerations, survey techniques would provide 
us with some original data that can be counted and analysed using statistical methods. 
To carry out an experiment, it is necessary to consider: (i) the objectives of the 
experiment, (ii) selecting a random sample of the population and divide them into a 
control and treatment group, (iii) administer the treatment, and (iv) measure and 
analyse the results from the two groups. The idea here is similar to the way scientists 
evaluate drugs – providing drugs to a randomly selected treatment group and 
comparing their outcome to the excluded control group. In terms of analysing 
elasticities, for example, a supermarket could administer random changes to prices in 
some stores, but not in neighbouring ones and measure and compare the sales across 
products and stores. Methodologically this is perhaps the best, most reliable way to 
generate original data. Its main disadvantage is that it is very expensive to administer. 
However, the advent of internet in some cases has reduced massively the cost of 
conducting experiments, so perhaps we will see more of them in antitrust cases in the 
near future. 
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2.2.2. Residual Demand Analysis 
The residual demand facing a firm (or a group of firms) is the demand function, 
specifying the level of sales made by the firm as a function of the price they charge, 
net of the influence of the amount of product provided by all other firms in the 
industry. Following Landes and Posner (1981)
9
 and Scheffman and Spiller (1987)
10
, 
consider a market where a dominant firm is facing a market demand D
market
(p) and 
also a competitive fringe, who are willing to supply an amount based on the price 
offered in the market, S
fringe
(p). The residual demand is then the amount left to the 
dominant firm after the fringe has supplied any units they are willing to supply at that 
price: 
         ( )         ( )         ( )  
The estimation of the residual demand allows the analyst to understand the 
competitive behaviour of a firm. A firm operating in an environment where the 
constraints imposed by other firms are high, will be left with no power to raise the 
price above the competitive level. In other words, the fewer the competitive 
constraints from other products or firms, the less elastic the residual demand curve by 
the firm is going to be. This means that by reducing the quantity it supplies, the firm 
could cause a long-lasting price increase. Hence, the elasticity of the residual demand 
curve conveys invaluable information on the competitive situation within a market. 
The dominant firm‘s price elasticity of demand is equal to the market demand 
elasticity, adjusted accordingly to take into account the supply response of the 
competitive fringe: 
 
Note that the residual elasticity of demand increases as the elasticity of market 
demand increases or as the elasticity of supply from the fringe increases.  
The key economic insight is that the residual demand function captures all the 
relevant information about the constraint imposed by other firms and expresses it in 
terms of the residual demand elasticity. If the product market in question is close to 
homogeneous (i.e. very little differentiation among products), then from an estimate 
of the elasticity of the residual demand the analyst can infer whether a firm or a group 
of firms could cause a significant and long-lasting price increase. If that is the case, 
then the product sold by these firms, or the geographic area in which they operate, 
constitutes an antitrust market. Residual demand analysis can be applied to any kind 
of market and with due modifications, as discussed by Baker and Bresnahan (1985)
11
, 
this approach can also be taken in markets with differentiated product. 
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To obtain an estimate of the own-price elasticity of the residual demand, data on 
price, quantity, demand and cost shift variable need to be gathered. In the most 
general form, assume that firm i has the following residual demand function: 
    (        ) 
where Q is the quantity, P is the price, X is a cost shift variable (could also be a 
vector) affecting only the firm‘s rivals, Z is a cost shift variable that only affects firm i 
and Y is a demand shift variable that affect consumers‘ behaviour (such as income or 
the price of complements etc.). In this case the price equation can be estimated by 
instrumental variable techniques. This requires first regressing the quantity sold on 
(     ) and then use the fitted vales of   ̂ to estimate the following price equation 
(small letters indicate natural logarithms): 
 
In this case, the estimated price elasticity of the residual demand equation is  and 
can be used to test whether it is statistically different from any pre-specified value. 
In contrast to the empirical analysis of price movements, residual demand 
estimation stems from economic theory. The estimated own-price elasticity is directly 
derived from an equilibrium model of supply, demand and assumed mode of 
competition in a given market. However, it requires in-depth knowledge of the 
production and demand process. Cost and demand shift variables need to be chosen 
correctly for the whole approach to be consistently estimated. Moreover, the whole 
demand and supply identification relies strongly on functional form assumptions. 
 
2.2.3. Critical Loss Analysis 
Critical loss analysis, as developed by Harris and Simons (1989)
12
, is a 
complementary tool that uses information about demand and the own-price elasticity 
to make inferences about the price constraints exerted by substitute products. Firms 
operating in markets where they possess some degree of market power will 
experience a loss in sales if they unilaterally raise the price for their product. This 
technique estimates the ‗critical‘ loss in sales that would render unprofitable a 
unilateral price increase on behalf of a firm or group of firms. Assuming a benchmark 
homogeneous product market, the critical loss formula will be: 
 
For example, consider a 5% increase in prices in a market where the current price-
cost margin is 20%: 
 
In other words, if the quantity demanded falls by more than 20% following the 5% 
price increase, the price increase is not profitable. Notice that the higher the margin, 
the smaller the critical loss in sales it is going to be (if the margin is 60% for example, 
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critical loss would be 7.7%). This issue is related to the ―cellophane fallacy‖13 
because if the margin is high, it means that the firm is already exercising its market 
power. The ―fallacy‖ in this case is to treat the elasticity and the margin as 
independent from each other, when we know from the theory that margins are 
inversely related to the own-price elasticity. Hence, if margins are high, this implies a 
low price elasticity, which in turn implies that the actual losses in case of a price 
increase would be small. 
Estimation of the critical loss requires relatively little information. Given data on 
the initial price and some estimate of the margin, we can calculate the critical loss 
using a simple calculator. Of course, estimation of the actual loss in sales would be 
much more difficult as it would require estimation of the demand elasticity. 
Nevertheless, critical loss provides a good benchmark upon which the profitability of 
price increases can be assessed. In that spirit, critical loss analysis can also be used in 
terms of product characteristics other than price. For example, as reported in Davis 
and Garces (2009), in the Sportech/Vernons merger, Sportech‘s advisors presented a 
critical loss analysis evaluating whether it would be profitable to reduce the quality 
(size of the jackpot paid out) of the gabling product being sold. 
 
2.2.4. Diversion Ratio and Upward Pricing Pressure 
The diversion ratio tries to answer the following question: if the price of good 1 
increases, what fraction of the lost sales will go to good 2? Diversion analysis usually 
relies on the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which implies 
that the cross-price elasticities of demand between product 1 and all other products in 
a market is the same.
14
 If the IIA holds, then the diversion ratio can be calculated by 
dividing the cross-price elasticity of demand between products 1 and 2 by the own-
price elasticity of demand for product 1. However, even if we do not have data on 
elasticities, assuming that the IIA holds, we can express the diversion ratio in terms of 
market shares. If all the products in the market are either ―close‖ or ―distant‖ 
substitutes for each other, then the diversion ratio between products 1 and 2 is: 
                (             ) (               ) 
All other factors being equal, the lower the market share of product 2, the lower the 
diversion ratio. Or, alternatively, the higher the market share of product 1, the higher 
the diversion ratio. In other words, the more unequal the two firms are, the higher the 
diversion ratio would be.  
Given the diversion ratio and a measure of firms‘ gross margin, we can then try to 
quantify the post-merger incentives of firms to raise prices. Under the assumption that 
the elasticity of demand is constant over the price range that includes the pre- and 
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post-merger prices, Farrell and Shapiro (2010)
15
 provide test statistic that compares 
the upward pricing effect of a merger with the expected post-merger marginal cost 
efficiencies. In the symmetric case of Bertrand competition they find that there is 
upward pricing pressure if: 
  
    
      
        
                 
where,  Margin is the pre-merger gross margin,  (price-marginal cost)/price, DR is the 
diversion ratio between the two firms and Cost Efficiency is the predicted decline in  
marginal cost after the merger. 
In the new US Horizontal Merger Guidelines the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure 
Index or GUPPI is defined as follows: 
                    
                                    
                                    
 
Although the Guidelines are not precise on this, they do state that a merger is unlikely 
to raise significant unilateral effect concerns if the GUPPI is ―proportionately small‖, 
with some commentators arguing for that to mean 5% or less.
16
 
 
The economic logic underlying both the diversion ratio and the UPP or GUPPI is 
clearly sensible and focuses on the incentives faced by the merging parties to raise 
prices. However, it is the application of these ideas that raises some important 
concerns especially with regard to the assumptions that need to be made in order to 
operationalize and quantify these measures. First, the formulas above assume that the 
diversion ratio from firm 1 to firm 2 is the same as from firm 2 to firm 1. They also 
assume that the gross margins of the two firms are the same. Of course, both these 
assumptions need to be checked in each merger case and if they do not hold then the 
formula needs to be adjusted accordingly.
17
 Second, to allow for multi-product firms 
and non-Bertrand firm conduct, such as Cournot competition (Nash-in-quantities) and 
consistent conjectures the UPP formula becomes even more complicated as shown by 
Jaffe and Weyl (2010).
18
 Third, the UPP is essentially a much-simplified merger 
simulation that allows only the price of one product to re-equilibrate, while holding all 
other endogenous prices, quantities, and elasticities constant at pre-merger levels. In 
other words, when the UPP uses ―true‖ elasticities, it differs from a merger simulation 
only because of the former's non-reequilibration assumptions. However, to calculate 
the ―true‖ elasticities some form of differentiated oligopolistic demand model (as we 
will analyse in the next section) needs to be estimated. Given that, the extra ―cost‖ of 
running the full, rather than the one-product, merger simulation seems almost trivial. 
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Diversion and UPP analysis basically provides a very straightforward and quick way 
to estimate the likely effects from mergers between producers of substitute products, 
albeit under very restrictive assumptions. These assumptions need to be tested when 
data is available in each merger case and should not be used without great caution. 
 
2.2.5. Differentiated Product Demand Models 
Estimating demand elasticities and substitution patterns for differentiated product 
markets has become an essential component in examining policy questions regarding 
market power, mergers, and antitrust violations. Empirical models of demand took 
center stage during the last decade, as it became evident that theoretical analysis of 
those questions often provides ambiguous answers. Consistent demand estimation and 
accurate quantification of elasticities are important prerequisites for examining the 
firms' strategies impact on a market, the economy and evaluating different 
counterfactual policy scenarios. In what follows, we provide a very brief overview of 
the methods used in modeling demand for differentiated products in imperfectly 
competitive markets, by illustrating the main challenge faced when estimating 
demand and by surveying some of the recent methods put forward to solve them. We 
present mainly the intuition behind these models, referring the interested reader to the 
research papers cited therein for all the technical details. 
The main problem faced by an analyst trying to estimate demand for differentiated 
products is the ―dimensionality problem‖. Due to the large number of products, even 
if we were to assume a very simple and restrictive functional form for the demand 
function, the number of parameters will be too large to estimate. For example, a linear 
demand system, where f(p)=Ap, where A is J×J matrix of constants, implies J² 
parameters. The number of parameters can be reduced by imposing various 
assumptions (such as symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and adding up restrictions) 
given by representative consumer theory. However, the basic problem (―curse of 
dimensionality‖) still remains: the number of parameters to be estimated increases 
with the square of the number of products. This problem becomes even more severe if 
we attempt to use a flexible functional form that would allow to estimate better cross-
price elasticities. 
The literature provides various solutions regarding the dimensionality problem: (i) 
multi-level demand models, (ii) spatial models, and (iii) discrete choice models. The 
first two methods essentially solve the dimensionality problem by either imposing 
symmetry between the different products or by segmenting the market into smaller 
subgroups. The last class of models takes a more fundamental approach and project 
consumer preferences over the products' characteristics rather than the products 
themselves. 
Multi-level demand models attempt to solve the dimensionality problem by 
dividing the products into smaller groups. Although originally these methods were 
developed for the estimation of broad categories of product (like food, shelter, 
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entertainment etc), Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994)
19
, Hausman (1996)
20
 and 
Hausman and Leonard (2002)
21
 use the idea of multi-stage budgeting to construct a 
multi-level demand system for differentiated products. The actual application involves 
a three stage system: the top level corresponds to overall demand for the product (for 
example, ready-to-eat cereal); the middle level involves demand for different market 
segments (for example, family, kids and adults cereal); and the bottom level involves 
a flexible brand demand system corresponding to the competition between the 
different brands within each segment. 
The demand system applied has the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model 
formulation (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980
22
) at the lowest level: the demand for 
brand j within segment g in city c at quarter t is 
 
where      is the dollar sales share of total segment expenditure,      is the overall 
per capita segment expenditure,      is the price index and      is the price of the kth 
brand in city c at quarter t. This system defines a flexible functional form that can 
allow for a wide variety of substitution patterns within the segment.  
    The middle level of demand models the allocation between segments: 
 
where      is the quantity of the gth segment in city c at quarter t,      is the total 
product expenditure and  are the segment price indexes. 
    Finally, at the top level demand for the product itself is specified as 
 
where     is the overall consumption of that good in city c at quarter t,     is 
disposable real income,  is the price index for this product and     are variables 
that shift demand including demographics and time factors. 
    The advantages of using this model to estimate demand for differentiated 
products are: (i) the model is closely linked to the neo-classical demand theory; (ii) it 
allows for a flexible pattern of substitution within each segment; (iii) it is relatively 
easy to estimate. 
    However, criticism of this method has several parts. First, although the demand 
within segments is flexible (the AIDS model allows for a second order flexible 
system), the segment division is potentially very restrictive. This practice has been 
defended on the grounds that one could test for the validity of the segmentation and 
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that this segmentation is used by the "players" in the industry. Testing is promising in 
theory, but in practice it has little power since different segmentations of the market 
are very difficult to be rejected by the data. The notion of using the segmentation 
advocated by market participants has some appeal (although the relevance of 
segmentation used for marketing purposes is not always clear). In practice, however, 
even when analysing the same market, industry sources and researchers usually differ 
both on the number of segments they use and on how they allocate the different 
brands across segments. For example, Hausman (1996) uses only three segments 
when analysing the ready to eat cereal market, while Cotterill (1996)
23
 uses four. 
Also, the allocation of products to different segments is highly subjective: brands 
within identical segments might not be the same across studies. Given that the cross 
price elasticity between brands in different segments will be low relative to brands 
within a segment, it is obvious that the a priori division of brands into segments will 
have important implications. 
A second criticism is that the multi-level demand system does not fundamentally 
solve the dimensionality problem. The flexible functional form at the lowest level of 
demand is achieved by restricting attention to a small number of products. In a 
differentiated products market this is feasible only if the number of segments is large. 
In practice this is done by restricting attention in each segment to the "important" 
brands, usually measured by market shares. However, in many cases the main 
competitive threat to leading products comes from smaller brands with similar 
characteristics. Being able to divide the market into a sufficient number of segments 
and restricting attention to the largest brands within each segment are significant a 
priori constraints that may bias any subsequent analysis. 
    Finally, the lowest level of demand regresses expenditure shares on the prices of 
all brands in a segment. This implicitly assumes that the structure of the segments and 
the products that belong to each segment are essentially the same over time. If the 
products in a segment change over time, there is a serious problem with the estimation 
and the interpretation of the estimates. In industries, like the personal computer 
industry, where new brands are introduced very frequently this assumption would be 
highly problematic. This highlights the inherent inability of these models to deal with 
the important phenomenon of new products' entry or, more generally, technical 
change that alters product characteristics over time, since they do not provide a 
description of the underlying factors which make two products close substitutes. 
    In conclusion, the multi-level demand system has the advantages of being 
flexible at the lowest level of demand (as long as we work with a constant set of 
products) and easy to estimate, but requires division of the products into segments, 
and is workable only with a limited number of products.  
Spatial (or distance metric) models constitute a recently proposed alternative that 
combines methodological elements from both the neo-classical demand and the 
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characteristics (discrete choice) approach. Consumers are assumed to have 
preferences over products directly, but cross elasticities between goods are 
parameterized flexibly in terms of the goods' characteristics. 
    Following Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002)
24
, Pinkse and Slade (2004)
25
, and 
Slade (2004)
26
, brand model j demand would be written in matrix notation as follows: 
 
where q, p and ɛ are J×1 vectors of quantities, prices and error terms respectively, 
Z is the matrix of observed brand and market characteristics and the J×J matrix  
is assumed to be a common (parametric or non-parametric) 
function of measures of distance in product-characteristic space. This model is based 
on a normalized-quadratic, indirect-utility function, in which the prices of the 
differentiated products as well as individual incomes have been divided by the price 
of the outside good. This utility is in Gorman polar form and can therefore be 
aggregated to obtain brand-level demands. 
The advantages of this framework is that it is easy to estimate and allows for more 
flexible substitution patterns to be driven by how close products are in the 
characteristics space. However, it does not solve the fundamental dimensionality 
problem since in practice symmetry and other restrictions need to be imposed. 
Moreover, this model cannot be used for welfare analysis and it does not address the 
need to model consumer heterogeneity (consumers are assumed to have the same 
marginal utility of income). 
Finally, an extensively used alternative to the classical market-level approach is 
discrete choice models. These models solve the dimensionality problem by modeling 
a product as a bundle of characteristics (Lancaster, 1971)
27
. Consumer preferences are 
defined over the characteristics space, rather than the products themselves, making 
this the relevant dimension for empirical work. 
In discrete choice models the products' characteristics play two separate roles. 
First, they are used to describe the mean utility level across heterogeneous consumers. 
Second, the products' attributes guide substitution patterns: products with similar 
characteristics will be closer substitutes. In other words, discrete choice models 
operationalize the notion of "how close products are" with reference to the products' 
characteristics. On the one hand, this approach is more specific than previous models 
in the sense that the researcher needs to identify what are the relevant product 
attributes that drive substitution. On the other hand, this is more flexible because, 
unlike previous models, it is not constrained by a priori market segmentation, while 
still being able to take advantage of the information contained in these segments. For 
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example, Nevo (2000
28
, 2001
29
) analysing the same market as Hausman (1996) uses 
both brand attributes (such as sugar, fat calories, fiber etc) and market segment 
information (kids, adults, all-family etc) as product characteristics. Therefore, discrete 
choice models' reliance on characteristics is not restrictive and provides a flexible 
framework for differentiated product markets. 
    A more serious problem with the discrete choice literature is the heavy reliance 
on an additive independent and identically distributed shock. Following Davis 
(2000)
30
, a general version of a discrete choice model specifies that each consumer 
i=1,...,I solves the following indirect maximization problem 
 
where     denotes observed product characteristics (including the product's price), 
    denotes unobserved product characteristics,     denotes observable consumer 
characteristics,    denotes unobserved consumer characteristics, f(⋅ ) is a known 
function,  is a function known up to a vector of parameters θ and  is an 
additive random term specific to both consumer and product. 
    This specification of consumer preferences incorporates the models used in 
many empirical studies of demand in differentiated product markets. More 
specifically, assuming that is independently and identically distributed across 
products and consumers with type 1 extreme value distribution and that there are no 
unobserved consumer characteristics (  =0) corresponds to the multinomial logit 
model introduced by McFadden (1973)
31
. This model provides an extremely tractable 
representation of individuals demand functions, but has the undesirable property that 
the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is independent of the 
existence and attributes of all other alternatives (independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA)). This property means that a change in an attribute of one alternative 
will change the probabilities of all other alternatives proportionally, keeping the ratios 
of the choice probabilities the same. In the multinomial logit model different 
consumers will have different ranking of the products, but this difference is only due 
to the i.i.d shock. Therefore, this model a priori restricts consumers to substitute 
towards other brands in proportion to market shares and does not allow for flexible 
substitution patterns between goods to be determined by the data. 
    To alleviate this problem, shocks to individual utility need to be correlated 
across brands. Intuitively, we would expect that the second-choice of consumers that 
decide to no longer buy an IBM ThinkPad notebook, for example, would be different 
than the average consumer. In particular, they will more likely substitute towards 
another laptop with similar characteristics, rather than a desktop. Subsequent research 
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tried to circumvent the IIA property by introducing such correlation across products 
either through the additive separable term, , or through consumer observed,    , 
and unobserved,   , heterogeneity. 
    Models, which allow  to be correlated across products rather than 
independently distributed, are nested in the generalised extreme value model 
introduced by McFadden (1981)
32
. The most popular example of these models is the 
nested logit model, in which all brands are grouped into pre-determined exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive sets and  is decomposed into an i.i.d shock plus a group 
specific component. This implies that correlation between brands within a group is 
higher than across groups; buyers of IBM ThinkPad are more likely now to substitute 
towards other laptops. However, substitution within the group is still driven by market 
shares; if some laptops are closer substitutes to IBM ThinkPad than others, this will 
not be captured without further segmentation. 
    The main advantages of the nested logit is that it is easy to compute and allows 
for more flexible substitution patterns. It has been used to describe various industries 
such as automobiles (Verboven, 1996)
33
 or personal computers (Foncel and Ivaldi, 
2005)
34
. However, as in the case of multi-stage budgeting, the a priori division of 
products into groups is not always clear. Moreover, the segmentation does not fully 
account for the substitution patterns: given the assumption of i.i.d shocks within a 
group, elasticities among those products still have the problems associated with the 
simple logit model. In addition, in the nested logit the order of the nests matters. The 
Principles of Differentiation General Extreme Value (PDGEV) model introduced by 
Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997)
35
 overcome this last problem. In modelling 
demand for personal computers, they segmented the market along two dimensions 
(branded vs generic and frontier vs non-frontier technology) without ordering them. 
With the exception of dealing with the problem of ordering the nests, this model 
retains all the advantages and disadvantages of the nested logit. 
    An alternative way to avoid the IIA property is to allow the correlation across 
products to be a function of both product and consumer characteristics. Given that 
consumers have intrinsic preferences over the products' characteristics, it is more 
likely to substitute towards products with similar characteristics. Moreover, we would 
expect consumers with similar demographics to have a similar ranking of products 
and therefore similar substitution patterns. The random coefficient multinomial logit 
model with unobserved product characteristics presented by Berry, Levinsohn and 
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Pakes, or BLP, (1995)
36
 provides a framework that incorporates both unobserved and 
observed consumer heterogeneity. 
    BLP combined many advances both in the discrete choice literature (random 
coefficient multinomial logit) but also in the empirical industrial organization 
literature (Bresnahan, 1987
37
; Berry, 1994
38
) and present a model that allows for 
flexible substitution patterns that depend on product and consumer characteristics 
without any reliance on a priori market segmentation. These advantages, however, 
come at a higher computational cost compared with the other discrete or continuous 
models. Subsequent research (Nevo, 2001
39
; Petrin, 2002
40
; Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes, 2004
41
) extended the BLP framework in various dimensions to incorporate 
more observable consumer heterogeneity.  
Despite its wide applicability, this approach has also its critics: discrete choice 
model are unusable in some markets precisely because of the need for attributes that 
describe the product. For example, Hausman (1996) claims: "Indeed, it is difficult to 
conceive how I would describe Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios in terms of its attributes-
perhaps the volume of apples and cinnamon along with other ingredients. Thus, it is 
readily recognized that for highly differentiated products, the discrete choice model 
specification based on product attributes may not be usable." Other relevant examples, 
where it is difficult to define a product in terms of its attributes, might include 
perfumes, wines etc. Hence, despite many advances, these models are not a panacea 
and still require careful modeling. 
 
2.3. Other Techniques 
2.3.1. Bidding Studies 
In many markets transactions among firms are based on a bidding procedure. The 
underlying economics of these environments are not that different from other markets, 
but the auction format and the particularities of each auction (reservation prices, entry 
requirements etc.) means that specialized analysis is required before reaching any 
conclusions on the firms‘ market power. A particular concern in many auctions is the 
possibility of collusion. Since auctions are essentially mechanisms for buyers to 
reveal their willingness to pay for an object (a rare painting, a contract, a power plan, 
or a government bond just to give a few examples) and given the important 
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informational asymmetries they may exist, when some bidders might have superior 
information compare to others, antitrust authorities try to prevent bid rigging in order 
to stop or prevent the anti-competitive behavior of a cartel of bidders. Empirically, 
given the many formats an auction can take (orally ascending or descending, first 
price or second price sealed bid and all their permutations), there is not an all-
encompassing econometric framework, but instead the details of each auction need to 
be studied in isolation and the empirical model need to be adjusted according to the 
information available to the bidders at the time. 
 
2.3.2. Stock Market event studies 
Stock markets‘ reactions to news can be a particularly valuable source of information 
that may lead to inferences about the nature of a merger or any other corporate 
announcement. Eckbo (1983)
42
 and Stillman (1983)
 43
 were the first to present the 
rationale behind the analysis of stock markets‘ reactions based on financial theory. 
Put it simply, if the stock market is assumed to be efficient, so that asset prices reflect 
the true underlying value of a company, then when a merger between two companies 
takes place, there are two possible outcomes in the product market. First, if market 
power increases substantially after a merger, the product price will increase and so 
will profits for both the merger partners and the other firms operating in the market, at 
least in the short run (that is, prior to entry by new players). This implies that, on the 
assumption that the stock market is efficient, both the merging firms and horizontal 
rival firms in the industry should earn positive abnormal returns when the anti-
competitive merger is announced. Also, when steps are taken by the authorities to 
investigate the merger, negative abnormal returns should be observed. 
Second, if the merger generates cost efficiencies, then the merged firm will be 
more profitable, than the sum of the pre-merger entities, all other factors being equal; 
such higher profitability, however, will not extend to other firms in the industry. This 
implies that the merging partners should gain positive abnormal returns around the 
date of the merger announcement, and negative abnormal returns around the date 
when antitrust investigations are announced. The situation for rival firms is, however, 
more complex. If the market expects the cost efficiencies to be easily passed along to 
other players in the industry, then rival firms should also earn positive abnormal 
results when the merger is announced and negative returns when legal proceedings are 
announced by the authorities. Otherwise, negative abnormal returns can be expected 
for the rivals at the time the merger is announced and positive returns when the 
investigation is announced. 
Summarising, observing positive abnormal returns for the merging partners at the 
time of the merger announcement does not allow the analyst to distinguish between a 
merger which is expected to raise prices and one which is expected to lower costs. 
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Likewise, observing positive abnormal returns for the horizontal rivals does not make 
it possible to discriminate between the two hypotheses of a price-increasing versus 
cost-reducing merger. However, observing insignificant or negative abnormal returns 
for the rivals around the announcement date is a sufficient condition to conclude that 
the market expects the merger to be cost-reducing, not price-increasing. 
The above-mentioned hypothesis is tested by using time series stock-price data for 
rival firms, and comparing their actual stock price returns around the announcement 
date with a counterfactual measure of what the return would have been had the merger 
not taken place, and summing over to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns. The 
counterfactual return for an asset can be calculated based either on the mean-adjusted 
return model (MARM);
44
 or on the market model;
45
 or the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM);
46
 or the market index model.
47
 These tests hinge upon the idea that the 
capital market is efficient. Most studies in this area though show only a weak or semi-
strong for of efficiency. Most importantly, these tests rely on the reactions of the stock 
market after an event (or its announcement). However, antitrust authorities need to 
make decisions before such announcements are made. Hence, financial analyses like 
these are perhaps complementary to examining competition and market power in an 
industry, but they can hardly be substitutes given their post-event nature and capital 
market efficiency reliance. 
 
2.3.3. Cost analysis – Production determinant regressions 
Costs are a key component of profitability, and as such it should perhaps not be 
surprising that knowledge of an industry‘s or a firm‘s cost function is often very 
important for competition analysis. Cost considerations are important in both merger 
and regulatory contexts. In merger investigations, one reason for approving a 
horizontal merger even if it is likely to increase market power can be if unit costs are 
likely to go down. One reason they might is if a merger generates substantial 
economies of scale. Similarly, in regulatory contexts, regulators often choose to set 
prices as a function of some measure of costs. In doing so, regulators face the 
complex task of getting appropriate and meaningful data, devising a relevant cost 
measure, and estimating its value.  
For some purposes, we may ―only‖ need estimates of the marginal or average 
cost of production and, if so, such estimates can potentially be retrieved from 
company records or industry estimates. In such cases there may be no need to actually 
estimate a cost function. However, on other occasions, we want to know whether the 
marginal cost varies with the quantity produced, and in particular whether we have 
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economies or diseconomies of scale as firm size varies. In this case, the economists‘ 
traditional approach requires making assumptions about the potential form of the cost 
function and estimating the cost model‘s parameters. While ―econometric‖ cost 
function estimation is perhaps most familiar to economists, ―engineering‖ cost 
estimation can also prove very effective. One way to get engineering estimates is to 
perform detailed interviews with the technical personnel at plants and firms to get 
hands-on estimates of costs and scale effects.  
The ―traditional‖ economic approach to estimate a production function such as 
, where  is the quantity produced,  are inputs 
such as capital, labour, material etc,   the unobserved econometric error and  the 
parameters to estimate, is to write the following equation (lower letters indicate taking 
natural logarithms): 
 
where       are labour, capital and material choices for firm i. Consider a data set 
consisting of a large number of firm-level observations on outputs and inputs and 
suppose we are attempting to estimate the production function There are four issues 
that are likely to arise: endogeneity, functional form, technological change, and 
multiproduct firms.  
First, the problem of endogeneity may arise because OLS estimation, even if 
the true model is assumed linear in parameters and the unobserved (productivity) term 
is assumed additively separable, productivity must not be correlated with the 
independent variables in the regression, i.e., the chosen inputs. We will face an 
endogeneity problem if, for example, the high-productivity firms, those with high 
unobserved productivity   , also demand a lot of inputs. If we do not account for this 
endogeneity problem, our estimate of the coefficient on our endogenous input will be 
biased upward. To solve this problem by instrumental variable regression we would 
need to find an identifying variable that can explain the firm‘s demand for the input 
but that is not linked to the productivity of a firm. Recent advances in the production 
function estimation literature have included the methods described in Olley and Pakes 
(1996)
48
, who suggest using investment as a proxy for productivity and use it to 
control for endogeneity. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
49
 suggest an alternative 
approach, but in an important paper Ackerberg et al. (2006)
50
 critique the 
identification arguments in those papers, particularly Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), 
and suggest alternative methodologies. 
A second consideration is that we must carefully specify the functional form to 
take into account the technological realities of the production process. In particular, 
the functional form needs to reflect the plausible input substitution possibilities and 
the plausible nature of returns of scale. If we are unsure about the nature of the returns 
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to scale in an industry, we should adopt a specification that is flexible enough to allow 
the data to determine the existence of scale effects. Clearly, we want to use any actual 
knowledge of the production process we have before we move to estimation, but 
ideally not impose more than we know on the data.  
Third, particularly when the data for the cost or production function estimation 
come from time series data, we will need to take into account technological change 
going on in the industry. Technological progress will result in new production and 
cost functions and the cost and input prices associated with the corresponding output 
cannot therefore immediately be compared over time without controlling for such 
changes. For this reason, one or more variables attempting to account for the effect of 
technological progress is generally included in specifications using time series data. 
Moreover, if firms are using different technologies, then it would be important to 
attempt to account for such differences. 
Fourth, when the firms involved produce more than one product or service, 
costs and inputs can be hard to allocate to the different outputs and constructing the 
data series for the different products may turn into a challenge. Estimating 
multiproduct cost or production functions will also further complicate the exercise by 
increasing the number of parameters to estimate.  
A final alternative approach to cost estimation is known as the ―engineering‖ 
approach. This approach to determining the nature of scale economies was pioneered 
by Bain (1956)
51
. It is based on interviews with engineers familiar with the planning 
and design of plants and produces direct and detailed industry specific data. As the 
name suggests, the objective is to determine the shape of the cost function or the 
nature of the production function by collecting specific and detailed information first 
hand from people knowledgeable of the cost and scale implications of their 
businesses. 
 
2.3.4. Industry Specific Model Simulation 
As the name suggests, this is an all-other-methods encompassing category that we 
frequently observe in reports or industry analyses of merger or antitrust cases. Here a 
case-specific theoretical or empirical model is detailed with the aim to prove a 
particular point. Such models are frequently employed when severe data limitations 
make any of the previous approaches difficult to implement and particular 
assumptions related to the industry structure and competition have to be made. There 
is a large heterogeneity on the difficulty and sophistication of the empirical methods 
employed under this category and can vary between a very simple simulation of a 
theoretical model‘s parameters to a fully-fledged structural empirical investigation. 
 
3. A primer on the role of quantitative evidence in EU competition law 
 
Econometric techniques may be used in a variety of competition cases, in both merger 
control and antitrust. We will briefly summarize the type of quantitative techniques 
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employed in proceedings relating to the main categories of competition law 
violations. We will first examine the practice of the European Commission, before 
exploring how the European courts have addressed quantitative evidence, either in 
actions for annulment of the Commission‘s decisions, or in preliminary ruling 
procedures. 
 
3.1. Quantitative evidence in EU Commission’s decisions 
Merger control is by far the area where the Commission most often employs 
econometric evidence. More recently, the Commission has started to expand the use 
of quantitative evidence in other areas of EU competition law, most notably, for 
decisions involving abuse of a dominant position and cartels. 
 
3.1.1. Econometric techniques in EU merger control 
Econometric techniques are often used in merger control for the delineation of 
product but also geographic markets, but also for the competitive assessment of the 
merger, in particular for the identification of unilateral (non-coordinated) effects.  
 
3.1.1.1. Econometrics and market definition 
Econometric estimates of demand elasticities are typically considered more 
informative than descriptive economic statistics (e.g. market shares, barriers to entry, 
concentration indexes), although at the same time they can be more data demanding 
and can rely on a large set of assumptions that need to be made in order to estimate 
the appropriate model
52
. There exist several indirect empirical methods to identify 
substitute products that act as competitive constraints and may limit the market power 
of the entity resulting from the merger. The most frequently used price tests include 
the hypothetical monopolist test, price correlation analysis, stationarity analysis and 
shock analysis. The aim is to understand the trends in the prices of potential 
substitutes and hence the existence of a competitive relation with the 
products/services of the merged entity. 
 The hypothetical monopolist test assesses whether a profit-maximizing 
monopolist on a candidate market may impose a small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price (SSNIP test). The tool is referred to by the European 
Commission‘s guidelines on market definition53. Yet, its use requires information on 
price elasticities, which is often unavailable; hence, it has only been used in a few 
cases
54
.  
For instance, in its recently published decision Unilever/Sarah Lee, the 
Commission proceeded in applying a SSNIP test of the gender segments (male/non-
male) deodorants in order to find if these could be separate relevant markets for 
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competition law purposes. The Commission employed a merger simulation model 
showing that that the profits of a hypothetical monopolist of the male (or non-male) 
segment would increase if the prices of all male (or non-male) deodorants increased 
by 5%. These results supported the conclusions of the market investigation and 
confirmed that a hypothetical monopolist in the non-male market would not be 
constrained by the male deodorant products, thus indicating that those products 
belonged to a distinct relevant market
55
. The Commission was able to use a SSNIP 
test, having already estimated a demand system with elasticity parameters, building 
on the simulation model. Implied marginal costs and margins were also calculated for 
all products before and after the 5% price increase and these margins and quantities 
were used to calculate the implied total variable profits pre- and post-SSNIP prices. 
In the absence of information on price elasticities, critical loss, correlation 
analysis, stationarity analysis and/or shock analysis might provide some less 
information-intensive alternatives.  
The Commission has employed critical loss analysis mostly for assessing the 
anticompetitive effects of mergers, rather than in the step of market definition
56
. On 
the contrary, price correlation analysis, and occasionally stationarity analysis have 
often been used by the Commission for the purpose of market definition
57
. Correlation 
analysis examines if the prices of any two substitute products follow a similar trend 
over time, the correlation indicating the degree to which the prices of the two products 
are related: a high correlation and positive co-efficient (+1) indicating that the price 
trends are almost identical. This does not necessarily mean that the two products 
should be included in the same relevant market; after all the co-efficient indicates 
price trends and there might exist significant quality differences between the products 
or  differences related to the existence of a strong brand name. In order to assess 
whether the prices of two products are sufficiently correlated and thus form part of the 
same market, the Commission uses as a benchmark the correlation between two 
products that are accepted as being in the same market. In the absence of such 
benchmark, a view must be taken on what level the correlation coefficient is high 
enough to indicate that two products are in the same market. If the two prices move 
perfectly ―in step‖, then the correlation coefficient is one; if there is no association 
between the prices, the correlation coefficient becomes zero. Account should also be 
taken of the risk of spurious correlation, for example because both products use the 
same inputs and thus an increase in the price of the input will create the same trend of 
price increase for both products. Yet, although not constituting conclusive evidence 
that the two products form part of the same relevant market, the absence of price 
correlation indicates that there is no competitive relationship between the two 
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products.  In some instances, correlation analysis has also been used in order to define 
geographic markets
58
.  
Stationarity analysis attempts to mitigate these defects, by observing the 
development of the price ratio of two products in two different geographic markets 
over a certain period of time. In case the price ratio remains static, there is only one 
relevant market including both products. Stationarity analysis tests whether the ―law 
of one price‖ holds between the products, under the assumption that if products are 
close substitutes, then their prices can only deviate from each other for short periods 
of time. Stationarity tests do not require use of any benchmarks, hence, it becomes 
important to look at the results of both these types of analysis together, as just 
evidence that prices move together over time is not conclusive evidence of strong 
competitive constraints between two products. The Commission‘s Notice on the 
definition of the relevant market raises the possibility of using price elasticity as a 
means of defining markets, although, it does not indicate the degree of price elasticity 
required for the two products to form part of the same relevant market: 
―There are a number of quantitative tests that have specifically been designed 
for the purpose of delineating markets. These tests consist of various 
econometric and statistical approaches estimates of elasticities and cross-price 
elasticities for the demand of a product, tests based on similarity of price 
movements over time, the analysis of causality between price series and 
similarity of price levels and/or their convergence. The Commission takes into 
account the available quantitative evidence capable of withstanding rigorous 
scrutiny for the purposes of establishing patterns of substitution in the past‖59. 
In any case, econometrics constitute only one type of evidence used for the purpose of 
market definition, among an array of qualitative evidence, such as evidence of past 
substitution between the two products, the views of customers and competitors, 
marketing studies, consumer surveys, barriers and costs associated with switching 
demand.  
In Arsenal/DSP, which concerned the acquisition of a paper plant by one of 
the world's largest manufacturers of specialty paper, the Commission used both 
correlation analysis and stationarity analysis techniques to examine the extent to 
which prices moved together over time. The Commission found that reels and sheets 
were not part of the same market, as the correlation coefficients were clearly not in 
the range normally considered to indicate that two products are in the same relevant 
market
60
. It also found that the correlation co-efficients were significantly below the 
correlations between paper products, which were included in the same market. The 
stationarity tests found that there was a clear upward trend in the prices of reels 
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relative to the prices of sheets, which suggested that the ―law of one price‖ did not 
hold in this case. The decision also discusses extensively the correlation and 
stationarity analysis presented by one of the merging companies with the aim to 
contest the Commission‘s analysis. The Commission observed that the merging 
party‘s econometric analysis was subject to a large number of methodological 
shortcomings, in particular, the statistical tests were not implemented properly, and 
the analysis was not in accordance with the Commission Notice on the definition of 
the relevant market for the purposes of Community law
61
. Yet, despite the 
econometric evidence pointing towards the existence of two separate markets, the 
Commission also examined if both products were part of a wider overall market, by 
looking to a market survey and further correlation analyses. The issue of market 
definition was thus left open, as in both cases the merger would have led to a 
significant impediment to effective competition. 
Shock analysis requires little data as it is based on natural experiments, and 
thus does not constitute an econometric technique as such: the test consists in 
examining the price trends of the products involved following a sudden and 
unexpected fluctuation in demand or supply (e.g. new technology, the introduction of 
a new product). The Commission mentions this alternative technique in its Notice on 
relevant market definition, where it is observed that  
―[…] it is possible to analyse evidence relating to recent past events or shocks 
in the market that offer actual examples of substitution between two products. 
When available, this sort of information will normally be fundamental for 
market definition. If there have been changes in relative prices in the past (all 
else being equal), the reactions in terms of quantities demanded will be 
determinant in establishing substitutability. Launches of new products in the 
past can also offer useful information, when it is possible to precisely analyse 
which products have lost sales to the new product‖ 62. 
The technique has also been used in a number of cases, most notably in Ryanair/Aer 
Lingus, where the Commission examined the vigorous reaction of Ryanair to the entry 
of new competitors in the carrier services located in the Republic of Ireland in 
comparison to its relatively less vigorous response to the entry of new carriers 
operating out of the Belfast airports as indicating that the two markers were 
separate
63
.  In Astra/Zeneca, the European Commission also referred to new entry as a 
starting point for the investigation of the competition constraints each party posed to 
the other with regard to the treatment of various gastro-intestinal diseases
64
. 
 
3.1.1.2. Econometrics and competition assessment in EU merger control 
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The passage from the dominance test to the significant impediment of effective 
competition (SIEC) test, following the adoption of the new Merger Regulation 
139/2004, led to an increasing use of econometric evidence in EU merger control as a 
means to identify directly the existence of anticompetitive effects
65
. Until then, 
although the Commission had made use of econometric evidence in the competition 
assessment step of merger control in rare occasions
66
 (it made more use of them in the 
step of market definition), the structuralist nature of the dominance test prevalent at 
the time led to the use of descriptive statistics (market shares, concentration indexes, 
HHI) rather than inferential statistics and econometrics, which have a more 
prospective nature, in order to provide evidence that the merger will create or will 
expand a dominant position. The use of econometric tests was also thought of as a 
way to engage in a more economics-oriented definition of the dominance criterion, 
which was for historic reasons linked to the static interpretation that was given to it by 
the case law of the European Courts on Article 102 TFEU
67
.  
Obviously, the move to a different substantive standard in EU merger control 
does not affect the content and methodologies followed by these econometric 
techniques, nor does it affect the choice of the adequate technique
68
. Yet, the SIEC 
standard might increase the instances in which the Commission relies on econometric 
evidence in order to prove the anticompetitive effects of a merger, in view of the 
relatively less important role market shares and other structural factors now play in 
EU merger control. Indeed, the revised substantive standard displaces the focus to 
establishing a theory of harm, on which the Commission‘s assessment and overall 
narrative of anticompetitive effect will be based, rather than describing the structural 
conditions of the market and inferring from a high level of concentration or high 
market shares the existence of an anticompetitive effect, as was previously the case 
with the dominance substantive test. The requirement of a substantiated theory of 
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harm thus substitutes the presumption of the anticompetitive effect of the merger 
because of the structuralist characteristics of the market in this case. In other words, 
causality cannot be inferred from the descriptive statistical data on the structure of the 
market (market concentration). One must infer that a causal relationship exists 
between the different data only on the basis of a theory of harm that would explain the 
relationship between the different variables.  
In EU merger control, the Commission refers to two main theories of harm: 
non-coordinated effects and coordinated effects, which will thus form the theoretical 
underpinning of the econometric tests and methodologies used to establish the causal 
relationship between the different variables
69
. 
The area of unilateral or non-coordinated effects has been the domain of 
predilection for the use of econometric techniques. The theory of unilateral effects 
regroups situations where the merger might lead to monopoly or dominance or it 
might lead to non-coordinated effects
70
. In all these cases the merging firms may find 
it profitable to alter their behaviour unilaterally, following the acquisition, by 
elevating the price and suppressing output, by acting independently of the remaining 
firms
71
. Unilateral effects that do not reach the level of dominance were recently 
included in the scope of EU merger control, following the adoption of a new 
substantive test, that of significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) which 
expanded the EU merger control‘s scope beyond the situations where the merging 
firms acquired a dominant position
72. As it has been remarked elsewhere, ―although 
the competition agencies in the US and Europe have published guidelines spelling out 
the conditions for the unilateral (non-coordinated) effects theory to build an inference 
of anticompetitive effects in differentiated product markets, the courts have not yet 
explicitly accepted an independent evidential value for the theory‖, thus pushing the 
competition authorities to rely on a wealth of empirical evidence and quantitative 
techniques in this case
73. The development of new approaches, such as ―upward 
pricing pressure‖ (UPP), challenges the ―market definition paradigm‖ and enables the 
Commission to proceed to a direct estimation of non-coordinated effects, focusing on 
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the firm‘s incentives to change their prices post-merger74. Although this technique has 
been referred to in the US horizontal merger guidelines
75
, it has not yet been used at 
the time of writing this chapter in EU merger control. 
In practice, two methods are mainly used in order to assess whether a 
particular merger is likely to cause substantial unilateral effects or whether these are 
negligible. First, regression analysis attempts to identify the competitive interrelations 
between firms from past data and estimate the intensity of competition through 
diversion ratios in local markets. Second, merger simulation models may also provide 
reliable projections of the effects of the merger on price or quantity for a short term 
(2-3 years after the merger).  
Structural models, such as simulation, are designed ―to capture the key 
economic elements of the real world, abstracting from those elements that are not 
crucial‖, the choice of the key elements being dependent on the model specification76. 
The advantage of merger simulation is that it incorporates efficiencies as the model 
usually takes into account the extent to which the claimed efficiencies are likely to 
reduce incremental costs post-merger. The model is partly based on data and partly on 
assumptions. Simulation is particularly useful for mergers of firms producing 
differentiated goods. For example, one of the first steps consists in estimating market 
shares and own or cross-price elasticities of demand pre-merger from retail 
supermarket scanner data or manufacturer level data
77
. These estimated elasticities are 
then combined with observed data on price, quantities or market shares to calibrate 
the ―demand system‖. There are various demand systems: the linear and log-linear, 
the Antitrust Logit Model (ALM), the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), the 
Nearly Ideal Demand System (NIDS), nested logit models, from which the 
competition authority will choose one, on the basis of the parameters to be determined 
and the nature of the demand. The second step includes the calibration process, which 
involves some degree of subjective judgment as it essentially involves the 
determination of the parameter values of the model indirectly from ―casual 
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empiricism or unrelated econometric studies‖, chosen with the view ―to guarantee that 
the model precisely mimics some particular feature of the historical data‖, that is the 
prices and market shares prevailing on the market or expected to prevail in the near 
future
78
. The next step of the simulation model estimates the price changes post-
merger (that is the new equilibrium in the post-merger situation in the light of the 
empirical data) that would be consistent with the merged firm‘s maximizing profits 
for all the brands it owns, while incorporating merger-related costs changes and the 
likely reaction of competitors to the changed competitive environment. The post-
merger prices and quantities estimated with the simulation are then compared with the 
pre-merger data in order to provide an estimate of the non-coordinated effects.  
Yet, simulation has also been criticized for abstracting too much from the 
actual details of the industry under consideration. The Logit Model, often used in 
merger control, is based on strong assumptions concerning the form of the demand or 
the fact that firms are price setters, and its utility in complex data settings, when 
market shares pre-merger are asymmetric and there are post-merger synergies, has 
been questioned
79
. Furthermore, simulation cannot generally take into account 
dynamic aspects of competition, such as the repositioning of products by competitors, 
new market entry or non-price competition. There is also little empirical evidence of 
the accuracy of merger simulation in predicting the effects of actual mergers. The 
little relative use of merger simulation is not only due to the methodological 
weaknesses of the method but also to institutional factors, as the European courts have 
generally been more reticent to accept predictive evidence as opposed to evidence of 
past events or current events, and this affects the success of predictive quantitative 
methods, such as merger simulation
80
. The use of quantitative methods in unilateral 
effects cases may also be explained by the more solid grounding of the theory in the 
economic profession (in comparison to co-ordinated effects)
81
, and the intrinsic 
relation between econometric methods and non-coordinated effects theory. 
 Without mentioning simulation explicitly, the Commission‘s Guidelines on 
horizontal mergers seem to acknowledge the need for econometric techniques in the 
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assessment of the possible non-coordinated effects of a merger
82
. Since the entering 
into force of Regulation 139/2004, the Commission has employed simulation analysis 
in a number of cases
83
.  
However, simulation has also been used in the context of the application of the 
previous EC merger regulation 4064/89: Oracle/PeopleSoft was the first case in 
which the Commission‘s use of econometric methods was particularly decisive for the 
outcome of the case. As there was some doubt as to the creation of a dominant 
position for the merged entity, its competitor SAP continuing to lead some of the 
relevant markets, the Commission did not examine the structural evidence, but 
proceeded immediately with a simulation model. The following excerpt of the 
Commission‘s decision is of particular interest for the evidential value of the 
simulation method in general: 
―As a general matter Oracle submits that the use of simulation models is 
controversial due to the unavoidable need to make simplifying assumptions. In 
this respect simulation models can at best be seen as a crude indicator rather 
than solid evidence. The Commission agrees that the use of simulation models 
depends critically on the ability of the model to adequately capture the 
fundamental mechanisms that drive the behaviour of the different market 
participants and that, in principle, the assessment as to whether that is the case 
in any particular case may be a subject of debate. For models to be 
mathematically tractable it is necessary to make simplifying assumptions and 
in this process it is important to ensure that the essential mechanisms that are 
left in the model adequately reflect the reality. 
But the debate over which simplifications to accept in the model should not 
obscure the fact that any prospective analysis of the effect of a merger will 
inherently be based on assumptions. A prediction of the effect of a merger 
made within the framework of a model is based on a high degree of 
transparency regarding the logical consistency of the prediction as well as its 
underlying assumptions. A prospective analysis made outside the framework 
of an economic model based on qualitative assessment is equally, though in a 
less transparent and implicit way, based on a number of assumptions and may 
therefore equally be subject to the same kinds of criticisms 
The Commission therefore maintains as a general point that this kind of 
simulation model can be a useful tool in assisting the Commission in making 
the economic assessment of the likely impact of a merger. 
In this particular case, it is clear that the simulation model was based on the 
assumption of only three bidders being present in the market. In the light of 
the findings with regards to the market definition, this assumption cannot be 
upheld. The Commission has found that it would not be appropriate to rely on 
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the results of the model in order to demonstrate the harmful effects of the 
merger on a more broadly defined market‖.84. 
  The Commission has been more reticent to employ simulation techniques in 
more recent mergers, although simulation has been used.  
In Unilever/Sara Lee, which concerned the sale of branded deodorants in a 
range of EU countries, the Commission estimated one and two-level nested logit 
models for deodorants, with nests for male and non-male deodorants, and sub-nests 
depending on whether the deodorant was presented as skin friendly. The Commission 
then combined the estimated elasticities of demand with standard supply-side 
assumptions (i.e. static Bertrand competition) to simulate the price effects of the 
merger. The methodology employed gave to the Commission the possibility to look to 
compensating efficiency gains that would offset anticompetitive effects, in particular 
a substantial decrease in the post-merger marginal costs. The nested logit model used 
relied overall on simplifying assumptions, a crucial feature of which is that within 
each nest, switching between individual brands is proportional to brand market share. 
Hence, the Commission employed in this case a two-level nest structure, which 
subdivided the male and non-male deodorants according to some further product 
characteristic, that is whether or not the male or non-male deodorants are branded as 
being ―skin-friendly‖, thus reducing reliance on market shares, as the assumption that 
consumers switch between products in proportion to market shares is limited to a 
narrower product set (e.g. non-male skin friendly deodorants). Yet, even with this 
modification, the nested logit model failed to take into account important aspects of 
differentiation across brands (such as the format of the deodorant roll-on versus 
aerosol, fragrance etc). The model could not thus identify the competitive interaction 
between brands within each category, as the simulation relied on estimates of 
substitution across all brands. It did not also include elements of dynamic 
competition, such as entry, product repositioning or retailer buyer power. The 
Commission recognized these limitations of the simulation method, yet it considered 
that the ―estimated effects are consistent with the rest of the available evidence and of 
a sufficient magnitude to be assigned a certain weight in the analysis‖85. It is noted in 
the decision that given the time frame of the investigation, it would have been 
prohibitively complex to introduce these additional factors into the model and the 
assessment was carried out by using the other qualitative and quantitative evidence on 
file
86
. 
The decision is also noteworthy for the importance awarded by the 
Commission to statistical reliability and robustness checks, which were particularly 
necessary in this case in view of the inherent limitations of the econometric evidence 
presented. According to the Commission, 
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―(a)s a general comment, it has to be noted that econometric modelling can 
always be subjected to rigorous and formal scrutiny and in this sense it is a 
special tool for competition policy analysis. In fact, econometrics is not only a 
methodology to formulate and estimate models built on assumptions, but also 
a methodology to apply formal statistical tests to assess the performance, 
robustness and reliability of these models. This double sidedness of 
econometrics is an inherent feature of the discipline. The immediate 
opportunity to test the results distinguishes econometrics from most other tools 
used in competition policy analysis. 
As a consequence of this more formal and more rigorous testing, it is more 
likely that the limitations of econometric evidence are revealed. In fact, all 
econometric models (and, for that matter, all economic models) are 
approximations, which use a number of assumptions. Moreover, the models 
deliberately focus only on a limited range of the observed economic 
phenomena, leaving many of the features of the modelled 
markets/industries/economies unexplained. Hence, it is always possible to find 
weaknesses and even flaws in an econometric analysis. 
The inherently imperfect nature of econometric models, however, should not 
lead to the automatic rejection of this type of evidence in competition policy 
analysis. The results of robustness checks and formal tests should rather 
determine how much weight, relative to other tools in the analysis, is to be 
given to the econometric evidence in the assessment of the case at hand‖87. 
 The Commission performed a robustness test of the simulated prices increases 
looking to alternative nesting and data choices, proceeding to a calibration adjustment 
of demand using observed costs data, a practice that it has also followed in some 
recent cases in which the post-merger price effects were simulated
88
. The decision 
also includes an extensive discussion of the criticisms to the Commission‘s simulation 
by the economic consultancy advising Unilever: the robustness of the nested logit 
model used by the Commission was challenged with the argument that no weight 
should be assigned, for the purposes of the competitive assessment, to any inferences 
relying on the estimates by the Commission of demand elasticities
89
. However, the 
Commission found that the results of the simulation were sufficiently robust to be 
informative about the likely unilateral effects of the transaction, thus positively 
evaluating the evidential contribution of the simulation method in this case. 
 In other instances, the Commission has employed the tool of critical loss 
analysis for assessing the unilateral effects of mergers
90
. In Lufthansa/SN Airholding, 
the Commission examined a merger between Lufthansa and SN Brussels Airlines. 
The parties had submitted quantitative evidence based on critical loss analysis, both 
for market definition purposes and for the competition assessment of the merger. The 
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Commission noted that ―because of its simplicity, critical loss analysis relies on 
numerous assumptions and its use has been subject to significant debate (notably for 
industries with high fixed costs like the airline industry)‖. Indeed, according to the 
Commission, ―calculation of the critical loss is highly dependent on the margin and 
therefore, dependent on how the price and the variable cost are calculated‖. In 
addition, the assumption in critical loss analysis that a single price is charged to all 
customers does not fit well with the characteristics of the airline industry where price 
discrimination is prominent, and the calculation of avoidable costs is notoriously 
complex
91
. Hence, the Commission concluded that ―in view of these methodological 
problems‖, the use of critical loss analysis was not appropriate. Questions were also 
raised on the implementation of the critical loss analysis in this case, in view of the 
fact that the questions in the survey were not appropriate to evaluate the actual loss to 
be compared to the critical loss. The Commission‘s reticence to accept critical loss 
analysis might also reflect the criticisms expressed to this methodology in the 
economics community
92
. 
 Econometrics has also been employed for assessing the possibility of 
foreclosure in vertical mergers
93
. In Itema Holding/Barcovision, a vertical merger 
between Itema and Barcovision, the Commission performed an econometric 
estimation of the downstream demand on the basis of the transaction-level data 
provided by the parties but found that the econometric results were inconclusive
94
. 
Although the data gathered during the investigation provided detailed and accurate 
information on the sales of the different companies, the Commission was unable to 
obtain precise and robust elasticity estimates due in particular to the lack of 
appropriate instruments. As it was impossible to estimate econometrically own-price 
and cross-price elasticities, the Commission used an approximation of own-price 
elasticities based on the Lerner index and a wide range of alternative switching 
parameters were considered in order to derive cross-price elasticities on the basis of 
the own-price elasticity parameters. For the purpose of the incentives calculation, it 
has been assumed that in reaction to a price increase from one manufacturer, all 
customers switch to another manufacturer, i.e. they do not reconsider their decision of 
purchasing the product. This was consistent with statements from the customers‘ 
survey. Based on this econometric analysis, the Commission found that foreclosure 
would not be profitable for Itema and the impact on downstream customers would be 
very limited. The Commission noted that the conclusion that foreclosure would not be 
profitable for the merged entity was robust to a wide range of alternative parameters, 
in particular regarding alternative switching parameters. The Commission has also 
taken into account in its calculations the elimination of double mark-ups for the 
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merged entity seeking to optimise profits (as an efficiency gain), although the parties 
did not claim such elimination (or any other efficiency). 
 In some cases, the Commission proceeded to a direct evaluation of the 
competitive constraints that the parties exert to each other using regression analysis
95
. 
This is generally possible when one compares market configurations where the 
undertakings compete against each other with configurations where they do not. 
Unlike structural simulation models, this methodology does not rely on assumptions 
regarding the nature of competition in the industry
96
. In StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips, 
regarding the acquisition by StatoilHydro of Jet petrol stations in Scandinavia owned 
by the US company ConocoPhillips, the Commission gathered evidence from its 
market investigation (the views of the competitors of the new entity) and from the 
internal documents of the parties, as well as econometric studies (regressions) in order 
to examine the competitive constraint each party exercised on each other. It also 
conducted a customer survey in selected jurisdictions
97
. The acquired company, Jet, 
was indeed perceived to be an independent competitor in the Swedish retail fuel 
market, having a strong brand image and being viewed by StatoilHydro as its most 
efficient competitor (as it followed from StatoilHydro‘s internal documents and 
information gathered during the market investigation). The Commission also relied on 
econometric analysis of the fuel prices charged by individual fuel stations managers in 
order to compete effectively with their competitors in their catchment area in order to 
examine the extent of the competitive constraint that Jet placed on StatoilHydro‘s fuel 
stations. A competitive constraint would be assumed to exist if StatoilHydro‘s prices 
would be systematically lower whenever Jet fuel stations were in the vicinity. This 
required from the Commission the collection of data on pump prices at StatoilHydro‘s 
fuel stations and on the location of Jet‘s fuel stations relative to those of 
StatoilHydro‘s. Of course, other factors that could influence pump prices were also 
considered, such as labour costs, the location of the stations in densely populated 
areas or isolated urban areas. The Commission proceeded in this case to extensive 
data gathering, collecting information on the daily prices of diesel and petrol at 
StatoilHydro‘s stations for a period of three years and identifying each competitor 
situated in the vicinity of StatoilHydro‘s fuel stations. It then used pooled cross-
sectional multiple regression to model the relations between StatoilHydro‘s fuel prices 
(the dependent variable), in view of the presence of Jet fuel stations in the vicinity and 
other factors affecting pump prices - e.g. StateHydro had submitted data on each fuel 
station‘s characteristics, such as if it was manned or unmanned (independent 
variables). The regression models were estimated for both Norway and Sweden for 
diesel and 95 octane petrol separately and three different regression specifications 
were estimated for each country and each product in order to ensure the robustness of 
the results. The Commission concluded that both StatoilHydro‘s diesel and petrol 
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prices in both jurisdictions were lower by up to 5% whenever a Jet fuel station was at 
the vicinity, thus indicating that Jet exercised an important competitive constraint on 
StatoilHydro‘s pricing. The Commission confirmed these finding with further 
customer surveys of a representative sample of the whole population, which indicated 
that consumers were price-sensitive and in their large majority believed that the 
proposed merger and the disappearance of the Jet brand was likely to reduce 
competition in the retail fuels market. These findings completed the Commission‘s 
usual market investigation, which usually relies on the data provided by the parties in 
their CO notification form and views from other market participants (most frequently 
competitors and some few large customers). It is noted that in this case, there were no 
large customers, as most consumers in the retail market were individuals, hence the 
need to use a consumer survey. 
Parties also often submit econometric evidence with the aim to challenge the 
findings of the Commission‘s market investigation98. In Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the 
acquisition by the low cost air carrier Ryanair of Aer Lingus, Ryanair had submitted 
econometric evidence (price regression analysis) intending to show that Ryanair‘s 
prices on ―monopoly routes‖ were not higher or even lower than on routes where it 
faces competition, thus proving that a price increase as a result from the merger 
should be excluded by the fact that such price increases would contradict Ryanair‘s 
strategy to optimise the number of passengers on its flights (―load factor")99. The 
Commission found, however, that Ryanair and Aer Lingus exercised a competitive 
constraint on each other and that they reacted directly on each other‘s pricing 
behaviour. This finding was based on some internal documents of the parties to the 
transaction indicating that Aer Lingus and Ryanair took into account the prices of the 
other when setting prices on a respective route, the parties‘ promotions and 
advertising campaigns but also the Commission‘s own analysis of the econometric 
evidence submitted by the parties. In particular Annex IV of the Commission‘s 
decision includes developments on the motivations for the use of econometric 
analysis in this case, the strengths and limitations of particular methodologies. 
Furthermore, in this Annex the Commission reviewed the econometric evidence 
submitted by the Merging Parties, presented the results from its own price regression 
analysis and discussed a number of technical issues in more detail in reaction to the 
comments received by Ryanair and Aer Lingus in their response to the Statement of 
Objections. In particular, the Commission verified if Ryanair‘s regression analysis 
results were robust to small changes in the specification used, following what it 
discarded the cross-section analysis submitted by Ryanair as meaningless and biased 
because it did not control for important factors. The Commission gave the technique 
serious consideration and re-run the regression correcting some methodological 
errors. It concluded nevertheless that neither Ryanair‘s nor its own cross-section 
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analysis was robust to the necessary standard. Indeed, no definite conclusions could 
be derived from cross-section regressions in this case given the impossibility to 
control for unobserved factors that affected prices and differed across routes, the 
small number of observations, the sensitivity of the results to the month considered or 
the fact that the inclusion of statistically insignificant explanatory variables sometimes 
affected the coefficients of other variables
100
. The Commission proposed instead to 
use a fixed-effects regression analysis, which can mitigate the omitted variable bias 
that affects cross-section regressions, because of unobservable cost or demand factors 
whose variation across routes would be likely to affect fares. The results of this fixed-
effects regression analysis did not clearly establish an impact of Aer Lingus‘s pricing 
on Ryanair prices. Yet, despite these inconclusive results, the Commission inferred 
the existence of such an impact, based on economic theory, qualitative evidence 
(internal documents, conduct of the firms on the market) and indications that Ryanair 
might also be constrained on parameters of competition other than price. The 
econometric evidence was complemented with a wealth of additional evidence, such 
as a passenger survey.  
There are no instances where econometric evidence was used to prove the 
likelihood of tacit collusion in coordinated effects cases. The Commission usually 
relies on the economic theory of tacit collusion and market characteristics to infer the 
likelihood of collusion and establish a coherent ―narrative‖ on how coordination 
would operate
101
. Coordinated effects are based on a more dynamic model of ―an 
equilibrium outcome of repeated interactions, where each interaction is just a play of 
the static Cournot or Bertrand game‖102. The fact that firms interact repeatedly may 
enable them to realize more profitable and less competitive outcomes relative to what 
would have been the case in a single play game and also ―affects firms‘ incentives and 
ability to implement and sustain a collusive outcome‖103. The Commission merely 
employs descriptive statistics on market data and economic theory (from a game-
theoretic framework) to assess the likelihood of collusion. Theoretically, simulation 
techniques could be used; however, as it is recognized by a recent report of the 
OECD,  
                                                          
100
 Ibid., para. 468. 
101
 OECD, p. 246. On the importance of ―narratives‖ in competition law evidence, see I. Lianos, 
―Judging Economists‖: Economic expertise in competition litigation: a European view, in Ioannis 
Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris (ed.), Towards an Optimal Competition law System , Kluwer International, 
The Hague , 2009, pp. 185-320. 
102
 Janusz A. Ordover, ―Coordinated Effects‖, in Chapter 57, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Issues in 
Competition Law and Policy, Vol. II (ABA, 2008), at 1359, 1362. 
103
 Ibid. As it is noted by Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, ―Simulating the (Unilateral) Effects 
of Mergers: Implications of the Oracke/PeopleSoft case‖, (August 15, 2006). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924375 at 3 (also published as Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, ―The 
Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary 
Merger Control‖, (2007) 34(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 133), ―the decisive difference, 
therefore, lies in the nature of strategic relationship between the merging firms and the remaining 
competitors. It is crucial that unilateral effects do not require the other firms in the market to also raise 
their prices (as with coordinated effects)‖. 
 41 
―merger simulations models for coordinated effects cases remain a significant 
distance away from being usable in actual mergers. Given the lack of clarity in 
some of the underlying economics of coordinated effects, this should not come 
as a surprise‖104. 
In contrast to non-coordinated cases, where there is a unique equilibrium pre-
and post-merger, which is possible to identify and compare with the use of 
econometric techniques, in coordinated effects merger cases, the analysis focuses on 
the conditions for the existence of coordinated equilibria post-merger
105
. Yet, there 
are multiple equilibria from which the players can choose and game theory does not 
permit any inferences on which of these will be effectively chosen. The use of 
econometric techniques is thus limited and what counts is substantiated evidence that 
additional coordinated equilibria will exist post-merger. This is difficult to apply in 
practice in view of the need for detailed information on a number of factors, not 
readily available in most cases.  
 
3.1.2. Econometric evidence and abuse of a dominant position 
 
The use of econometric techniques in abuse of dominance cases has 
traditionally focused on the step of the definition of a relevant market
106
. As in merger 
control, the Commission has employed quantitative techniques, such as the 
hypothetical monopolist test relying on historic sales records or supermarket scanner 
data, and critical loss analysis to define the relevant product market. It is reminded 
that the operation of market definition is an essential step in the analysis of the 
existence of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. As it is explained by the 
Commission‘s Guidelines on Market Definition: 
―(m)arket definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of 
competition between firms. It serves to establish the framework within which 
competition policy is applied by the Commission. The main purpose of market 
definition is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the 
undertakings involved face‖107. 
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The competitive constraints an undertaking faces is a useful information on 
the existence (or not) of a dominant position
108
. The assumption is that the ability to 
price above long-run marginal costs or to maintain the price above the competitive 
levels produces consumer harm and reduces social welfare
109
. Dominance for the 
purposes of EU competition law has been defined by the CJEU in the United Brands 
and Hoffman-La Roche cases as:  
―a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it 
to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers‖.110 
 ―such a position does not preclude some competition … but enables 
the undertaking … if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable 
influence on the conditions under which that competition will develop, 
and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct 
does not operate to its detriment‖.111 
The definition of dominance appears thus to contain two conditions: (i) the 
ability to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market; and 
(ii) the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and consumers. This differs from the economists‘ idea of a firm whose 
conduct is not closely constrained by competing products, as it requires evidence of 
―substantial market power‖, as opposed to market power, for the European 
Commission to intervene
112
. The definition also emphasizes more the behavioural 
aspects of dominance as it focuses on the extent of a firm‘s competitive constraints or 
ability to act in ways that a competitively constrained firm could not. Yet, in practice, 
the EU competition case law has largely relied on structural aspects, such as the 
existence of a high market share, probably as a way to simplify an otherwise overly 
complex operation, during the first decades of EU competition law
113
.   
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The primary indicator of dominance is usually the market share of the 
undertaking on the relevant market (i.e. the percentage that the sales of the 
undertaking represent in relation to the whole market turnover). The Court of Justice 
held in Hoffmann-La Roche that 
―the existence of a dominant position may derive from several factors which 
taken separately are not necessarily determinative but among these factors a 
highly important one is the existence of very large market shares‖114. 
Market shares provide a starting point for the assessment of the existence of a 
dominant position, but also very high market shares provide in themselves virtually 
conclusive evidence that a firm is dominant. 
The CJEU stated in Hoffmann-La Roche that 
―although the importance of the market shares may vary from one market to 
another the view may legitimately be taken that very large market shares are in 
themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence 
of a dominant position‖115. 
In AKZO Chemie BV, the CJEU went even further by establishing a refutable 
presumption of market power, in case the undertaking in question had a market share 
of more than 50% of the relevant market
116
. For market shares lower than 50%, the 
analysis is merely qualitative, as besides structural factors, such as market shares or 
other concentration measures, the Commission and the Courts examine the existence 
of barriers to entry and expansion, vertical integration or the existence of buying 
power. 
 This structural approach in market definition is, however, at odds with the 
principal aim of defining a dominant position in competition law. As it is rightly 
explained by Baker and Breshahan, 
―[…] the ultimate economic question in antitrust litigation is almost never 
whether a firm or a set of firms have market power. The case almost 
invariably concerns an economic objection to the challenged conduct – an 
agreement among rivals, a merger, exclusionary tactics, and the like – that 
turns on whether the conduct has increased (in a  retrospective case) or is 
likely to increase (in a  prospective case) market power. Accordingly the 
economic question is not the level of market power but the change. Antitrust 
law at times relies upon presumptions that if the level of market power is high, 
various types of conduct will increase it, and if the level of market power is 
low, they will not. That is, in legal terms, anticompetitive effect is at times 
inferred from proof of market power. Whether or not such inferences are 
justified empirically, they shift attention from the ultimate economic question 
of whether market power has increased. […] [I]t is important not to lose sight 
of the ultimate question. Accordingly, when it is possible, economic methods 
should be used to assess changes in market power, examining a historical 
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counterfactual without the challenged practices in a retrospective case or 
providing an analysis of the change in incentives in a prospective one‖117. 
 The inquiry over the existence (or not) of a dominant position is thus linked to 
the question of the abusive conduct (and that of the likely effects of the adopted 
practice on the market). A structural approach does not address the last two issues, as 
it focuses only on market structure, building from the finding of a concentrated 
market a heroic inference tree of anticompetitive effects. Econometric evidence may 
enable the Commission and the Courts to focus on the essential question, and avoid 
the usual type 1 and 2 errors that might result from the more impressionistic approach 
of the structural method. This will also avoid the criticism often expressed to the 
structural method of establishing dominance, first defining a relevant market, then 
assessing market shares and barriers to entry, that outcomes might be manipulated 
through the chosen market definition, narrower or broader than what it should be.  
 Some national competition authorities have indicated that alternatively they 
can rely on direct evidence of substantial market power, by measuring the ability of 
the undertaking to price above competition levels or examining the undertaking‘s 
profitability or by determining whether an undertaking‘s performance is indicative of 
market power
118
. The Commission has also occasionally looked to evidence of high 
profits as an indication of dominance: e.g. in Microsoft the Commission concluded its 
discussion of barriers to entry by pointing to Microsoft‘s high profitability (an 81% 
profit margin for Windows) as ―consistent with its near-monopoly position in the 
client PC operating system market‖.119 The Commission has nevertheless expressed 
some caution on a possible overreliance on econometric evidence for establishing 
dominance:  
―(q)uantitative analysis should never determine on its own the existence of 
dominance but it can be very useful to lend additional credibility to a 
qualitative assessment. Also it can work as a useful check since a qualitative 
assessment that does not match the date should be reconsidered‖120. 
We have not found any case during the examined period, where the Commission 
relied on econometric evidence to assess the existence of a dominant position, with 
the exception of course of the evidence used for the step of market definition. 
Although some of these methods have been criticized
121
, it is expected that the 
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building of econometric capacity at the European Commission and national 
competition authorities‘ level will increase the use of direct evidence of dominant 
position in the future, although this will be mainly used as subsidiary evidence. 
 Yet, the most remarkable recent development in the enforcement of Article 
102 TFEU is the use of econometric evidence in establishing the existence of an 
abuse. This is particularly the case for pricing abuses, where the Commission has in 
some cases proceeded to examine whether the dominant undertaking‘s pricing was 
excessive in the context of a margin squeeze case
122
, or in order to apply the new test 
(―as efficient competitor‖ analysis) introduced by the Commission‘s priority guidance 
on the legality of rebates
123
.  
In Intel, the Commission found that Intel had abused its dominant position by 
providing rebates to computer manufacturers (original equipment manufacturers) on 
condition that they bought all or almost all of their x86  central processing units 
(CPU) from Intel and by providing direct payments to a major retailer (Media Saturn 
Holding) in order to stock only computers with Intel‘s CPUs. Intel had also made 
direct payments to OEMs to halt or delay the launch of products containing a 
competitor‘s x86 CPUs. The Commission performed an economic analysis with the 
aim to establish if a competitor that is ―as efficient as‖ Intel could compete with Intel 
in this market. The ―as efficient as‖ competitor test is an hypothetical exercise which 
analyses if a competitor who is as efficient as Intel but who has lower sales base than 
Intel would be able to compensate the OEMs for the loss of Intel‘s rebates (as they 
will not be purchasing Intel products) without having to offer the CPUs at a price 
below a measure of viable costs or being required to meet a higher share of its 
customer‘s needs for CPUs than is realistic to expect. Indeed, as a dominant 
undertaking, Intel has the advantage to spread the costs of the rebate across a 
significantly higher amount of purchases than its competitor AMD, hence it might be 
uneconomical for AMD, also if it is an ―as efficient as competitor‖, to compensate 
customers for the loss of the Intel rebate, even if it‘s costs are lower than those of 
Intel. In conclusion, the ―as efficient as‖ test examines the ―merit‖ of the foreclosed 
rival: competition law should apply only when there is a likelihood that ―as efficient 
as‖ competitors will be excluded.  
The analysis takes into account the following factors: what is the contestable 
share – the amount of sales that can realistically be switched to a new competitor in 
any given period and what is the relevant measure of costs to be maintained viably in 
the market (average avoidable costs – AAC). The assumption is that in order to be 
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viable in the long run, a company must cover at least the total cost of producing its 
output. In the presence of high fixed costs, as in the computer processors industry, this 
implies that prices on average must be significantly above marginal costs for a 
company to cover its total costs and, thus, to remain viable. Average Avoidable Costs 
(AAC) operates as a benchmark to assess the exclusionary effect of Intel's rebate 
schemes: if an as efficient competitor is forced to price below AAC, this clearly 
means that competition is foreclosed because the as efficient as competitor incurs 
losses by making (incremental) sales to customers benefiting from the dominant firm's 
rebates
124
. Hence, it becomes important to examine if each category of costs is 
avoidable and could thus be included in the AAC benchmark or unavoidable, thus 
leading to their exclusion from it. The dominant undertaking has the incentive to 
characterize as much of its costs as unavoidable. The plaintiff has the opposite 
incentives.  
 In this case, Intel presented an expert report, which used some quantitative 
analysis (regression) in order to determine whether a given cost component could be 
considered avoidable or unavoidable, by examining the extent to which changes in 
output affect changes in cost. The expert based his analysis on a combination of 
qualitative evidence, quantitative evidence and economic judgment, with more 
emphasis on qualitative analysis, and consideration of quantitative evidence, at a 
second stage, as supporting or contradicting the qualitative evidence. The 
Commission discussed extensively and critically this quantitative evidence and its 
assumptions: 
―Regression analysis is intended to show conditional correlation between 
variables. It is the relevance of the statistical assumptions that allows an 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients in terms of their correspondence to 
economic parameters. In particular, wrong assumptions will lead to spurious 
results. Well known issues for empirical work are, for instance, the risk that 
certain relevant variables are omitted, the risk that the apparent conditional 
link or lack thereof is hidden by a higher level process simultaneously 
conditioning the two variables, and the risk of wrongly specifying the 
temporal dependence between the variables‖125. 
The Commission highlighted the risk of omitted variables (a variable which is 
correlated with the variables assessed for a conditional link but not present in the 
regression calculation) and the issue of simultaneity or interdependence of variables 
(the fact that two variables whose correlation is assessed are jointly determined in a 
common process due to the choices of the firm), which were particularly prominent in 
this case: indeed, the expert‘s report performed successive regressions with only one 
independent variable at the time (hence his calculations were prone to the issue of 
omitted variables)
126
 and it inferred correlations between variables that were jointly 
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determined in a common process, hence underestimating the overall correlation
127
. 
Furthermore, the expert report based its analysis on time series, which was found by 
the Commission as being inappropriately applied in this case (as it did not take into 
account rigidities in the variation of some variables) and which, in general, requires 
―special care‖128.  
The Commission concluded that the regression analysis method employed in 
this case had ―many methodological shortfalls which cast serious doubt on its 
capability to serve as a reliable tool to distinguish avoidable and unavoidable costs‖ 
and its application was ―biased towards finding costs to be unavoidable‖ as ―the lack 
of a statistically significant positive correlation can be used to overturn other evidence 
suggesting that a cost is avoidable‖, while ―a statistically significant positive 
correlation will not be used to overturn other evidence suggesting that the cost is 
unavoidable (if the coefficient is small)‖129. The Commission even expressed doubts 
as to the inferences to be drawn in general by regressions: on the one hand, the lack of 
a statistically significant correlation does not necessarily mean that a relationship 
(between the variables) does not exist, as this result might be due also to ―the lack of a 
sufficiently rich dataset necessary to allow the relationship to be conclusively 
identified‖; on the other hand, a statistically significant coefficient does not prove that 
in reality no relationship exists, although the probability of the lack of a relationship, 
when the result is very significant statistically, is very small
130
. The regression 
analysis presented by Intel led also to unexpected results, indicating that there were 
important biases in the estimation and misspecifications in the statistical model used; 
hence, according to the Commission, ―common scientific sense‖ should have led Intel 
to question the validity of its model, ―rather than unquestionably decide that the cost 
category is unavoidable, which is to its benefit‖131. Yet, even if the Commission 
doubted the reliability of the study as evidence, it carefully examined the analysis and 
discussed the problems it spotted. The Commission also adapted a mathematical 
formula, proposed by a party‘s expert report, in order to calculate the ―required share‖ 
that an entrant with a unit cost of AVC (average variable costs) should obtain in order 
to be able to compete against Intel‘s conditional rebates132. On the basis of this 
formula, the Commission was able to derive the minimum required share that an 
OEM (original equipment manufacturer) should switch to an equally efficient 
competitor to Intel that offered the x86 CPUs processors at AAC (average avoidable 
costs) in order to overcome the loss incurred by the rebate awarded to match Intel‘s 
offer.   
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3.1.3. Econometric evidence and cartels 
Economic evidence is considered as a form of circumstantial/indirect evidence (to be 
distinguished from direct evidence, such as contemporary documents, minutes or 
notes of meetings, corporate statements etc), traditionally used in antitrust 
investigations against cartels in order to examine if collusion has been reached and 
that price fixing is feasible
133
. According to the Commission, ―the notion of indirect 
or circumstantial evidence […] comprises of evidence which is appropriate to 
corroborate the proof of the existence of a cartel by way of deduction, common sense, 
economic analysis or logical inference‖ from demonstrated facts134. The category of 
economic evidence usually refers to economic theory and models of collusive 
behavior as well as evidence relating to market structure conducive to collusion, such 
as high concentration, high barriers to entry, the nature of the product (homogeneous 
and standardized etc), and economic theory on the role of facilitating practices. 
Although the use of indirect evidence by the European Commission (and economic 
evidence in particular) is common practice in cartel investigations, it almost always 
completes some direct evidence of the cartel infringement. It is well known, that 
parallelism of behaviour in price increases is only an indication and does not 
constitute as such evidence of collusion
135
.  
In Woodpulp II, the CJEU has also adopted a very strict standard of proof for 
assessing economic evidence of cartels: as the Commission‘s efforts to rely on 
economic evidence in addition to evidence of a parallel pricing conduct were subject 
to the high standard that concertation should be the ―only plausible explanation‖ for 
such conduct
136. The Court noted that ―the Commission [had] no documents which 
directly establish[ed] the existence of concertation between the producers concerned‖, 
thus over-emphasizing direct evidence of concertation. It is reminded that in this case, 
the Court had commissioned an expert report, which came to the conclusion that the 
uniformity of prices could be explained by the natural operation of the wood pulp 
market and that such uniformity of prices was in some respects inconsistent with the 
operation of a cartel, although it also observed that this did not per se prove the 
absence of concertation for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU
137
. As a result of this 
restrictive case law of the CJEU, the Commission cannot rely on economic evidence 
only (including econometric evidence) in order to prove a cartel, but combines 
different pieces of evidence (direct and indirect), examined ―not in isolation but in 
their entirety‖ and never ―divorced from their context‖138. 
The Commission has made use of quantitative evidence in some cartel (or in 
general Article 101 TFEU) cases during the examined period
139
.  
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In the PO/Copper plumbing tubes
140
 decision, regarding a price fixing cartel in the 
European market for water, heating and gas tubes, two undertakings members of the 
cartel submitted econometric studies (price determinant regressions) so as to prove 
statistically, as well as economically, that the price effects of the infringement were 
insignificant, in order to show that the cartel had no or only a limited impact on the 
market, due to various factors, such as overcapacity, buyer power, difficult economic 
conditions and loose implementation of the agreements. It is well known that cartels 
are restricting competition by their object: their anticompetitive effects are thus 
presumed and it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove coordination between 
competitors on prices or output without any need to examine the actual or potential 
effects of the cartel for Article 101(1) TFEU to apply
141
. Yet, it is sometimes useful to 
examine the actual effects of the cartel in order to calculate the antitrust fines. These 
are determined according to the gravity and duration of the infringement. In assessing 
the gravity of the infringement, the Commission used to take account of its nature, the 
size of the geographic market but also its actual impact on the market, where this 
could be measured
142
. The first expert econometric study submitted by one of the 
undertakings examined discussed whether and to what extent the prices it charged 
increased as a result of the discussions and contacts among copper tube producers in 
the 1990s
143
. A second econometric study was presented by another of the 
undertakings in question, which compared on the one hand the price level in periods 
without discussions to those with discussion (comparison over time) and included 
several variables to control for shifts in demand and cost factors as well as a time 
trend
144
. The Commission received the raw data and estimation procedures employed 
by the parties and, to the Commission‘s words, ―after a careful investigation‖ of the 
econometric evidence, it came to the conclusion that the reports did not disprove the 
serious price effects derived from the Commission‘s own calculations but mostly by 
pieces of direct evidence (such as contemporaneous statements, notes and internal 
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memos), as well as some additional circumstantial evidence (market data on prices 
and profits)
145
.  
The Commission went even further and examined thoroughly the internal validity 
of the reports submitted. With regard to the first study, the Commission found that it 
did not feature enough control variables, it did not include robustness tests and that it 
did not check for collinearity problems (which could be related to the fact that the 
study found the price increases to be statistically insignificant)
146
. Furthermore, the 
expert‘s report had some important unexplained counterintuitive results (the copper-
tube price was found to be negatively related to copper price). The Commission re-run 
the model with slight changes in its functional form and obtained very different 
results. It found that the study tried to ―hide‖ significant price increases in certain 
countries, during specific periods of time, by presenting average price increases 
across many countries and for a long period. These aspects led the Commission to 
broadly discard the conclusions of this study
147
. 
With regard to the second study, the Commission noted some very restrictive and 
arbitrary assumptions, which could lead to an underestimation of price increases
148
. 
The time period covered by the study was very short and its price predictions 
significantly diverted over time from the actual prices. The study found only an 
explanatory variable with a robust sign (the raw material price), thus failing to capture 
the effects of any other factors on the price of the product. It also lacked important 
control variables. The Commission re-run the model of the study with some more 
realistic assumptions regarding the effects of the cartel coordination (time-variable 
intensity of cooperation, instead of constant) and obtained more realistic results. 
Hence the conclusions of this study were also ignored.  
In Bananas, a case involving the discussion and disclosing of pricing intentions 
(information exchange) between competing leading brands of bananas importers in 
eight Member States, the cartelists produced econometric studies purporting to show 
that their conduct did not have any effects on the market
149
. Although the Commission 
noted that the exchange of information in question was anticompetitive by object and 
that it was not required to prove the existence of anticompetitive effects
150
, it accepted 
to examine the ―economic arguments‖ of the parties (a price determinants 
regression)
151
. These econometric studies were considered at the stage of the 
examination of the existence of a cartel infringement under Article 101(1) TFEU, 
rather than at the stage of setting fines like in the PO/Copper plumbing tubes 
Commission decision.  
The Commission proceeded again to a thorough analysis of the internal validity of 
both studies submitted. With regard to the first study the Commission noted 
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methodological problems in the econometric techniques, such as the omission of 
relevant variables, the incomplete description of the model and its assumptions, the 
lack of stationarity tests and the lack of robustness checks
152
. With regard to the 
second study, its conclusions were equally discarded as it did not use proper 
regression techniques to support some arguments and they were serious flaws in the 
analysis submitted. The methodology was not properly described and most of the 
regression variables turned out to be insignificant ―or only significant at a 10% level, 
which cannot be considered as highly relevant
‖153
. 
 A similarly (bad) luck awaited the quantitative study submitted by one of the 
cartelists in the LCD panel producers‘ price fixing cartel154. The cartelists had 
submitted an econometric study using regression analysis in order to examine whether 
prices charged for the product were higher during the alleged cartel period, with the 
aim to support the argument that the prices discussed at the cartel meeting were not 
actually implemented
155
. As in the PO/Copper plumbing tubes, the issue was the 
determination of the amount of the fines. The Commission ―carefully analyzed‖ the 
study before concluding that there were issues of endogeneity bias, omitted variables, 
selection bias (due to the definition of product groups for which regressions were 
run), misspecifications and other methodological flaws, hence rejecting the arguments 
based on the study
156
. 
In contrast to the weak probative value of econometric evidence in the proof of 
cartels, econometrics has an important role to play in the detection and investigation 
of cartels and also in the context of actions for antitrust damages following a cartel 
infringement. Econometric techniques using a structural approach (focusing on 
markets with traits thought to be conducive to collusion) have been used to help 
provide information as to where cartels may be located, as well as logit models or 
OLS predicting the probability or the number of cartels likely to exist in a specific 
industry
157
. Some authors have also emphasized behavioural approaches to detecting 
cartels, which also require the use of econometric techniques
158
.  
Quantitative economic analysis includes as a first step an industry analysis with a 
scoring approach (looking to different variables, such as indicators of price, 
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transparency, concentration and entry) in order to exclude from the sample cases 
where cartel activity is relatively improbable and, as a second step, a critical event 
analysis (with a focus on exogenous shocks or structural breaks) testing the collusive 
against the competitive scenario. The OECD has reported a number of EU member 
States where cartel investigations were triggered based exclusively on economic 
indicators
159
. However, in general, relying only on economic evidence (including 
econometrics) for apportioning the standard of proof for the prohibition of cartels has 
not yet been a winning strategy, most probably in view of the criminal nature in some 
member States of cartel infringements, the reticence of the courts to examine in depth 
econometric evidence (see Section 3.2.) and the different standards of proof for 
establishing collusion or causation of harm and standards of proof in the 
quantification of damages in cartel cases
160
 (see Section 4).  
This might change, as econometric techniques are now frequently used for 
evaluating damages for antitrust infringements (mostly cartels), hence establishing 
some degree of understanding, if not familiarity, of the courts in econometric 
techniques and thus leading to an increased interaction between econometric 
conventions and the legal standard of proof. Although the development of EU 
competition law in damages actions for antitrust infringements is relatively recent and 
still under-developed, there are some indications that quantitative techniques will be 
widely used in evaluating damages, hence promoting also the use of these techniques 
in the proof of cartels. In a nutshell, the empirical techniques available for the 
evaluation of damages include
161
: 
(i) comparator-based approaches: before and after approaches (time-series) or 
approaches comparing prices in the cartelized market with those in ‗similar‘ 
uncartelised markets in other geographic regions (cross-sectional approaches) or 
difference in differences approaches. These approaches involve the estimation of 
the correlation between the pre-cartel prices in the cartelized or similar markets 
and the post-cartel prices in these markets, cross-sectional econometrics, time-
series econometrics and panel data regression;  
(ii) financial cost-based approaches: which construct a ―but for‖ cartel price 
―bottom up‖, by measuring the relevant costs and comparing the average of 
marginal unit costs plus a reasonable mark-up with actual prices. This also 
involves some form of quantitative methods (bottom-up costing, valuation);  
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(iii) market-structure based approaches: these involve the use of simulation 
models in order to estimate the losses incurred, using different models of 
oligopolistic behavior. 
 Yet, these various methods, some of which could also be employed in theory 
for calculating fines and hence in the context of public enforcement
162
, are mostly of 
interest for the private enforcement of EU competition law by national courts.  
 
3.2. Econometric evidence in the courts 
As all substantive competition law provisions of the Treaty have direct effect, national 
courts are actively contributing to the enforcement of EU competition law, and 
complement the judicial review role of the General Court and that of the CJEU in 
public enforcement, as well as the important role played by the CJEU in the 
interpretation of all provisions of EU competition law (through the preliminary ruling 
procedure). This study will focus on the role of the European courts (General Court, 
CJEU), a complementary study on national courts being in preparation by the authors, 
although some examples deriving from the practice of national courts will also be 
examined in this study. 
 Depending on the type of judicial proceedings, control of legality or 
interpretation of a provision of EU competition law, the courts face different 
limitations as to their ability to ―hear‖ and examine econometric evidence. 
There are two routes to contest the legality of the acts of the EU institutions. 
First, Article 263 TFEU provides that the Court may review the legality of the 
decisions or acts of the Commission that are capable of affecting the interests of 
individuals. Challenges are made at first instance to the General Court and appeals on 
points of law can be made from the General Court to the CJEU. The role of the CJEU 
on issues of evidence is limited as provided that the evidence has been properly 
obtained and the general principles and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden 
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of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, ―it is for the [General Court] 
alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it‖163. 
The CJEU maintains, however, a role to play when the evidence adduced before the 
General Court has been distorted. Secondly, national courts can request the CJEU to 
make a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU law, where such ruling is 
necessary to enable that court to give judgment. The interpretation of the EU law may 
indirectly raise the issue of the legality of the act of an EU institution under primary 
EU law and thus lead to an indirect control of the legality of the act.  
The issue of judicial review of the Commission‘s decisions is thoroughly 
examined in a separate chapter of this volume but it is recognized that the intensity of 
the judicial review by the General Court is still limited in presence of a complex 
economic and technical appraisal by the Commission, although there is some recent 
case law indicating that, although accepting the margin of discretion of the 
Commission ―with regard to economic matters‖, the Court is moving towards a more 
intensive review of the Commission‘s decisions even for complex economic and 
technical assessments, at least with regard to Commission‘s decisions on fines164. 
With regard to the general limitations faced by the General Court, despite not 
being empowered to ―remake‖ the impugned decisions, by substituting its own 
assessment of the facts and evidence for that of the Commission (it is a judicial 
review procedure not an appeal procedure), the Court has closely monitored the 
Commission‘s decisions. Although it is acknowledged that its review powers are 
limited to a ―manifest error‖ type of review, it is emphasized that the Court has held 
the Commission to a high standard in respect to the statement and the appraisal of the 
facts, the sufficiency and soundness of the evidence and to the quality of its reasoning. 
The judicial control of the appropriateness of the amounts of fines is more intensive, 
following the interplay of Article 261 TFEU and of Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Pursuant to these provisions, the Court of Justice is endowed with unlimited 
jurisdiction to assess the appropriateness of, and if necessary to vary, downward or 
upward, the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission. The Court is not able to 
impose a different fine but to rule on existing fines set by decisions of the 
Commission. However, in its most recent case law, the Court of Justice prescribed 
rigorous standards of judicial review for the decisions of the Commission by the 
General Court and established its full jurisdiction to review decisions in which the 
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Commission imposes fines. In particular, the Court held that "the Courts cannot use 
the Commission's margin of discretion - either as regards the choice of factors taken 
into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Guidelines (of the 
Commission) or as regards the assessment of those factors - as a basis for dispensing 
with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts".
165
 
With regard to ―complex economic and technical assessments‖, the Commission 
was recognized a discretion, over which the Courts only exercise a limited review for 
a ―manifest error‖ of appreciation166.  
In the Microsoft case, the Court seems to have introduced some distinction 
between the standard of judicial review for economic versus technical assessments. 
For the former, the General Court noted that the ―review of complex economic 
appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to checking whether the 
relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, whether 
the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
assessment or a misuse of powers‖167. For the latter, the Court observed that ―insofar 
as the Commission's decision is the result of complex technical appraisals, those 
appraisals are in principle subject to only limited review by the Court, which means 
that the Community Courts cannot substitute their own assessment of matters of fact 
for the Commission's‖168. The Court continued by observing that with regard to both 
economic or technical matters, the Courts ―must not only establish whether the 
evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also 
determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into 
consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it‖169. These paragraphs may be interpreted 
as indicating that the Court has some leeway in substituting its own assessment of 
matters of fact regarding complex economic assessments, as this is explicitly excluded 
for technical assessments, but not mentioned for economic assessments. Certainly, the 
Court uses the expression ―limited review‖ for complex economic assessments as 
well, but explains that this ―does not prevent the Community judicature from 
examining the Commission‘s assessment of economic data‖170. In its most recent 
cases, the Court of Justice prescribed rigorous standards of judicial review for the 
decisions of the Commission by the General Court, recognizing that ―whilst, in areas 
giving rise to complex economic assessments, the Commission has a margin of 
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discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Courts of the 
European Union must refrain from reviewing the Commission‘s interpretation of 
information of an economic nature‖171.  
A similar distinction between economic and ―technical‖ evidence appears in the 
Court‘s judgment in Ryanair v. European Commission172. The Court recognizes that it 
must take account of the margin of discretion recognized to the Commission, 
―implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on 
concentrations‖, however, it repeats that this does not mean that it should refrain from 
reviewing the Commission‘s interpretation of information of an economic nature: 
―(n)ot only must they establish, in particular, whether the evidence relied on is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all 
the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it‖173. 
It is noteworthy that the Court adds an additional reason for exercising a strict 
scrutiny by noting that ―where the institutions have a power of appraisal, respect for 
the rights guaranteed by the legal order of the European Union in administrative 
procedures is of even more fundamental importance‖, citing, among these guarantees, 
―the duty of the Commission to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant 
aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views 
known and also his right to have an adequately reasoned decision‖174. We examine the 
intensity of the review exercised by the Court in this case later in this section. 
In the meantime, the following question arises: Should there be a slight 
distinction between economic and technical assessments, with regard to the extent of 
deference by the Courts to the Commission‘s margin of discretion? As the Courts are 
required to review more rigorously economic assessments, it is important to examine 
if econometric evidence (which combines economic theory and statistics) can be 
characterized as being closer to complex economic evidence or to merely ―technical‖ 
evidence. This question will not be examined in this study, but should the Court 
pursue the distinction between the assessment of ―economic‖ versus ―technical‖ 
evidence, the issue will certainly be raised. The difficulties of classifying different 
kinds of complex assessments by the Commission as ―economic‖ or ―technical‖ may 
be the main reasons for not following such an approach. Yet, introducing such a 
distinction could also question the reasons why the Commission benefits from such 
margin of discretion with regard to economic and technical assessments. Is this 
related to the Commission‘s superior or trans-disciplinary expertise or ―particular 
competence‖, as a specialized competition authority? [Yet, one may object that it 
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remains possible for the Courts to commission expert reports, although, as we will 
see, they have rarely used this option.] Is it related to the limited time the Courts 
dispose to examine the facts of the case, thus forcing them to conduct a cursory 
review of very complex matters? [Yet, this would negate the main reason for having a 
judicial review: the need to ensure that the assessment of facts by the Commission 
remains of high quality.] Is it finally related to the perception that the Commission 
should benefit from a margin of discretion in order to pursue the appropriate 
competition policy, in view of the information it has access to on the overall economic 
conditions reigning in the Internal Market, thus information which is not limited to the 
relevant market in question (as it is the case for any competition law case subject to 
judicial review by the courts) but covering micro- and macro-effects at a wider level? 
[Yet, if that were the case, the Courts would have recognized a wider discretion to the 
Commission with regard to economic assessments, as opposed to technical ones, and 
not the opposite, as it seems they have, if our interpretation of the EU Courts‘ case 
law introducing a distinction between the two proves to be correct.] 
Assuming that econometric evidence can be characterized as a ―complex 
economic assessment‖ or that the same standard applies to both economic and 
technical assessments, it is important to examine how the courts have dealt in practice 
with quantitative techniques, looking to the few cases where such evidence was 
discussed by the EU courts.  
In Hoechst AG v. Commission, the applicants for the annulment of the 
Commission‘s decision in the polypropylene cartel, had relied on a market study 
which included an econometric analysis of price competition in order to prove that 
there was no agreement on prices between them, following different meetings 
between the cartelists and that the undertaking‘s behaviour on the market did not 
correspond to what they allegedly agreed to in their meetings. The Commission 
denied that this price competition analysis ―was conclusive‖, noting ―the limits to the 
possibilities offered by econometric methods as regards the simulation of competitive 
prices and the impossibility of determining the share of general overheads borne by 
each product‖175. The General Court limited itself to note that ―the Commission took 
full account of the applicant's arguments regarding the effects of the cartel on the 
market and that it stated conclusively in the Decision the reasons which led it to 
consider that the conclusion drawn by the applicant from the [economic] study were 
unfounded‖, thus not engaging with the substance of the analysis176.  
 In merger control, the Commission benefits from a margin of appreciation for 
the broader category of ―assessments of economic nature‖, hence not just complex 
economic assessments, as in antitrust cases
177
. The EU Courts had initially adopted an 
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approach to the breadth of their scrutiny which was largely consistent with that 
applicable to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU decisions
178
. However, in more recent cases, 
such as the Airtours, Schneider, and Tetra Laval appeals, the EU Courts signalled a 
move toward a more exacting and intensive standard of review
179
. It was held in Tetra 
Laval that although the Commission enjoyed a relatively wide margin of appreciation 
when reviewing notified concentrations, this did not mean that the EU Courts did not 
possess the power to scrutinize carefully its decisions
180
. Instead, the Court 
emphasized that, due to the ―forward looking nature‖ of the merger assessment, its 
scrutiny would have to encompass an exhaustive judgment of the reliability and 
sufficiency of the evidence, and of its ability to support the Commission‘s 
conclusions
181
.  
Of particular interest for econometrics is also the Schneider Electric v. 
Commission judgment, where the General Court, after analysing the econometric data 
put forth by both parties in order to estimate the elasticity of demand, rejected 
Schneider ‗s challenge to the Commission‘s decision182.  
 Commenting on these cases, Yves Botteman noted that  
―[Schneider and Airtours] illustrate the fact that European Courts have not yet 
delved deeply into considerations that relate to how the econometric models 
are constructed and which parameters have (and should have) been taken into 
account. Rather, the Courts so far have reviewed the extent to which an 
economic study supports the argument that either the Commission or a party is 
trying to put in the administrative or judicial proceedings. This interpretation 
is consistent with the ECJ's approach in Tetra, which would limit the scope of 
judicial review to reviewing Commission's interpretations of information of an 
economic nature‖183. 
 Indeed, the evidential requirements of the Courts towards the Commission 
have increased. In GE v. Commission, the General Court noted that  ―(i)t is not 
enough for the Commission to put forward a series of logical but hypothetical 
developments which, were they to materialize, it fears would have harmful effects for 
competition on a number of different markets‖ but  ―rather, the onus is on it to carry 
out a specific analysis of the likely evolution of each market on which it seeks to 
show that a dominant position would be created or strengthened as a result of the 
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merger and to produce convincing evidence to bear out that conclusion‖.184 This 
evolution opens the door to the development of the use of econometric evidence by 
the Commission in merger control, in view also of the Court‘s judgment in Impala, 
where the Court accepted that evidence of a collective dominant position may be 
established ―indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia and 
items of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the 
presence of a collective dominant position‖, thus indicating the Court‘s openness to 
indirect evidence, including quantitative techniques
185
. 
 The recent Ryanair judgment of the General Court illustrates the intensity of 
judicial review in merger decisions on econometric evidence, analysed in this case as 
―technical‖ evidence186. The case concerned an action for annulment by Ryanair 
against the Commission‘s decision prohibiting the merger between Ryanair and Aer 
Lingus
187
. This was the first prohibition decision of the Commission since 2007, and 
the judgment of the General Court was awaited with great interest, in particular in 
view of the extensive use of quantitative evidence by the Commission and Ryanair in 
the decision and their submissions. We have already examined the different types of 
quantitative analysis employed by the Commission in this case and will focus now on 
the intensity of the judicial review exercised by the Court. Ryanair was relying on 
quantitative evidence and various econometric studies in order to challenge the 
inferences the Commission made from ―non-technical evidence‖ (arguing that 
conclusions should be drawn solely from the technical evidence) as well as criticizing 
the Commission‘s own econometric studies on different grounds. With regard to the 
first issue the Court noted the following:  
―the assertion that the ‗non-technical evidence‘ cannot be taken into account 
unless it is supported by ‗technical evidence‘ cannot be upheld. There is no need 
to establish such a hierarchy. It is the Commission‘s task to make an overall 
assessment of what is shown by the set of indicative factors used to evaluate the 
competitive situation. It is possible, in that regard, for certain items of evidence to 
be prioritised and other evidence to be discounted‖188.  
Econometric evidence and empirical analysis are thus among the ―relevant factors‖ in 
analyzing the anticompetitive effects of the merger, without, however, been 
recognized a primary evidential role
189
.  
As to the second issue Ryanair criticized the Commission‘s econometric analysis 
for confusing statistical and economic significance, for making the wrong inferences 
from the econometric evidence, for producing results in contradiction with economic 
principles, for not being robust and for applying inconsistent standards in accepting or 
rejecting factual evidence
190
. The Court examined each of Ryanair‘s arguments by 
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referring to the content of the contested decision, assessed ―in the light of the case-law 
on the Commission‘s margin of discretion with regard to economic natters‖191. 
According to the Court, the Commission had carefully examined this evidence in its 
decision and had explained the limitations of econometric studies and its reluctance to 
draw firm conclusions from them. The results of the quantitative evidence were also 
confirming and complementing the conclusions derived from the qualitative 
evidence
192
. The Court found that the Commission has not exceeded the limits of its 
discretion, as it had made reference to Ryanair‘s arguments in the text of the decision 
or its Annex and that it carried out a ―detailed examination of all the econometric data 
submitted by the parties‖ and of their observations and ―performed further tests and 
extensions‖ of the regressions included in its statement of objections in order to 
address Ryanair‘s observations193. Although the Court took pains to examine each of 
the arguments of Ryanair with regard to the econometric evidence
194
, at no point it 
engaged in an in-depth analysis of the internal and external validity of the studies, by 
looking, for example, to their reliability, objectivity and robustness. This might be due 
to the often repeated statement by the Court that Ryanair did not show that the 
Commission had exceeded its margin of discretion in economic matters, although the 
―technical‖ character of the evidence presented might be another explanation for the 
abstention of the Court to engage more actively with the validity of the econometric 
evidence. In addition to the issue of the appropriate degree of deference to the 
Commission in technical assessments, the Court may have also lacked the capacity to 
perform such extensive analysis, in view of its choice not to appoint an expert to assist 
it in the examination of the evidence
195
. 
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It is reminded that the possibility of engaging a court-appointed expert has been 
rarely used by the European Courts
196
. In Woodpulp II, the Court decided to obtain 
two experts‘ reports asking them if the economic evidence presented by the 
Commission justified the conclusions drawn in its decision on the parallelism of 
prices and if on the basis of the existing documentation, the characteristics of the 
natural operation of the wood pulp market should lead to a differential price structure, 
or whether, and for what reasons, it should lead to a uniform price structure and 
whether the characteristics and the functioning of this market during the period 
covered by the decision differed from its characteristics and functioning prior and 
after to that period (thus applying a comparator-based approach)
197
. The court 
appointed an expert economist as it was confronted, according to the Opinion of 
Advocate General Darmon, with ―a substantial body of economic argument, referring 
at times to theoretical models which, whilst doubtless familiar to an economist‖, were 
nevertheless ―at any rate, of manifest complexity‖198. The Court relied on the 
assessment of the economic evidence by its experts (accountancy and economic 
experts), which was inconclusive, as they did not rule out concertation but they also 
found legitimate reasons for the conduct under examination, to conclude that 
concertation was not the only plausible explanation for the parallel conduct and thus 
to annul the Commission‘s decision199. Commenting on the possible implications of 
this case for the assessment by the EU Courts of economic/econometric evidence in 
merger control, Botteman explains that  
―(t)o some extent, the use of econometric expert opinions in Woodpulp II was 
motivated by the fact that the Commission's case rested on a limited set of facts, 
i.e. parallelism in prices meant that concert between the pulp producers was at 
play, that needed to be tested against the possibility that the normal operation of 
the market was a more plausible explanation for the uniformity of prices than a 
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concerted action. Given that merger investigations are more and more data- and 
facts-intensive, it is unclear whether the Courts would appoint their own experts. 
In this regard, recent practice of the [General Court], e.g. in the Microsoft appeal, 
indicates that when cases are factually well prepared by both sides, there is no 
need to call independent experts to testify before the Court‖200. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of judicial review of the Commission‘s decisions 
in economic and technical matters, set by the previous case law, EU Courts may be 
inspired by the intensity of review exercised by some national courts towards 
economic and econometric evidence, although one should also take into account the 
different institutional contexts.  
The most recent German Cement cartel case and the judicial scrutiny exercised by 
the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG), which has specialized chambers for 
antitrust matters, to the decision of the Federal Cartel Office to impose a fine for 
additional earnings related to a cartel in the cement industry (making use of the 
possibility offered to the FCO by German law to order the disgorgement of benefits) 
illustrates the different approaches that EU and national courts may take with regard 
to the assessment of econometric evidence
201
. Contrary to the EU competition law 
framework, the German Higher Regional Court fully reviews decisions taken by the 
FCO with regard to both the fact finding by the authority and the legality of the act in 
terms of merits. Hence, the FCO does not benefit from any margin of discretion. The 
Court may amend or replace such decisions at its discretion. In the cement cartel case, 
the Court reviewed the fines both under the law applicable in 2003 (when the decision 
of the FCO was adopted, which provided for disgorgement of profits-related fines of 
up to three times the additional proceeds obtained through a cartel) and under the 
currently applicable law (adopted in 2005 and amended in 2007, which provides that 
fines may not exceed 10% of the enterprise‘s total turnover in the preceding year), the 
Court choosing to rely on the latter. As the fines aimed to skim-off additional earnings 
related to the infringement, the economic evidence presented at the Court resembled 
to that usually submitted for the evaluation of antitrust damages. The OLG appointed 
an expert and quantified the additional earnings based on the econometric assessment 
submitted by the expert. With regard to the standard of proof, the OLG has a broad 
discretion to choose the best suited methodology so that the results are conclusive and 
economically reasonable. With the help of the expert, the Court identified the 
appropriate methodologies: among the different ones available for the evaluation of 
damages, the expert ruled out comparator-based geographical yardstick methods, as 
there were significant differences in market characteristics between the different 
regions and countries. The expert suggested instead a during-and-after time series 
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approach, which involved the choice of an appropriate reference period (the period 
not influenced by the cartel). The Court followed the expert‘s suggestions on the 
design of the empirical method for the estimation of additional earnings. The court 
expert then proceeded to the application step, carrying out the analysis using data 
submitted by the parties, before performing robustness checks, allowing the various 
parties (the FCO, the defendants, the public prosecutor) to put forward additional 
questions and criticisms
202
. These were extensively discussed in the judgment, 
although the OLG did not perform a control of the external validity of the evidence. 
The Court did not explain why it relied only on the time series method, but only 
included some discussion of why it did not follow the regional yardstick analysis. 
This may be owed to the fact that the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) had indicated in 
an earlier case that yardstick approaches (i.e. the comparison to the development of 
comparable markets) was a superior approach compared to model-based 
approaches
203
. 
The court‘s review cannot of course be transformed to a methodological check 
exercise in econometrics. There is a fundamental trade-off to be made between 
accuracy and practicality. 
 
4. Econometric evidence meets evidence law and theory 
The aggregation, the weighing and the evaluation of econometric evidence in 
competition law proceedings raises important challenges for regulatory authorities 
and courts. As it is the case for economic theory (economic authority), econometrics 
are based on strict assumptions and methodological rules. The use of quantitative 
methods generally refers to the application of a statistical model to the data at hand 
(observations). A statistical model is simply a set of compatible probabilistic 
assumptions, the assumptions being modelling choices made by a researcher 
concerning the distribution of the data to be modelled, the dependence of each 
observation on another, and how the parameters of that distribution change over 
observations or time. The goals of the modelling process are description and 
inference. How well a model accomplishes these goals is a direct function of how 
appropriate its assumptions are for a particular data set.  
 The assessment of quantitative evidence requires, as it is the case for all types 
of evidence, the evaluation of the total strength of the evidence and the decision to 
attach a specific weight to types/methods of quantitative evidence implying the 
existence of different outcomes for each type. It is thus important to determine a point 
where evidence will be deemed sufficient and a decision will be reached. It is possible 
to distinguish two steps in this process. Initially, the decision-maker will assign 
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weight to the specific quantitative method. This is a concrete analysis that takes, for 
instance, into account the specific characteristics of each case, the availability of facts 
and the perception (by the decision-maker) that the specific method will produce 
accurate predictions. Then, comes the evaluation of the evidence collected according 
to a specific forensic standard. In common law jurisdictions, we usually refer to this 
standard as the standard of proof, which refers to the quantity/quality of evidence 
needed in order to persuade a decision-maker that an allegation is true. The 
determination of the standard of proof is an abstract operation, in the sense that it is 
determined ex ante for all cases or categories of cases. Nevertheless, the two steps of 
the analysis are linked by the requirement of evidential cogency: what will be deemed 
persuasive according to the required standard of proof depends on the evidential 
weight the decision-maker will award to the specific method or combination of 
methods/facts.  
We will first explore the issue of the standard of proof in EU competition law, 
in order to examine how evidential cogency may impact on the reception of 
quantitative evidence in EU competition law. We will then turn to the specific 
characteristics of econometric evidence and its hybrid nature in the context of legal 
proceedings. 
 
4.1. Standard of proof/persuasion in EU competition law 
While EU competition law has so far adopted clear rules as to the allocation of the 
burden of persuasion (burden of proof) in EU competition law proceedings
204
, the 
same is not true for the determination of a point where evidence will be deemed 
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sufficient to carry the conviction of the authority or the judge (standard of proof or the 
degree of necessary persuasion), which constitutes a question governed by national 
law
205
. National courts and competition agencies remain subject to the standard of 
proof required under their own domestic law. Yet, as far as the application of EU 
competition law is concerned, the European Courts have touched upon the issue of the 
integration, weighing and evaluation of evidence, hence developing principles of EU 
evidence law that would be applicable, as a result of the supremacy and pre-emption 
principles of EU law, to all instances of implementation of EU competition law by the 
Commission, or by national competition authorities and courts. This was either done 
by treating issues of evidence as matters of substantive law requiring interpretation by 
the EU Courts, rather than as a procedural matter, left to the principle of procedural 
autonomy of Member States
206
, or by subjecting the national legal systems of proof to 
the discipline of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law
207
. 
 
4.1.1. Standard of proof: a contested concept in EU competition law 
Evidence law theorists usually establish a distinction between ―the assessment of the 
probative value or force of the parts‖ (probative force) and ―the weight of the whole 
of evidence.‖ (weight)208 Usually, both evaluations are not regulated by rules: there 
are no formal rules of weight and the probative force of one or more pieces of either 
sort of evidence depends upon complex considerations, which are quite difficult to 
formalize.  
Anderson, Schum and Twining distinguish among the following issues: 
―1. How can we express assessments of weight (the vocabulary of evaluation, 
analogous to a marking scheme)?  
2. What are the standards for decision of factual issues (cf. the pass mark)? 
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3. How can judgments of weight and probative force be combined? 
4. What are the criteria for evaluating the probative force of individual items 
of evidence or the weight of a ‗mass‘ of evidence in a given case (cf reasons 
for awarding or debiting marks or awarding a particular overall grade)? 
5. To what extent could the law of evidence prescribe rules of weight or 
evaluation (cf marking rules)?‖.209 
The first and the fourth issue relate to the question of ―what are the conventions for 
expressing decisions or judgments about probative force or weight, independently of 
any particular criteria for arriving at such decisions or judgments‖; The second and 
the third issue focus on ―what are the criteria or standards the decision-maker is to use 
in making the required decisions and judgments‖; Finally, the fifth issue relates to 
―what, if any, is the legal significance of the various criteria and standards?‖ 210. The 
concept of the standard of proof strictly refers to the fifth issue, although it might have 
some influence on the second issue. On the contrary, the first, third and fourth issues 
are outside the scope of this concept as such, and will not be examined in the 
following section. 
Examining the common law of evidence from the perspective of continental-
civil law tradition, Damaśka observed that three of the common law features stand out 
as typical: ―the complexity of common law regulation (of evidence); a preoccupation 
with shifting the material for the fact-finder to hear and see; and an aspiration to 
structure the analysis of evidence‖211. It is the first and the third features, which relate 
to the question of what is frequently called in the common law tradition as ―standard 
of proof‖ that we will explore in the remainder of this section. 
The common law prescribes clear marking rules (for the evaluation of 
evidence), which take the form of standards of proof. Usually there are different 
standards of proof, which denote ―objective degrees of cogency‖ and ―subjective 
degrees of persuasion or belief‖.212 In English law, there are two standards:  
―under the standard commonly prescribed for civil cases, the fact-finder must 
determine whether the plaintiff has proved all the elements of the ultimate 
probandum by a preponderance or on the greater weight of the evidence or 
whether, on a balance of probabilities, the elements of the ultimate probandum 
are more probably true than not. On the criminal side, the fact-finder must 
determine whether the evidence establishes the elements of the offense and the 
defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt‖.213  
Of course, there are various degrees of proof within each standard, the 
standard depending on the subject matter or as Denning L.J. put it ―a degree of 
probability which is commensurate with the occasion‖214. Hence, some authors have 
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concluded that in common law jurisdictions, the standard of proof is probabilistic, as 
civil claims have to be proved by preponderance of the evidence
215
. The required 
standard of probability is set by the law ―at levels that serve the system‘s aims‖216. 
Hence, each standard of proof is set through a decision procedure rule aiming to keep 
the sum of the expected costs of false acquittals and false condemnations to a 
minimum, the assumption being that each type of error has the same cost (in criminal 
proceedings the cost of false condemnation is perceived as higher, thus explaining the 
choice of the higher in terms of probability standard of proof of beyond reasonable 
doubt)
217
. The common law system evolved towards the lower standard of probability 
of the preponderance of the evidence, the emergence of the civil jury acting as ―a 
proximate cause‖ for the development of the probabilistic nature of judicial decision-
making, as this was the only way available to judges to provide judicial instruction to 
juries while pursuing error minimization
218. However, ―beyond reasonable doubt‖ 
does not involve proof to an ―absolute certainty‖219. 
 On the contrary, the concept of standard of proof is ―unfamiliar‖ to most 
continental legal systems
220
. This issue is often related to the principle of free 
evaluation of evidence, which can be contrasted to the exclusionary view of the rules 
of evidence in common law, the jury‘s discretion being somehow limited by more 
formal rules of evidence, although this does not go as far as a system of preuve légale, 
where the weight of each class of evidence will be determined by the law
221
. In civil 
law jurisdictions the standard, if there is any, is profoundly subjective and relates to 
the intime conviction of the judge, that is, ―an inner, deep-seated, personal conviction 
of the judge‖, without distinguishing between criminal and civil cases222, as common 
law systems do. In addition, in a limited number of civil law matters, of particular 
gravity for the defendant, common law requires the plaintiff to meet the intermediate 
standard of ―clear and convincing evidence‖223. Hence, one can schematically oppose 
two views of the standard of proof: that of the anglo-american law, which is more 
objective, as it refers to probabilities or the ―logical provability‖ of the propositions, 
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on the assumption that individual judgment is error prone and hence in need for some 
rational limitation, and the more subjectivist civil law standard of proof, whose crucial 
feature is ―the psychic state of taking a fact for true‖, largely relying on a test built on 
the éthos, experience and intuition of the judge224. 
The choice between the civil law approach to evidence evaluation and that of 
the common law is a subject of controversy
225
. But, does the debate have any practical 
relevance? A high standard of proof coupled with a burden of proof requiring 
plaintiffs to prove the elements of their claims may indeed make it difficult for 
plaintiffs to succeed. Yet, as it has been noted, ―(b)ecause parties can select cases for 
trial (the so called selection effect), mainly cases that fall close to whatever standard 
of proof applies will proceed to trial‖ and ―other cases will tend to settle‖, hence the 
result will not be that different under any standard of proof
226
. Presumptions and other 
rules of evidence evaluation might also offer additional instruments to influence the 
outcome of the case.  
Turning to EU competition law, it is clear that (i) the EU courts and the 
Commission adhere to the principle of free or ―unfettered evaluation of evidence‖227, 
but they have generally avoided to use systematically the concept of ―standard of 
proof‖, although more recent cases have referred to the concept more frequently, in 
particular in its probabilistic dimension; (ii) the requirement of a sufficient degree of 
evidence varies according to the context and the stage of the proceedings; and, (iii) 
presumptions play a considerable role in mitigating the subjectivity of the standard of 
intime conviction to which EU courts adhere to. 
As to the first issue, Eric Gippini Fournier observes that the expression 
‗standard of proof‘ had not appeared in competition judgments of the EU courts 
before Sumitimo
228
, Tetra Laval
229
, Bertelsmann/Sony
230
 and GlaxoSmithKline
231
, the 
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few other instances where the expression ―standard of proof‖ has been used relating to 
―an approximate translation‖ in the English version of the judgment, the term not 
appearing as such in the official French version
232
. After reviewing the case law of the 
EU courts, Gippini-Fournier concludes that ―the approach of the EU Courts to the 
assessment of evidence is better understood from the perspective of continental law 
systems‖, where the question of how much evidence is required before a judge can 
conclude that a party has met its burden of proof ―does not typically receive an ex 
ante abstract answer in terms of probability‖, but it is the standard of intime 
conviction, without the law framing ―how strong this personal conviction of the judge 
should be‖233. 
Indeed, the EU courts have not so far engaged in a probabilistic approach to 
evidence evaluation
234
. In a number of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases, the EU 
courts have suggested that the Commission is subject to a standard of ―convincing 
evidence‖235, or they have employed a variety of related expressions, such as 
―sufficiently precise and coherent proof‖, ―convergent and convincing‖ or ―cogent‖ 
evidence
236, ―specific and credible evidence indicating with reasonable probability 
that‖ the event or effect occurred237, or ―precise and consistent evidence […] to 
support the firm conviction that the alleged infringements constitute appreciable 
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restrictions of competition‖238. Most often the Courts referred to the concept of the 
―requisite legal standard‖ without any further indication on what this might be239. In a 
more recent case the General Court went as far as requiring the Commission to ―show 
precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the infringement 
and to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringements constitute 
appreciable restrictions of competition‖240. 
The EU merger regulation being silent as to the evidential threshold the 
Commission should reach before declaring a merger to cause (or not) a significant 
impediment to substantive competition the case law of the EU Courts has provided 
some broad guidelines, in the context of the judicial review of some of the 
Commission‘s merger decisions241. It is reminded that the Commission enjoys a 
―margin of discretion‖ and is subject to a manifest error of appraisal test, under 
Article 263 TFEU, in contrast to Commission‘s decisions imposing fines, which are 
subject to the full jurisdiction of the Court
242
. The CJEU has also recognized that 
article 2 of the Merger Regulation leaves a certain margin of discretion to the 
Commission, ―especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature‖, adding 
that ―review by the Community courts of the exercise of that discretion, which is 
essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the margin of 
discretion implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the 
rules on concentration‖243. The judicial review function of the Court, the margin of 
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discretion of the Commission and the manifest error of appreciation type of judicial 
scrutiny exercised may lead the EU Courts to be reticent to regulate the evaluation of 
the evidence by the Commission to a specific evidential standard. The EU Courts 
have nevertheless recognized the importance of the judicial review of prospective 
economic evidence ―of the kind necessary in merger control‖ (such as econometrics), 
thus rejecting the Commission‘s conception that its margin of discretion is ―inherent 
in any prospective analysis‖244. The EU Courts examine whether the evidence relied 
on is ―factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence 
contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a 
complex situation‖245. According to the CJEU, the prospective analysis ―must be 
carried out with great care since it does not entail the examination of past events – for 
which often many items of evidence are available which make it possible to 
understand the causes – or of current events, but rather a prediction of events which 
are more or less likely to occur in future if a decision prohibiting the planned 
concentration or laying down the conditions for it is not adopted‖246.  
What is the requisite legal standard for the prospective econometric evidence 
to be given probative force? According to the CJEU in Tetra, a prospective analysis 
―makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to 
ascertaining which of them are the most likely‖247. Yet, when the CJEU examined the 
analysis by the Commission of a ‗conglomerate-type‘ concentration as an example of 
prospective analysis ―in which, first, the consideration of a lengthy period of time in 
the future and, secondly, the leveraging necessary to give rise to a significant 
impediment to effective competition mean that the chains of cause and effect are 
dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish‖, it also held that ―the quality of 
the evidence‖ produced by the Commission ―must support the Commission‘s 
conclusion that, if such a decision were not adopted, the economic development 
envisaged by it would be plausible‖248. The EU Courts‘ case law has also referred to 
other standards than ―most likely‖ and ―plausible‖, such as the fact that the 
Commission should be able to conclude that ―a dominant position would, in all 
likelihood, be created or strengthened in the relatively near future and would lead to 
effective competition on the market being significantly impeded‖249, an Advocate 
General suggesting a higher standard of proof for prospective evidence, requiring the 
Commission to prove that the notified concentration would ―very probably‖ lead to a 
significant impediment of competition
250
. It is clear that the standard of proof of the 
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occurrence, or not, of a significant impediment of effective competition should not be 
overly ambitious, as in this case it will make it virtually impossible to prove any 
anticompetitive effects of the merger
251
. A similar approach should also be adopted 
with regard to the standard of proof of efficiency gains in merger control, in view of 
the symmetrical standard of proof for prohibition and clearance in merger decisions. 
In practice, the approach followed by the EU Courts in both EU antitrust law 
and EU merger control ―imports a considerable degree of flexibility, dependent upon 
the particular circumstances of the case, the allegation made, and the nature of the 
evidence involved‖252. For example, the fact that some restrictions of competition are 
considered as being more serious than others and thus subject to stricter sanctions 
(high fines and monetary penalties) might lead to higher evidential requirements than 
other cases. For example, in his Opinion in Rhône-Poulenc, Advocate General 
Vesterdorf remarked:  
―[C]onsiderable importance must be attached to the fact that competition cases 
of this kind [cartels] are in reality of a penal nature, which naturally suggests 
that a high standard of proof is required… [T]here must be a sufficient basis 
for the decision and any reasonable doubt must be for the benefit of the 
applicants according to the principle in dubio pro reo‖253. 
The principle in dubio pro reo (literally: ‗when in doubt, in favor of the accused‘ – the 
presumption of innocence), enshrined in Article 6(2) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, requires that ‗any doubt in the mind of the Court must operate to the 
advantage of the undertaking to which the decision finding an infringement was 
addressed‘, in particular for decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments254. 
This is particularly the case in presence of indirect evidence of a concerted practice, 
such as parallel conduct, the Courts being relatively reluctant to infer the existence of 
a concerted practice from the simple fact that there is price parallelism, thus requiring 
a relatively high standard of proof
255
, probably because of the high risk of false 
positives to which the inclusion of situations of oligopolistic interdependence would 
have led with regard to the scope of Article 101 TFEU
256
.  
                                                          
251
 Since Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG & Impala v. Commission [2008] ECR I-4951, the standard 
of proof should be symmetrical for the finding that the merger does not produce anticompetitive 
effects, the same standard applying to clearance decisions and prohibitions. 
252
 N. Parr & E. Burrows, Burdens and Standards of Proof in European Community Competition Law, 
op. cit. , at 177. 
253
 Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, Case T-1/89,  Rhône Poulenc v. Commission [1991] ECR II-876, at II-
954. 
254
 Case T-44/02 Dresdner Bank AG and others v. Commission [2006] II-3567, paras 60–61; Case T-
36/05, Coats Holdings Ltd v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-110, para. 69. 
255
 See, Case C-49/92 P Commission v. Anic [1999] ECR I-4125, paras 121, 126; Joined Cases C-204- 
205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P & C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v. 
Commission [2004] ECR I-123, para. 81; Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P, Re Seamless Steel 
Tubes Cartel: Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd and Others v. Commission [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 16, paras 
47–48 & 51. 
256
 See, Case T-53/03, BPB plc v. Commission, [2008] ECR` II-1333, para. 64: ―It is apparent from that 
case law that the Court must reject the applicant's assertion that the Commission must adduce proof 
―beyond reasonable doubt‖ of the existence of the infringement in cases where it imposes heavy fines‖. 
 73 
The standard of proof also varies according to the stage of the administrative 
proceedings. The standard of proof for the opening of the proceedings or for sending a 
statement of objections is not that clear in EU competition law but national 
competition authorities, such as the OFT in the UK, are required to have ‗reasonable 
grounds‘ for suspecting the existence of a competition law infringement. In Claymore, 
the CAT distinguished three steps in the investigative proceedings of the OFT: the 
first stage is the investigation as such, the second stage is prosecution (Rule 14 notice) 
and the third stage is decision-making: the CAT imposed a sufficient evidence 
standard for the second and the third stage of the proceedings
257
. The General Court 
has also determined the amount of evidence required in order for the Commission to 
grant interim measures prior to the finding of an infringement
258
, or the possibility for 
EU Courts to suspend the effect of a Commission‘s decision on appeal (interim 
relief)
259
, which are, in both cases, lower than the standard of proof required for the 
finding of a competition law infringement. One may also assume that the standard of 
proof a Phase I merger decision might be different from that required from a Phase II 
merger decision. 
The difficulty to collect evidence and more broadly administrability concerns 
may also influence the courts in setting their evidential requirements. The EU Courts 
have recognized the inherent difficulties of the task of proving a cartel infringement 
and apportioned accordingly the evidential requirements, by establishing adequate 
presumptions enabling the Commission to make inferences. As it has been observed 
by the Court of Justice,  
―[…] in practice, the Commission is often obliged to prove the existence of an 
infringement under conditions which are hardly conducive to that task, in that 
several years may have elapsed since the time of the events constituting the 
infringement and a number of the undertakings covered by the investigation 
have not actively co-operated therein. Whilst it is necessarily incumbent upon 
the Commission to establish that an illegal market-sharing agreement was 
concluded […], it would be excessive also to require it to produce evidence of 
the specific mechanism by which that object was attained […]. Indeed, it 
would be too easy for an undertaking guilty of an infringement to escape any 
penalty if it was entitled to base its argument on the vagueness of the 
information produced regarding the operation of an illegal agreement in 
circumstances in which the existence and anti-competitive purpose of the 
agreement had nevertheless been sufficiently established […]‖260. 
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On the contrary, it was held that the nature/type of the restriction of 
competition cannot influence the standard of proof applied (at most this might 
influence the cogency of evidence required). For example, the Court of Justice held 
that the standard of proof required for the purposes of establishing the existence of an 
anti-competitive agreement in the framework of a vertical relationship was not higher 
than that required in the framework of a horizontal relationship. All other relevant 
factors should be looked at, including the economic and legal context of the case. 
Whether it could be inferred that an anti-trust agreement had been concluded could 
not be addressed in abstract terms, according to whether the relationship involved was 
vertical or horizontal
261
. 
 With regard to private enforcement, there is no definition at the European 
level of the amount of evidence required for the finding of a competition law 
infringement, the matter being left to the Member States
262
. There was a discussion in 
the Green paper on damages to lower the standard of proof for the issue of damages 
and causation, in comparison to the standard of proof for the finding of an 
infringement, as a possible means to address the informational asymmetry between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants
263
. This option was explicitly rejected by the 
European Commission
264
. The absence of a European framework may lead to 
important differences between jurisdictions where the concept of standard of proof is 
known (and which adopt a probabilistic perspective on evidence) and jurisdictions 
that simply mention that evidence should be convincing; in practice, however, there is 
little difference between the two standards
265
. The UK courts seem to require a 
balance of probabilities standard or a higher standard of proof in some cases for 
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finding a competition law infringement
266
. A lower standard of proof applies when the 
courts give summary judgments
267
, or grant interim applications
268
.   
 One could finally distinguish between inferences and legal presumptions. 
Courts and competition authorities make inferences all the time, as they have to deal 
with fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence. This exercise forms part of their 
traditional role conceived under the principle of the free evaluation of evidence in 
both anglo-american and continental legal systems. This role is particularly salient in 
competition law, as the authorities do not always possess a clear evidential record or 
documentary evidence of the infringements. Hence, they should be capable to 
supplement their evidential record with inferences that would ―allow the relevant 
circumstances to be reconstituted‖269. For example, according to the case law of the 
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EU Courts, ―(t)he existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may […] be 
inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the 
absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of 
the competition rules‖270. In the absence of direct documentary evidence of collusion, 
that is if the Commission bases ―solely‖ its decision on circumstantial evidence, ―it is 
sufficient for those undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances which cast 
the facts established by the Commission in a different light and thus allow another, 
plausible explanation of those facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the 
Commission in concluding that the [EU] competition rules have been infringed‖271. 
By providing a greater leeway to the Commission to make inferences about 
anticompetitive effects, the EU Courts may have also eased the effects of the rather 
strict evidential standards required for the proof of future anticompetitive effects in 
merger control
272
. The interplay of facts (items of evidence) and inferences determine 
the factual scenario (or plausible story), which would eventually carry the conviction 
of the decision-maker (competition authority or judge)
273
.  
 Legal presumptions operate in the opposite direction. They aim to regulate the 
evidential discretion of the decision-maker (competition authority or judge) by 
providing some ready-made causal inferences or analytical shortcuts about specific 
items of evidence. Presumptions may be conclusive or rebuttable
274
. For example, the 
EU Courts have long established the presumption that if competitors participate to a 
meeting to discuss prices or output levels and remain active in the market after that 
meeting, they are presumed to have taken into account in their future action in the 
market the information exchanged with their competitors when determining their 
conduct on that market and hence they are presumed to have participated to a 
concerted practice
275
. In the view of some of the Advocates General of the Court, this 
presumption of causal link between concertation and market conduct, which the EU 
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courts recognize in relation to concerted practices under Article 101(1) TFEU, 
constitutes ―nothing other than a legitimate conclusion drawn on the basis of common 
experience‖, flowing naturally from a relation of cause and effect between 
concertation and market conduct
276
. In other words, this presumption is a statement of 
what normally happens based on common or judicial experience. This acceptance 
may also be related to the well accepted normative principle in EU competition law 
that ―each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he 
intends to adopt on the common market‖277. The reason underlying the presumption is 
that, having participated in the meeting without publicly distancing itself from what 
was discussed, ―the undertaking has given the other participants to believe that it 
subscribed to what was decided there and would comply with it‖278. Hence, the 
presumption is not only the product of empirical observation but also results from a 
normative choice.  
In other circumstances, presumptions are based on some conception of 
economic normality
279
. The standard of proof being constant for all types of mergers 
in EU competition law, ―it takes more evidential effort to establish a fact that it held 
to be intrinsically improbable, such as harmful evidence of a conglomerate merger, 
than it would be to prove to the same standard a fact that is intrinsically more 
probable, such as the harmful effect of a horizontal merger‖280. Indeed, the distinction 
between standard of proof and evidential cogency may be illustrated by the 
development of specific presumptions, such as the one adopted by the General Court 
towards non-horizontal mergers. In Tetra Laval, the Court ruled that, ―(s)ince the 
effects of a conglomerate-type merger are generally considered to be neutral, or even 
beneficial, for competition on the markets concerned […] the proof of anti-
competitive conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for a precise examination, 
supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly produce 
those effects‖281. This positive presumption towards conglomerate or vertical mergers 
heightens the evidential burden bore by the Commission as it ―takes more convincing 
evidence to prove to the requisite legal standard that a conglomerate merger harms 
competition than to prove that a horizontal or vertical merger has the same effect‖ 
(higher evidential cogency)
282. More precisely, notwithstanding the ―perfectly 
symmetrical nature‖ of the standard of proof283, the cogency of evidence required for 
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what is less probable (in this case, non-horizontal mergers harm competition) is of a 
higher degree than for what is perceived, in mainstream economics, as more probable 
(horizontal mergers harm competition), assuming the application of the same standard 
of proof in both cases. If one employs Lord Hoffman‘s well known metaphor, it is 
more likely to see an Alsatian walking in the Green Park than a lion
284
. 
One should however observe that in practice, evidence is not evaluated in 
isolated pieces but, as Hock Lai observes, ―rather in large cognitive structures most 
familiarly in the form of narratives, stories or global accounts‖285. With regard to the 
requirement of precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of 
the infringement, the EU Courts have indeed recognized that ―it is not necessary for 
every item of evidence produced […] to satisfy those criteria in relation to every 
aspect of the infringement‖, but ―it is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by 
the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement‖286. Certainly, the EU 
Courts attach to the various pieces of evidence a ―probative value‖, based on the 
―reliability of that evidence‖287. Yet, the approach is holistic rather than atomistic: 
―judgments of plausibility are rendered not on propositions of facts viewed 
individually and in isolation‖, but ―the truth of any particular proposition of fact will 
have to be assessed in the context of a larger hypothesis or story or narrative 
account‖288. Such conception of the operation of evidence evaluation is compatible 
with the relative plausibility theory that one of the authors of this study has advanced 
elsewhere
289
.  
The relative plausibility theory should be distinguished from general 
probability theories of evidence evaluation. Plausibility does not reduce to probability. 
The assessment of the evidence or more generally fact-finding should not focus on 
abstract probabilities but on the relative plausibility of competing hypothesis 
presented by the parties
290
. According to this theory, legal proof is a form of inference 
to the best explanation that examines the comparative plausibility of the parties‘ 
stories
291
 ―ending in the question whether one is justified in believing (or treating) any 
of them as the true (or most plausible) account‖292. The process will involve two 
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steps
293
: first, it is important to generate potential explanations of the evidence; 
second, it is important to select the best explanation from the list of potential ones 
(which will be the ―actual explanation‖)294. Choosing among competing explanations 
depends on the relative plausibility of each narrative/story, as measured by reference 
to a number of criteria: the degree of coverage (that is ―the greater the portion of the 
evidence a story is able to account for the higher its plausibility‖), the 
completeness/consilience of the story (it explains more facts and has less gaps)
295
, the 
coherence of the narrative (that is ―the added quality of the individual elements 
integrating well together to yield a smooth and convincing narrative of events‖ and 
finally its probative force (that is ―the positive support it receives from the 
evidence)
296
. It becomes therefore clear that plausibility cannot be confined to a 
simple statement of probability, quantitatively determined as a percentage of already 
known ―objective data‖ or universal objective frequencies, which would assume that 
all available explanatory hypotheses would be known by the expert or the court
297
. 
Rather it refers to the relative ―strength of the explanation‖, as determined by the 
―inferential interests of the decision-maker‖298, the context of other evidence or other 
contrary explanations
299
. 
 
4.1.2. Econometric evidence and standard of proof 
 The rules of evidence have been framed with the view that most evidence will 
be factual. Yet, sources of evidence are diverse and might include contemporaneous 
documents, such as emails or statements by market participants (competitors, 
customers and consumers)
300
, but also more complex evidence, such as econometrics. 
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As we indicated previously, the probative value attached to a piece of evidence 
depends on the ―reliability of that evidence‖, which is ―the sole criterion relevant for 
evaluating freely adduced evidence‖301. As the Court noted in Siemens v. Commission, 
―(a)ccording to the generally applicable rules on evidence the reliability and 
therefore the probative value of a document depends on its origins, the 
circumstances in which it was drawn up, the person to whom it is addressed 
and the reputed and reliable nature of its content […[ In particular great 
importance must be attached to the fact that a document has been drawn up in 
close connection with the events or by a direct witness of those events. 
Furthermore, statements which run counter to the interests of the declarant 
must in principle be regarded as particularly reliable evidence.‖302. 
The question that arises is thus if econometric evidence should be treated differently 
from other types of factual evidence, having in mind that ―econometric evidence 
entails something more complex than crude facts‖303. 
 The complexity of econometrics has very much to do with the following 
characteristics (i) they are based on some specific causal inferences (―internal 
validity‖) made on the basis of some observations that are generalized, the last 
operation relating to the connection of these inferences to the real outside world 
(―external validity‖). External validity is important for the reliability of the evidence 
(this is a shared element with other types of evidence, which should also be reliable); 
(ii) Both these standards of validity (―internal‖ and ―external‖) are also based on 
conventions developed within the context of a specific professional group and/or 
research community, that of econometricians, with the result that these cannot be 
assessed easily by someone outside this group using simple common sense; (iii) as a 
result of the previous characteristics, and the technical complexity of econometrics, 
courts and competition authorities will have to spend a considerable amount of time 
and resources if they were to make an in-depth inquiry into the quality and the 
reliability of the econometric evidence presented by the parties, in particular if they 
had to re-do the econometric analysis themselves in order to verify its validity. It is 
much less time consuming and less costly to perform an in depth inquiry of simple 
factual findings. Does this mean that the EU Courts and/or the European Commission 
should apply a different standard of proof for econometric evidence than for other 
forms of factual evidence? 
 We will attempt to answer this question by examining the following 
intermediary questions: (i) how do the internal and external standards of validity of 
econometrics interact with the legal standard of proof, that is, a convention developed 
within the context of a separate community of practitioners (lawyers, judges) and 
academic researchers as to the validity of a legal argument. Are there any similarities 
between them or important differences that might lead to misunderstandings? Our 
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focus will not be here on positive law, but on the normative presuppositions about 
what constitutes valid evidence in econometrics and in law; (ii) what are the different 
options available to legal decision-makers about fitting econometrics in the different 
conceptual ―boxes‖ of evidence law? 
 
4.1.2.1. Internal and External standards of validity in econometrics and interaction 
with the law of evidence 
In this section we will examine the following questions: (i) taking into account the 
existing standards of internal and external validity in econometrics, do econometrics 
constitute evidence? and (ii) is it possible to make a causal claim in law based on 
econometric evidence?  
 
4.1.2.1.1. Do econometrics constitute evidence? 
In order to answer this question, it is crucial to define what exactly is meant by the 
concept of evidence. In a legal context, evidence has been defined as  
―any facts considered by the tribunal as data to persuade them to reach a 
reasoned belief on a probandum. The term is sometimes used to refer to 
evidential data or autoptic preferences and sometimes to refer to other facts 
taken as established for purposes of argument‖304. 
The law of evidence is agnostic and open as to the kind of facts (data or autoptic 
preferences, that is testimonial assertions, e.g. evidence that will be perceived by the 
tribunal through one of its senses) presented to the tribunal or, more broadly, the legal 
decision-maker (e.g. a competition authority) as long as these are provided with the 
aim to persuade the decision-maker to reach a reasoned belief on a probandum. One 
could narrow down this functional definition of evidence by including the 
characteristics of this evidence, but this is generally a different operation that has to 
do with the question of how credible this evidence is and what is its probative value. 
Most recent efforts to replace the concept of ―evidence‖ with that of ―information in 
litigation‖ in order to transcend sharp distinctions between ―fact‖ on the one hand and 
―value‖, ―law‖ and ―opinion‖ on the other, illustrate the openness of the legal system 
on the question of what constitutes evidence.  
 On the contrary, econometrics and more generally the social sciences have 
developed a narrower view of what may be considered as ―evidence‖. According to 
some authors, 
―scientific evidence  means, […] the more or less observable outcomes of 
scientific tests such as experiments, statistical analyses and surveys‖ […] 
means hint, sign, indication of or a reason to believe (the negation of) a 
scientific hypothesis […] (something that furnishes) proof of or good or 
cogent reason to believe (the negation of) a hypothesis‖305. 
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Evidence can have a variety of different features, depending on the theory of evidence 
one takes and the object, methodology and tools employed by the specific scientific 
discipline. In science, the notion of evidence is thus closely related to that of induction 
(that is, the question of what kids of inferences someone is justified to make, given 
the evidence at hand)
306
. Yet, there are different conceptions of induction and 
consequently confirmation
307
.  It follows that different conceptions of confirmation 
may lead to different views of what constitutes evidence. If one takes Popper‘s 
falsificationism and the hypothetico-deductive method of hypothesis testing, evidence 
may be characterized as ―a proposition that is implied by a hypothesis but which is 
ruled out by others‖. From a Bayesian confirmation theory perspective and its 
subjective interpretation of probability as degree of belief, evidence is a proposition 
that should be capable to ―raise the degree of belief in the hypothesis‖ and that it is 
―probabilistically relevant to the hypothesis‖308.  Other accounts of confirmation 
theory require that for being considered as evidence the proposition should make the 
hypothesis more likely than an alternative hypothesis or that it be more likely than its 
negation or that it provides reason to believe the hypothesis
309
.  
 It follows that there might be some conflict between the broad view of 
evidence in the legal context and the narrow view that one might have in the context 
of social sciences, in our case, econometrics. If one chooses the option to adopt the 
narrow view, the presence of a variety of conceptions of what constitutes evidence 
will present an insurmountable problem to the legal decision-maker, as she will have 
to choose a particular conception of evidence or to engage in the construction of a 
new widely-acceptable view of evidence in the context of social sciences, before 
transposing this to the legal context. It is clear that the first option presents important 
risks and subjects the concept of evidence selected to epistemological attacks by 
proponents of a different view. The second option is practically unavailable because 
of the complexity of the task, the limited amount of time the legal decision-maker 
disposes and the expected failure of completing a task that great thinkers in 
philosophy, statistics and science have been trying to achieve for centuries without 
however managing to reach consensus to this date. Hence, because of practical 
considerations at least, the legal decision-maker should leave open the question of 
specifying exactly what constitutes evidence and should explore the evidential basis 
of a claim without having a full definition of evidence at hand.  
 Yet, this agnostic approach on evidence will not lead the legal decision-maker 
to accept any information as evidence. The decision-maker may decide that she will 
hear as evidence only information that has already been accepted with good reason 
because it relies on some metaphysical assumptions widely accepted by the wider 
                                                          
306
 By induction, we mean enumerative induction (inference froma  finite number of observations to 
generalization), projection (inference from a finite number of observations to the next case), 
explanatory inference (inference from observations to a hypothesis that best explains them). 
307
 Historically, confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what 
to believe regarding the future in the face of knowledge that is restricted to the present and the past.  
308
 D. Fennell, Is structural econometrics evidence-based?, CPNSS working papers, (LSE 2008), p. 5. 
309
 Ibid. 
 83 
community or because it relies on an appropriate testing method which generates 
inferences. This is particularly true for evidence provided by (expert) witnesses, 
which have a peculiar position compared to other witnesses, as, first, they are allowed 
to testify not only on matters of facts they had personally witnessed, but on inferences 
from facts or classes of facts that others may have reported and, second, they 
represent ―persistent communities of practice outside the legal domain‖310.  
It is possible here for the legal decision-maker to make a choice between two 
different strategies: either to exclude some information based on some criteria, before 
even the operation of assessing its probative force, or to accept to hear all information 
provided. We have defined elsewhere the first strategy as manifesting an 
―exclusionary ethos‖ linked to the common law‘s traditional preference for regulating 
the admissibility of evidence
311
. This is done by looking to the quality and validity of 
the information provided, according to the standards of validity developed by the 
―persistent community of practice‖ to which the expert belongs (in essence an 
epistemological analysis focusing on methodology), and/or to adopt shortcuts to 
determine the value of  the information (such as the expert‘s credentials). The second 
strategy might be linked to what we have called elsewhere ―a discursive ethos‖, which 
will engage critically with the ―evidence‖ by weighing it and/or developing 
appropriate standards of proof referring to the quantity/quality of evidence needed in 
order to persuade the decision maker that an allegation is true, but without excluding 
any information in litigation a priori. We have extensively argued for the second 
approach elsewhere and we have criticized the development of the Daubert standards 
for the admissibility of evidence in the United States as not being an appropriate 
model for assessing economic (and econometric) evidence in Europe
312
. Our approach 
recognizes that legal decision-makers should not proceed in an epistemological 
analysis of the reasons we should believe what a particular method tells us, by looking 
to the appropriateness of the method for a given situation and why the method gives 
us reason to believe its results for that situation, before hearing all information 
provided, within the strictures permitted by the rules of civil or administrative 
procedure (e.g. by the parties, internal expertise of the authority, other experts 
appointed by the court/authority or by the parties, amicus curiae etc). Indeed, if any 
epistemological analysis of the information in litigation should be conducted, this 
should take place when examining the relation between the evidence and the causal 
claims (hence at the level of establishing causality). This view also takes into account 
that the practical context of a legal dispute is different from that of a scientific one
313
. 
From that perspective, econometrics submitted in legal disputes constitutes evidence. 
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This acceptance of course does not respond to the question if it is possible to make a 
causal claim based on econometric evidence. 
 
4.1.2.1.2. Is it possible to make a causal claim in law based on econometric evidence? 
To answer this question we may proceed as in the previous section. This will first 
require the definition of the legal conception of causality before examining its 
possible connection with the econometric conception of causality. Should the concept 
of causality be similar in law and in econometrics, one would, practically speaking, 
expect that econometric evidence may prove a causal claim in law simply by fulfilling 
the conditions for causal claims in econometrics to be considered as valid (internally 
and externally), assuming equal levels of standard of proof for evidence to carry belief 
in both law and econometrics. There are reasons of course to believe that the levels set 
for evidence to carry conviction are not the same in law and econometrics, because of 
differences in the practical context of the inquiry and its overall purpose. Yet, if there 
is a similar concept of causality, it would be possible to isolate, for example, the 
variables relating to the practical context and proceed to the creation of a conceptual 
framework in law by borrowing directly from the conceptual framework of 
econometrics. 
 One can observe that while the general concept of causality is certainly used in 
sciences (natural and social), in law, the concept employed to refer to a causal inquiry 
is the narrower one of causation. In a nutshell, causation refers to causal connections 
between events
314
. It can thus be considered as a species of causality with the practical 
objective to explain the occurrence of particular events, to control events and to 
attribute moral responsibility to agents whose action has provoked the events, the idea 
being that among the variety of relationships between events (e.g. agency and harm), 
only some of them will be considered as causal in law (legal causation). That depends 
on the functions pursued by causation in law. Causation in law exercises two 
functions: it is backward looking/explanatory and attributive (e.g. fixing the degree of 
responsibility of agents for the outcomes that follow their agency intervention in the 
world)
315
. In contrast, the statistical causality of econometrics has a different purpose, 
as its main function is forward looking (e.g. to predict future events); it also adopts an 
empirical view of causation that focuses on regularity or constant conjunction as a 
necessary condition for causation. This is not the approach generally followed by 
causation in law
316
. 
In law, the link that should be established between events for it to be 
considered as causal is special; all the necessary conditions of an event are not equal. 
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Which links are considered as constituting a cause in the sense of legal causation is a 
question that would be either determined by reference to the general concept of 
causality, applied in a non-legal context
317
 (option 1), or according to the logic of 
condition as applied in law, where the special link that must be established between 
particular aspects of events depends on the relevant legal category examined (option 
2). For example, one would focus on different aspects of events if the legal category 
examined is negligence, as opposed to fault. Here we have also a choice between two 
options: either to examine questions of causation in the light of the logic of 
conditions, in particular necessary (a cause is necessary or required to produce the 
result) and sufficient (a cause is sufficient or enough to cause the results) condition 
(option 2A), or to be open to all causal links but at the same time define a specific 
feature that the cause must possess in relation to the consequence in order for the 
causal connection to be considered made (adequate, proximate, direct causation). In 
this case, the determination of the specific feature can be perceived either as a genuine 
causal matter or as a causally relevant condition – ―cause in fact‖ [e.g. but for 
condition, a jointly sufficient set of conditions, such as NESS or INUS condition
318
] 
(option 2B1) or be addressed as a question of (legal) policy on the distribution of 
social risks (e.g. what is the fairest or the most efficient way to distribute 
responsibility/share social risks), which is an issue that will not receive the same 
answer in all areas of law and might also open the door to considerations coming from 
theories of causality outside the law (e.g. economics) (option 2B2)
319
.  
The analysis of the concept of causation applied in the area of competition law 
is a matter for further research
320
, yet one can already remark that the generalization 
of the use of counterfactuals in some areas of competition law, as a consequence of 
the shift towards an ―effects-based‖ economic approach in EU competition law321, 
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may indicate that EU competition law borrows from the general theory of causality 
(option 1) or at least from theories of causality outside the law (option 2B2). If that‘s 
the case, then one could expect fewer conflicts with the way causal connections are 
established in econometrics. 
The definition of the appropriate criterion of causality in econometrics is the 
product of historic evolution and compromise. Econometrics is a rather young 
discipline, whose formal date of birth as a separate field is set in 1933 with the 
foundation of the Econometric society, the aim of which was to unify the theoretical-
quantitative approach with the empirical-quantitative approach to economics
322
. In the 
words of Kevin Hoover econometrics is ―statistics that is centrally conditioned by 
economic theory‖323. It is well known that the main concern of a methodology of 
statistics is the proper interpretation of probability and how it applies to data. 
Econometrics differs from statistics in several ways.  
First, in econometrics, economic theory provides the blueprint for the specific 
set ups that will generate probabilities. The role of economic theory will be in this 
case ―to provide the conditions that articulate such a well-defined set-up: a 
nomological (or law generating) machine‖ and the ―identification needed to render 
statistics economically interpretable‖324. Hence, one should have the right theory to 
identify the model. The application of statistical techniques to economics 
(econometrics) presents thus very different characteristics than their application to 
other social sciences, as ―economics is a discipline with a theory325‖, a factor that 
accentuates the a priorist dimension of econometrics (the inferential direction runs 
from theory to data). Contrary to the use of statistics in sociology, econometrics do 
not aim to connect raw data and causes but to measure the laws of economics, that is 
to establish a connection between causes and laws, whether the laws be in functional 
or in probabilistic form. Econometrics does not test theories but is simply ―a tool of 
approximation of known theoretical relationships applied to data‖326.  This implicitly 
assumes that the fundamental laws of economics are causal laws. The fact that 
economics, until recently, was not open to experiments, as other social sciences (such 
as psychology) are, has led to a dominant role for a priori theory. Yet, one should not 
forget that although causal relations may be inferred from the distribution of 
probabilities resulting from a controlled experiment, it is still not possible to export 
these causal conclusions from one situation to another
327
, so even experimental 
economics would have been confronted to the same problem.  
Second, contrary to statistics, econometrics focuses on establishing causation, 
while statistics is content with correlation
328
. The role of econometrics in policy 
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evaluation may offer an explanation for this important difference. Furthermore, 
econometrics does not treat directly with reality but involves the use of models. One 
could conceive the ―theory-data confrontation‖ as an empirical analysis in which 
theoretical arguments play an essential role. As it is noted by Stigum, 
―There is a unifying framework within which we can view the different 
activities in economic theory-data confrontations. All have a core structure 
consisting of three parts: two disjoint universes, one for theory and one for 
data, and a bridge between them. The theory universe is populated by 
theoretical objects that have all the features that the theory ascribes to them. 
The elements in the data universe are observations from which we create data 
for the theory-data confrontation. The bridge is built on assertions that 
describe the way that elements in the two universes are related to one 
another‖329. 
Economic theory drives the selection of observations (through a data generation 
process that goes from sample population on whose characteristics observations are 
based to observations, that is data that the researcher has constructed with the help of 
a theory forming part of the data universe, ―in which all the pertinent data variables 
reside‖), as well as the interpretation of the specific theory that will be used (the 
theory universe) and which will interact with the data universe through the bridge 
principles
330. The theory universe comprises theoretical objects that ―describe toys in 
a toy economy‖: The variables in the data universe also live and function in a socially 
constructed world of ideas that has little to do with economic reality
331
. The bridge 
consists of principles that relate variables in the theory universe with variables in the 
data universe. The bridge principles in a theory-data confrontation reflect the 
researcher‘s beliefs as to how her theoretical and data variables are related to one 
another. This is done for econometrics by referring to economic theorems, which will 
delineate conditions under which bridge principles are justified. In essence the make-
up of the data depends on the theory and the design of the particular empirical 
analysis. Both the world of theory and the world of data are socially constructed and 
have little in common with the true social reality to be explained, which raises 
important questions on the relevance of econometrics to social reality. The ―riddle‖ is 
how to combine elements from a ―toy economy‖ with elements from a ―socially 
constructed world of ideas‖ to learn something about social reality332. Bridge 
principles, such as models, ―stipulate the mapping between theoretical variables […] 
and their statistical counterparts‖333. The worlds of theory and of data, as well as the 
bridge principles, are thus presented as axiomatized systems, hence they constitute 
formal systems. Models provide a consistent interpretation of these formal systems, 
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hence implying that we may have a multiplicity of models for a given theory: 
―different models of one and the same theory may describe very different matters‖334.  
As economics is based on logical positivism and its axiomatized view of 
science, the hypothetical-deductive method enables the formulation of explanations 
and predictions. Ceteris paribus clauses enable the generalization of hypotheses made 
to the real world. An alternative is to adopt ―an inductive statistical explanation, in 
which laws hold only probabilistically and the inferences are not to what happens but 
to the probability that it happens‖335. Econometrics takes the second route. 
Following the pioneering work of Haavelmo, probability models have been 
applied to economic data
336
. Haavelmo argued that quantitative economic models 
must necessarily be probability models in order to incorporate randomness. The 
models cannot be deterministic, as economic data is not deterministic (because of 
human agency). Once it is acknowledged that an economic model is a probability 
model, it follows naturally that the best way to quantify, estimate, and conduct 
inferences about the economy is through mathematical statistics (multivariate 
statistical techniques, such as multiple regression). In a regression the causes are 
correlated with their effects (in the simple configuration of a regression yi=α+βx1+e, 
where yi is the dependent variable, α and β are the regression parameters, e is the error 
term and the subscript denotes the observation number, y and x are correlated 
positively or negatively if β differs from zero in the regression [hereinafter, 
equation]). In the probabilistic approach, models are often characterized in terms of 
parameters, which are numerical measures describing important characteristics of the 
model. A regression equation if it is properly specified enables the decision-maker to 
account for the naturally occurring variations in economically important factors and 
thus acts as a surrogate to the missing in econometrics explicit experimental controls. 
The regression coefficient will provide an estimate of the effects of a particular 
explanatory (independent) variable on a dependent variable (the variable to explain). 
Yet, as it is noted by Cartwright, in probabilistic accounts of causality, as the one used 
in econometrics, ―deductions are from probabilities to causes, not from statistics – i.e. 
summaries of data‖, which can be ―a source of uncertainty about the premises of the 
deductions‖; in addition, ―there might be probabilistic dependencies that have no 
causal source and we might even be mistaken in inferring probabilities from the 
data‖337. 
According to Haavelmo, ―the class of scientific statements that can be 
expressed in probability terms is enormous‖ and in fact contains all the economic 
"laws" that ―have, so far, been formulated‖338. Indeed, it we want ―to apply statistical 
inference to testing the hypotheses of economic theory, it implies such a formulation 
of economic theories that they represent statistical hypotheses, i.e., statements-
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perhaps very broad ones-regarding certain probability distributions‖339. The model 
―attains economic meaning only after a corresponding system of quantities or objects 
in real economic life has been chosen or described, in order to be identified with those 
in the model‖ (the identification problem)340.  For example, the identification problem 
involves the choice of what constitutes endogenous and exogenous variables in an 
econometric analysis. Economic theory indicates which factors are the appropriate 
ones in the context of model specification. Model specification involves different 
operations: (i) the choice of the right sample, that is a selection of data, from the 
population to obtain estimates of the values of the parameters of the model, (ii) 
choosing the appropriate variable for analyzing the question in hand (dependent 
variable), (iii) choosing the explanatory (independent) variable(s) relevant to the 
question at issue and additional explanatory variables, in case a preliminary analysis 
shows the unexplained portion of the multiple regression to be particularly high and 
that there are other previously undetected variables missing, (iv) choosing the 
functional form of the multiple regression model (linear or non linear forms) and the 
appropriate multivariate statistical technique for the analysis (multiple regression, 
logit, etc). Then, it is important to find satisfactory methods of actually measuring 
those economic relations which it could be meaningful to confront with facts (after 
the question of identification has been sorted). The calculus of probability provides an 
appropriate tool. 
The criteria for the right mapping between theory and data and thus the 
possibility to make causal inferences have been set by a Commission of experts, the 
Cowles Commission in the 1940s in the United States
341
. The Cowles Commission 
followed a a priori/structural perspective to causality as it relies on a priori 
identifying assumptions, which are provided by economic theory. It emphasizes the 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables and proceeds with the 
identification and estimation of structural parameters for the models, as opposed to a 
process approach. As it is explained by Fennell, the deductive approach of structural 
econometrics involves first the use of (economic) theory and auxiliary hypotheses to 
construct an abstract causal model which gives the dependent variables (the variable 
to explain) as a function of the independent variables
342
. Error terms represent the net 
impact of omitted causal factors on some endogenous variables. The method thus 
begins by assuming that a particular set of functional forms correctly represents the 
causal structure generating the observed data. The next step involves using the data to 
parameterise the model. This is an operation that involves the measuring of the 
strengths of causal impacts of one variable on another, by measuring structural 
parameters. The aim of the operation is to discover the parameters that turn these 
functional forms into real functions, where any factor that appears with a non-zero 
parameter on the right side of the equation (see above) is judged to be a cause of that 
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effect. Once the parameter is measured, it gives the strength of causal influence 
between the variables. The model is called ‗structural‘ because it is supposed to 
represent the true causal structures among the quantities considered. Contrary to 
descriptive statistics which tell you about the correlations that happen to hold in the 
data, causal claims in econometrics tell you what will happen to y if you change x. 
Yet, as it is noted by Fennell, these causal claims are conditional on the many 
assumptions made:  
―What evidence is there for the crucial theoretical and background 
assumptions supporting the choice of model, for the assumption that the 
functional form chosen actually represents the causal structure generating the 
data; that the error terms do accurately measure the influence of omitted causal 
factors, that exogenous factors are not caused by any endogenous factors, and 
finally that exogenous variables do not have causes that cause an endogenous 
variable via an unmodelled path. Moreover, what reason is there to accept the 
concept of causality presupposed in the model and the relationships it 
presupposes between probabilistic relationships and causal claims?‖343. 
The criticisms of Christopher Sims on the inadequacy of structural equations 
to represent the numerous interdependencies among the variables and his suggestion 
of  vector auto-regression models (VAR) as a technique enabling the data to speak by 
taking an inferential and process oriented approach, as opposed to the a priorist 
structural approach of the Cowles Commission
344
, as well as the emergence of the 
LSE methodology and that of the calibration method illustrate the absence of 
consensus in econometrics on the issue of the causal inferences to be made from the 
estimates on economic reality. One could identify many different approaches of 
causality: the structural approach of the Cowles Commission used in econometrics, 
the more inferential/process oriented Granger causality used for dynamic time-series 
models in economic theory or the counterfactual approach of causality
345
. From these 
three, only the counterfactual approach to causality has been transplanted to 
competition law for the time being, in the form of the various counterfactual tests 
employed in the application of Articles 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and merger control. 
 Consequently, it is not possible to infer causation in competition law between 
two events (e.g. some anticompetitive conduct and a potential increase in price or 
reduction of quality) based on a clausal claim presented in the form of some 
econometric analysis.  
 Once it is clear that the legal concept of causation and causality in 
econometrics are not similar concepts, it becomes impossible to infer causation in law 
from causality in econometrics. A possible way ahead would be to develop a meta-
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theory or meta-analysis that would integrate these different expressions/forms of 
causality in a unitary framework. This approach raises a philosophical question, as it 
presupposes that there is a concept of causality at the first place, or at least an account 
of causality that ―provides a characterization of a single set of features that 
distinguishes all causal from noncausal relations‖346. This view is not shared by 
adepts of causal pluralism, who emphasize that causation is one word but ―many 
things‖ and who advance a ―multi-faceted‖, ―loose‖ concept of ―causes‖ or talk about 
―different kinds of causal system‖347. Reiss analyzes the claim of causal pluralism as 
equivalent to pluralism about evidence for causal claims
348
. He distinguishes between 
different accounts of causation: counterfactual accounts, regularity accounts, 
mechanistic accounts, probabilistic accounts, interventionist accounts. As previously 
explained, econometrics adopt a largely probabilistic account of causality, while law 
can be classified within Reiss‘ typology as closer to an interventionist account of 
causality, this concept of cause involving the idea that the manipulation of a cause 
will result in the manipulation of an effect, an idea implicit in the necessary and 
sufficient condition approach or the but for approach in legal causation. Yet, one may 
consider these different accounts as different manifestations of the principle of 
causality, as providing evidence or test conditions for the existence of a causal 
relationship. One can therefore advance ―different kinds of evidence for theoretical 
claims‖ about causation and use different methods to show causality349. However, this 
does not solve the problem of the possibility that alternative accounts of causation 
provide different explanations. For Reiss, in this context, ―we face a case of causation 
where the different concepts do not coapply‖350.Yet, it is important to consider the 
―practical purposes‖ of the causal claims made and to understand the value that these 
have with regard to the realization of the purposes of the decision-maker (scientist, 
policy-maker)
351
. Causal claims in an econometric setting will relate primarily to 
prediction; hence ―patterns in the data‖ will be ―deemed causal because they are 
useful for the prediction of the results of policy intervention‖352 . In essence, ―(w)hat 
kind of causal hypothesis should be investigated (and, in tandem, what kind of 
evidence should be sought) therefore is to be determined on the basis of purpose 
pursued in the given context‖353. Hence, different kinds of evidence for causal 
relationships tend to support different types of causal claims
354
. 
 Some other authors have attempted to provide a more unified framework for 
the concept of causation, which could be of interest to our study, should we decide 
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that a meta-theory of causation in both law and econometrics is needed. While 
accepting that ―causal relationships are, in principle, infinite in their diversity‖, 
Gerring advances ―a prima facie case for a unified account of causation‖, in view of 
the ―little profit‖ of a plural account355. While his thesis of an underlying probabilistic 
concept of causation shared by all accounts is not helpful for our analysis, his 
definition of a set of logical criteria applying to all arguments that are causal in nature 
across fields and methods, presents a particular interest for our study. Gerring 
distinguishes between ―the formal properties of a causal argument and the methods by 
which such argument might be tested‖356. Drawing on the commonalities of the 
heterogeneous approaches in social sciences Gerring suggests sixteen formal 
properties of causal argument, which relate to the formation of causal propositions. 
These are listed in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Causal Propositions: Formal Criteria
357
 
 
1. Specification (clarification, operationalization, falsifiability) 
(a) What are the positive and negative outcomes (the factual and the 
counterfactual, or the range of variation) that the proposition describes, predicts, or 
explains? 
(b) What is the set of cases (the population, context, domain, contrast-space, 
frame, or base-line), that the proposition is intended to explain? 
(c) Is the argument internally consistent (does it imply contradictory 
outcomes)? 
(d) Are the key terms operational? 
 
2. Precision 
How precise is the proposition? 
 
3. Breadth (scope, range, domain, generality, population) 
What range of instances are covered by the proposition? 
 
4. Boundedness (non-arbitrariness, coherence) 
Is the specified population logical, coherent? Does the domain make sense? 
 
5. Completeness (power, richness, thickness, detail) 
How many features, or how much variation, is accounted for by the proposition? How 
strong is the relationship? 
 
6. Parsimony (economy, efficiency, simplicity, reduction, Ockham’s razor) 
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How parsimonious is the proposition? 
 
7. Differentiation (exogeneity) (antonym: endogeneity) 
Is the X differentiable from the Y? Is the cause separate, logically and empirically, 
from the outcome to be explained? 
 
8. Priority 
How much temporal or causal priority does X enjoy vis-a-vis Y? 
 
9. Independence (exogeneity, asymmetry, recursiveness) (antonyms: endogeneity, 
reciprocality, symmetry, feedback) 
How independent is X relative to other Xs, and to Y? 
 
10. Contingency (abnormality) 
Is the X contingent, relative to other possible Xs? Does the causal explanation 
conform to our understanding of the normal course of events? 
 
11. Mechanism (causal narrative) 
Is there a plausible mechanism connecting X to Y? 
 
12. Analytic utility (logical economy) (antonyms: idiosyncrasy, ad-hocery) 
Does the proposition fit with what we know about the world? Does it help to unify 
that knowledge? 
 
13. Intelligibility (accessibility) 
How intelligible is the proposition? 
 
14. Relevance (societal significance) 
How relevant is the proposition to a lay audience or to policymakers? Does it matter? 
 
15. Innovation (novelty) 
How innovative is the proposition? 
 
16. Comparison 
Are there better explanations for a given outcome? Is the purported X superior (along 
criteria 1–15) to other possible Xs? Have all reasonable counter-hypotheses been 
explored? 
 
Yet, Gerring also considers the ―adjoining problem of induction‖, that is, ―the 
probative elements of causal argument‖358. This involves the development of seven 
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factors that characterize a good from a less good research design and could assist a 
decision-maker in testing causal propositions. These are also listed in the table below: 
 
Table 2. Causal Propositions: Criteria of Research Design
359
 
 
1. Plenitude (evidence) 
How many cases? How large is the sample (N)? 
 
2. Comparability (equivalence, unit homogeneity, cross-case validity) (antonym: 
uniqueness) 
2. (a) Descriptive comparability (conceptual validity): How comparable are the Xs 
and the Y? 
2. (b) Causal comparability: How similar are the cases with respect to factors that 
might affect Y or the X:Y relationship of interest? Finally, can any remaining dis 
similarities be taken into account (controlled, modelled)? 
 
3. Independence (antonyms: autocorrelation, Galton’s problem, contamination)  
How independent are the cases with respect to factors that might affect Y or the X:Y 
relationship of interest? Can any remaining interdependencies be taken into account 
(controlled, modelled)? 
 
4. Representativeness (external validity) (antonyms: sample bias, selection bias) 
Are the cases representative of the population with respect to all factors that might 
affect Y or the X:Y relationship of interest? Can any remaining un-representative 
elements be taken into account (controlled, modeled)? 
 
5. Variation (variance) 
Do the cases offer variation (a) on Y, (b) on relevant Xs, (c) without collinearity, and 
(d) within a particular case(s)? 
 
6. Transparency (process-tracing) 
Does the research design offer evidence about the process (i.e. the intermediate 
factors) by which X affects Y? 
 
7. Replicability (reliability) 
Can the research design be replicated? Are the results reliable? 
 
The ability to adjudicate between rival arguments is certainly an important 
task for the European Commission and the courts. The inability, at least of the courts, 
to assess econometric arguments in an evidential context that is increasingly 
characterized by multi-disciplinarity brings to the fore the question of the evaluation 
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of various kinds of evidence and claims of causality. By providing a unitary ―criterial‖ 
framework for the evaluation of causation, John Gerring‘s approach may provide to 
the courts the necessary tools to evaluate different kinds of evidence without 
necessarily sacrificing the diversity of causal arguments, by adopting a hegemonic, 
econometric-centred or legal-centred, view of causality. 
A quantitative way to combine research results from a range of studies is 
meta-analysis. Meta-analysis identifies a common metric of effect size and models it 
using some form of regression in which the results of the individual studies figure as 
inputs. Meta-analyses have a variety of advantages over alternatives, such as the 
increase in statistical power and the ability to control for a variety of sources of error. 
Obviously, only statistical evidence can be combined (it is not possible to combine 
econometric evidence with documentary or other qualitative evidence) and it requires 
that the different individual studies to be integrated with each other deal with the same 
hypothesis. Yet meta-analysis assumes that we have access to lots of details about the 
cases, which is not always the case. It is also hard to combine cases from different 
industries due to the idiosyncrasies of each industry. Nevertheless it‘s still a useful 
exercise for narrowly defined topics
360
.  
 
4.1.2.2. Fitting econometrics in the evidence law toolbox: options for the regulation 
of the probative value of econometric evidence 
Recognizing the probative value of econometrics as a source of evidence in 
competition law is one thing. Assessing the credibility and relevance of the specific 
econometric analysis presented in a case is another. One could imagine that the 
second question should be left to the experts: the econometricians presenting this 
evidence in regulatory and other legal proceedings. Yet, the conception of experts as 
neutral and impartial communicators of a scientific truth, when they act in a legal 
context, appears out-dated and largely inaccurate. Assuming a realist epistemology (as 
it is assumed by the authors), one cannot ignore the possible biases that might affect 
the expert‘s pronouncements: these biases are related to the expert‘s personal, 
financial and intellectual interests
361
.  
Adopting a Weberian approach
362, Davies‘s work explores the inward and 
external vocations of antitrust economists. He notes that antitrust government 
economists are intensively engaged with academic groups in their discipline and seek 
publicity and transparency on their work, through academic publications, which is 
unusual for bureaucrats. There exist also important differences as to the normative 
presuppositions of each group: bureaucratic economists carry more (neo-classical 
theory) presuppositions and exclude more questions of worth than academic 
economists; the empirical mind-set seems also more entrenched with bureaucratic 
economists. What transpires from Davies‘ work is that the ―overlap between the 
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scientific and the bureaucratic political vocation‖ of antitrust bureaucratic economists 
―leads to an intensification of certain norms and rituals‖363 A similar argument can be 
made a propos of competition economists or econometricians working in the private 
consultancy sector
364
. Their loyalties are divided between their vocation as scientists, 
but also their implicit role as advocates of the litigants‘ perspective, as their analysis 
forms part of a legal argument.
365
. The market for expertise, and the possible 
reputation costs of an improper expert submission, cannot also be trusted to mitigate 
entirely the risks of expert bias, in presence of an important informational asymmetry, 
as it is expected to be even more the case with the sophisticated econometric evidence 
presented in competition law cases. The rare instances when forensic experts were 
appointed by the courts, does not also modify this conclusion. One could start from 
the hypothesis that every knowledge created to serve policy needs, in this occurrence 
the ―regulatory science‖ of forensic econometrics, is sociologically distinct from other 
forms of knowledge and in particular its academic/ ―ordinary science‖ counterpart. 
Regulatory science is actively developed in response to practical contingencies and 
produced by social groups engaged in particular activities. Knowledge is thus socially 
determined. Mannheim refers to these extra-theoretical factors that are not driven by 
the ―inner dialectic‖ of the thought366. We assume that the conditions of the existence 
of an idea, its historical and social genesis, exercise an inevitable influence on its 
content and form. Every assertion can thus only be relationally formulated: an 
assertion by an econometrician in the context of a trial or regulatory decision-making 
should be assessed differently than her assertion in the context of a purely academic 
discussion.  
Delegating the task of assessing the credibility of econometric evidence 
exclusively to the community of expert (forensic) econometricians is not thus a (good) 
option. Increasingly, the legal system has taken stock of the challenges presented by 
econometric and sophisticated economic evidence and has intervened to regulate the  
way this evidence is assessed and to explore its probative value, although the principle 
remains of course the free evaluation of evidence. In Europe, this task has been 
mainly exercised by the various competition authorities, who developed soft law 
guidelines discussing ―best practices‖ for the submission and assessment of economic 
and econometric evidence in administrative
367
, as well as in judicial proceedings
368
. 
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We will refer to the Best practices recently published by the European 
Commission for illustration purposes, although a similar analysis may be conducted 
for all other soft law texts regulating the submission and assessment of economic 
evidence published by the various competition authorities across Europe. Because of 
the inherent limitations of the judicial review system in Europe and the quite recent 
evolution towards a more intensive judicial control of the Commission‘s decisions, 
EU courts have been largely absent from the analysis of econometric evidence, and in 
the few cases that such evidence was examined, the courts did not focus on the 
intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the evidence, but simply addressed the arguments of 
the parties and concluded that in view of the margin of discretion  from which benefit 
the Commission in economic matters, if the econometric data submitted by the parties 
have been addressed in detail in the Commission‘s decision, the Commission cannot 
be found to exceed the margins of its discretion
369
. The Court also observed that the 
econometric analysis of the Commission confirmed and complemented the 
conclusions derived from the qualitative evidence, hence any claim that the 
interpretation of the regression results by the Commission is misleading should not 
affect as such its probative value, taking into account the ―accessory‖ role attributed 
to this evidence by the Commission in its decision
370
. As Yves Botteman observed in 
an article published in 2006, after examining the case law of the Court reviewing 
merger decisions of the Commission,  
―[…] European Courts have not yet deeply delved into considerations that relate 
to how the econometric models are constructed and which parameters have (and 
should have) been taken into account. Rather, the Courts so far have reviewed the 
extent to which an economic study supports the argument that either the 
Commission or a party is trying to put in the administrative or judicial 
proceedings‖371. 
The EU Courts have not been brought to adjudicate between conflicting econometric 
studies presented by the parties and the Commission that would prima facie be 
equally plausible. As the Ryanair case illustrates, they avoid performing a relative 
plausibility analysis, which would look to the internal and external validity of the 
econometric evidence, by finding subterfuge in the discretion the Commission 
benefits in economic and technical appraisals. The most recent case law of the 
European courts on the intensity of judicial review for decisions imposing fines seems 
unlikely to change this timid approach. This view contrasts with the more active 
involvement of US courts in the assessment of the internal and external validity of 
econometric evidence, some examples of which we will be examining at the final part 
of this section. 
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 Before exploring in detail the content of these best practices, it is important to 
note that, contrary to the more procedure-oriented best practices for the conduct of 
proceedings in the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU that the Commission 
adopted during the same period of time, which were published at the Official Journal 
of the EU and are thus legally binding (for the Commission)
372
, the best practices on 
the submission of economic evidence have not to this date been published to the 
Official Journal and have been explicitly referred to as a DG Competition discussion 
paper, not a Commission notice, hence they do not have any legal effect
373
 and in no 
case can they create new rights or obligations or alter the rights and obligations 
arising from the Treaty, secondary legislation and the case law of the Courts
374
. The 
Commission also notes that the recommendations included in the document may not 
always apply, as the specificity of some individual cases may require an adaptation or 
deviation from them, and that they should be interpreted ―in light of procedural and 
resource constraints‖375. Their purpose is not normative but they aim instead to 
provide incentives to undertakings to submit economic and econometric evidence in 
the most effective way, so that this evidence has the greatest evidentiary impact. Yet, 
the document can provide very useful insights on the probative value of such 
evidence.  
 According to the Commission, the role of economic (and econometric) 
analysis is to provide a framework for explanation of how each particular market 
operates and how competitive interactions take place, as well as to be a tool of 
prediction of the ―possible consequences of the practices‖ and of the ―direction and 
magnitude‖ of these effects376. Explanation (in the form of diagnosis) and prediction 
constitute the two flips of the same coin, according to the positivist view of science 
(the deductive-nomological model of Hempel), which the Commission seems to 
adopt
377
. Yet, as it is noted in the Best Practices, economic analysis needs to be 
―framed‖ in a way that enables the decision-maker to use ―in an effective way reliable 
and relevant evidence‖ within the statutory time limit in which a decision has to be 
adopted
378
. This implies that, taking into account this practical constraint, to 
determine ―the relevance and significance of an economic analysis for a particular 
case‖, one should ―assess its intrinsic quality from a technical perspective, i.e. 
whether it has been generated and presented in a way that meets adequate technical 
requirements prevalent in the profession‖379.  
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The highlighted part of the quote did not appear in the first draft of the Best 
Practices, but was added in a later version. One could note that, contrary to the legal 
profession, which is organized in a closed manner, with accreditation procedures, self-
regulated by bar councils/associations and subject to strict ethical standards and codes 
of conduct, econometricians and economists are not formally organized as a 
―profession‖: there is no accreditation procedure, no ethical standards or codes of 
conduct, no formal competition forensic economists associations equivalent to the bar 
councils and associations. Yet, the absence of a framework does not make 
econometricians less of a profession than lawyers. As it has been noted elsewhere 
380
, 
the conceptual framework developed by MS Larson might be helpful in understanding 
the process by which, forensic economists, as producers of special services, seek to 
constitute and control a market for their expertise
381
. Larson highlights how the 
constitution of professional markets, a process that began in the nineteenth century, 
was an attempt to translate special knowledge and skills to social and economic 
monopolistic rewards. She notes that the first phase of professionalization came 
through the constitution of professional associations and the subsequent closure of the 
domain through accreditation and professional examinations. Yet, this is a strategy 
that characterizes the rise of the traditional professions in the 19
th
 century (law, 
medicine) but does not reflect the more sophisticated strategies adopted at the later 
stages of the development of the ―professional project‖ by other professions. Larson 
refers to the importance of developing a ―cognitive basis‖ as a mechanism to control 
the providers of professional services in order to standardize and thus identify the 
commodity they provide
382. However, as she also remarks, ―a cognitive basis of any 
kind had to be at least approximately defined before the rising modern professions 
could negotiate cognitive exclusiveness – that is, before they could convincingly 
establish a teaching monopoly on their specific tools and techniques, while claiming 
absolute superiority for them‖383. The monopoly is thus constituted by the linkage of 
rewards with merit by means of formally universalistic criteria of recruitment and 
promotion and by the parallel construction of a ―monopoly of credibility‖ with the 
larger public
384. From this perspective, ―cognitive standardization allows a measure of 
uniformity and homogeneity in the production of producers‖. Furthermore, ―the more 
formalized the cognitive basis, the more the profession‘s language and knowledge 
appear to be connotation-free and objective‖385. It is argued that the development of 
econometrics, following the so-called ―mathematical-quantitative revolution in 
economics‖ has brought the theoretical core of the subject of economics much closer 
to the ideal of a ―restricted‖ discipline‖386. Probably, the Commission‘s reference to 
the profession, as a source of knowledge for good economic (or econometric) practice 
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contributes to this professional project of economics. It is ironic that the Commission 
cautions the development of a ―restricted discipline‖ of economics (and econometrics) 
and the monopolistic rents that will certainly ensue, while at the same time targeting 
the ―professional project‖ of more traditional professions, such as lawyers, with 
intense liberalisation efforts aiming to break their ―restricted‖ nature and to open them 
to competition. 
The Best practices provide a wealth of information on the criteria that would 
enable the submission of econometric evidence to have the greatest effect. These do 
not only relate to its internal or external validity, but also to the reporting, 
interpretation and presentation of its results. We will comment on some of the most 
important aspects with regard to the aim of our study. 
First, assumptions matter:  
―Any economic model which explicitly or implicitly supports a theoretical claim 
must rely on assumptions that are consistent with the facts of the industry under 
consideration. These assumptions should be carefully laid out and the sensitivity 
of its predictions to changes to the assumptions should be made explicit. While it 
is not necessary for economic submissions to actually formalize verbal arguments 
in a model, this will sometimes be helpful to clearly spell out the assumptions 
underlying an argument, to check its logic consistency, to assess effects of a high 
degree of complexity, or to use the model as the theoretical basis for an empirical 
estimation‖387. 
Structural econometrics can thus be acceptable sources of evidence. As the 
Commission noted in its Draft Guidance paper on quantifying harm in actions for 
damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,  
―(t)he different forms of regression analysis […] are sometimes referred to as 
‗reduced form‘ approaches, as they directly estimate parameters of an equation 
that are themselves derived from other economic relationships (e.g. the 
interaction of supply and demand), without modelling these explicitly. 
Alternatively, econometric models can be built to estimate these underlying 
economic relationships. Although such econometric models, which are usually 
referred to as ‗structural‘, often rely on particularly strong assumptions, they 
may bring a deeper understanding of the market concerned and form an 
integral part of simulation exercises to estimate damages‖388. 
The Commission accepts that models and economic arguments are based on 
simplifications of reality, yet it also explains that   
―it is […] normally not sufficient to disprove a particular argument or model, 
to point out that it is ‗based on seemingly unrealistic assumptions‘. It is also 
necessary to explicitly identify which aspects of reality should be better 
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reflected in the model or argumentation, and to indicate why this would alter 
the conclusions‖389. 
Milton Friedman‘s epistemology with its emphasis on the ability of an abstract model 
to make good predictions of reality as the ultimate standard of validity of deductive-
nomological economic thinking
390
, makes finally its triumphal entry into the 
Commission‘s evaluation of economic evidence‘s validity, ironically, at the same time 
that it begins to be expelled from the discipline of economics
391
.  
 The Commission reminds us of good practices in formulating research 
questions that are relevant to the case at hand, by requiring that the null hypothesis but 
also other alternative hypotheses being explicitly formulated
392. The ―intrinsic 
quality‖ of empirical evidence, such as econometrics, depends on the reliance and 
reliability of the underlying data, while that of its theoretical counterparts, the 
economic theory which the empirical technique attempts to link to the data, depends 
on the extent to which ―the underlying assumptions match the corresponding 
economic facts‖393. Some degree of data mining is inevitable in structural 
econometrics, the Commission taking care to note the existence of statistical 
techniques developed to deal with measurement errors, missing observations and 
sample selection problems in order to deal with some of the data‘s ―imperfections‖394. 
The choice of the empirical methodology should also be ―properly motivated‖ and 
should address potential identification problems. According to the Commission, 
―identification can be understood as clarifying the basis upon which one 
theory can be preferred to another. Similarly, the term can be used to refer to 
any situation where an econometric model will invariably have more than one 
set of parameters which generate the same distribution of observations‖395.  
Having recourse to non-parametric estimation will not solve the problem. The 
identification problem for non-parametric estimation is exactly the same as in a 
parametric estimation. In any case, one needs either a good instrument or a good 
control group to make any inferences. The main advantage of non-parametric 
estimation is that one can impose fewer assumptions on the estimated equation. 
However, by imposing less structure, we are able to test fewer things. For example we 
can examine whether the market is competitive or not, but we cannot 
measure/quantify market power. 
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 With regard to the interpretation of the data, the Commission‘s document 
includes important information on statistical significance. The significance level 
measures the probability that the null hypothesis (that is, a particular dependent 
variable does not have a correlation with an independent variable) will be rejected 
incorrectly, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. The lower is the level of 
statistical significance the more difficult it is to reject the null hypothesis. In the draft 
version of the Best Practices the Commission had strict requirements on statistical 
significance, requiring the standard significance level of 5% or inversely 95% 
confidence level (the null hypothesis is rejected (in favour of an alternative 
hypothesis) when the p-value is below or equal to 5%), accepting a statistical 
significance level of 10% only in specific circumstances. The final version of the Best 
Practices quotes both 5 and 10%, thus adopting a more liberal approach, with regard 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Yet, the Commission also adds that ―just 
because some hypothesis cannot be rejected in a statistical sense does not necessarily 
mean that the empirical analysis has no evidentiary value‖396. Indeed, ―depending on 
the question of interest, an approximate economic or econometric result can be 
informative if, for example, it is the direction of effects rather than its magnitude that 
are most relevant‖397. Not being statistically significant does not mean that a finding 
cannot be economically significant. When only limited data are available, it may not 
be possible to show that some effects are statistically significant, although they may 
be highly significant from the economic point of view. Robustness checks should also 
be performed prior to the presentation of the results in order to ensure that the 
regression results are sensitive to slight modifications in the data, the choice of 
empirical methods and the precise modelling assumptions. Robustness checks the 
external validity of the analysis and if the results can be generalised outside the 
sample. According to the Commission, ―the econometric analysis needs to be 
generally consistent and reasonably predict observed past outcomes and 
behaviour‖398.  
 The Best Practices also include information on the reporting of econometric 
evidence, requiring the disclosure of assumptions and the sensitivity of the predictions 
of the analysis to changes, its limitations with regards to accuracy or explanatory 
power of the underlying data, the timely provision of data to the Commission in order 
to enable the replication of the analysis performed, the discussion of alternative 
methodologies and, if possible, the completion of multiple empirical analyses relying 
on different methodologies in order to check the robustness of the tests or models 
With regard to the probative value of such evidence, the Commission follows 
the case law of the General Court in Ryanair noting that ―economic models or 
econometric analysis, as it is the case with other types of evidence will rarely, if ever, 
prove conclusive by themselves‖ and that it ―can always take into account different 
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items of evidence‖, prioritize some and discount others399. It is clear that this is not a 
matter of probabilities, as a probability perspective on evidence would have advanced. 
On the contrary, the Commission takes a holistic view of the different items of 
evidence, which are examined according to the narrative/story evidential model that 
emphasizes congruence and consistency. According to the Commission, ―one must 
assess the congruence and consistency of the economic analysis with other pieces of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence (such as customer responses, or documentary 
evidence)‖400. The best way to rebut econometric evidence remains to show its 
inconsistency with regard to the rest of the arguments of the case
401
. Yet, econometric 
evidence is useful even if it provides only partial verification of an accompanying 
economic model or theory of competitive effects, although it should be properly 
qualified
402. In multiple instances the Commission refers to the ―weight” of different 
items of econometric evidence, thus indicating that this may vary, depending on its 
internal and external validity: 
―Failure to observe and validate all key assumptions or deficiencies in the data 
should not prevent an economic analysis to be given weight, though caution 
must be exercised before relying on its conclusions‖403. 
and 
―Reports which do not allow for replication and in particular econometric 
analysis not including the code and data in electronic form will receive less 
consideration and are consequently unlikely to be given much weight‖404. 
Yet, the consensus of the ―profession‖ over ―generally accepted methods405‖ might 
also enable some discrimination among the different sorts of evidence produced: 
―congruent and convergent results based on methods supported by academic and 
practitioners‘ (sic) are likely to be given greater significance than widely 
divergent results‖406. 
 The timid approach of the EU Courts and the choice of EU competition law 
for a soft law (non-binding) approach with regard to the selection and application of 
criteria for evaluating the probative force of individual items of  econometric evidence 
or the weight of a ‗mass‘ of evidence in a given case offers a wider margin of 
discretion to the Commission than the more actively interventionist approach 
followed by the US courts, which subject econometric analyses to a strict scrutiny of 
their internal and external validity. This is not only limited to the admissibility step in 
application of the Daubert criteria of the US Supreme Court
407
, but also extends 
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beyond the admissibility step, when the courts assess the weight of econometric 
evidence, as the Daubert factors ―may weaken technical evidence even after 
submission‖408. Hence, the courts look to the qualifications of the experts, the 
reliability of the method used (has it been or can it be tested?; has it been subject to 
peer review?; has the specific method a known or measurable error rate?; has the 
scientific community accepted that method?; has the method failed to include 
variables?) and its relevance to assist the trier of facts
409
. With regard to the relevance, 
the US courts delve into the internal and external validity of the evidence presented by 
looking to the statistical power of the conclusions reached, and suggested that failure 
to include all measurable variables or outliers may affect the probative value of the 
econometric evidence, although it may not lead to its exclusion from consideration
410
. 
The same applies for failure in the selection of underlying data
411
. 
 Of course, in practice the intensity of the review by the courts of first instance 
or the appellate review, which for evidentiary rulings in the US is only for abuse of 
discretion, depends on the familiarity of the judge with quantitative research 
methodologies and hence, by definition, varies. As an illustration of a hands-on 
judicial scrutiny of econometric analysis, we can cite Judge Richard Posner‘s opinion 
in Ata Airlines, Inc v. Federal Express Corporation, a breach of agreement case 
which involved the award of damages to one of the parties. The award was based on a 
regression analysis presented by an accountant. The district court had accepted the 
admissibility of such econometric evidence, despite the objections of the defendant (in 
this case Fedex)  relying on the fact that ―simple regression analysis is an accepted 
method‖, although it was clear that the district judge was not able to assess how this 
simple regression methodology was applied in this case. Judge Posner noted that 
―(t)his cursory, and none too clear, response to FedEx‘s objections to (the 
expert‘s) regression analysis did not discharge the duty of a district judge to 
evaluate in advance of trial a challenge to the admissibility of an expert‘s 
proposed testimony. The evaluation of such a challenge may not be easy; the 
principles and methods used by expert witnesses will often be difficult for a 
judge to understand. But difficult is not impossible. The judge can require the 
lawyer who wants to offer the expert‘s testimony to explain to the judge in lain 
English what the basis and logic of the proposed testimony are, and the judge 
can likewise require the opposing counsel to explain his objections in plain 
English. 
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This might not have worked in the present case; neither party‘s lawyers,[…] 
understand regression analysis; or if they do understand it they are unable to 
communicate their understanding in plain English (sic).‖412. 
Judge Posner then proceeded to an introductory class of regression analysis for the 
benefit of the district court judge and the parties‘ lawyers, before addressing the 
regression analysis presented by one of the parties‘ expert.  The latter presented many 
flaws: the dependent and independent variables were not appropriately selected and 
hence the regression was not built on ―a rational foundation‖ and the model was 
improperly implemented, among other deficiencies. Judge Posner concluded that the 
―regression had as many bloody wounds as Julius Caesar when he was stabbed 23 
times by the Roman Senators led by Brutus…‖ and reaffirmed the ―responsibility‖ of 
district judges to ―screen expert testimony, however technical‖, in particular in a jury 
trial, ―since jurors on average have an even lower comfort level with technical 
evidence than judges‖413. 
 The development of an equivalent capacity of EU Courts to proceed to an 
intensive judicial scrutiny of the econometric evidence presented and examine its 
internal and external validity will be one of the major challenges for the 
implementation of the ―effects-based‖ approach in EU competition law. We have 
expressed elsewhere our preference for the establishment of specialized tribunals that 
would have the required technical competence and we have emphasized the 
possibility for courts to appoint neutral experts or assessors, as it is provided for in 
various civil procedure systems in Europe
414
. 
 However, greater judicial scrutiny of the validity of the econometric evidence 
is a different question than the rules of weight or evaluation (cf marking rules) that 
may apply to econometric evidence. It is clear from the analysis of the case law of the 
EU courts and that of the best practices adopted by the European Commission and 
other competition authorities in Europe that the regulation of the weight of specific 
items of evidence is minimal (the standard of proof referring to the body of evidence 
rather than to each specific item of evidence
415
) and that decision-makers benefit from 
a margin of discretion, which is compatible with the principle of the free evaluation of 
evidence. Yet, an empirical analysis of the Commission‘s decisions may indicate 
some regularity on the probative value provided to certain types of econometric 
evidence. Of course, our analysis should be put in the complex factual context of each 
case, taking into account the existence of various items of evidence of different types, 
some econometric, some documentary, a consumer survey etc. As we explained 
previously, assessing evidence is a holistic process, but empirical analysis of different 
types of econometric evidence might prove useful in a more practical context, but also 
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in order to illustrate the overall credibility and probative force of econometric 
evidence. 
 
5. Codifying and Analyzing Econometric Techniques in EU antitrust 
decisions 
Based on the previous categorization of quantitative techniques, we collected and 
codified information on all the publically available decisions on merger, antitrust and 
cartel cases of the European Commission from 2004 until 2011. Our aim is to analyze 
both their frequency of use over time, but also to try to quantify the opinion of the 
European Commission for the particular techniques used. 
 
5.1. Data Description 
All publicly available versions of European Commission decisions on merger, 
antitrust and cartel cases, concluded by the Commission from 01/01/2004 to 
11/10/2011 (based on the last decision date for each case), for which an English 
version of the decision was available, was collected. The main source of these 
documents was the online database of the European Commission‘s Directorate-
General for Competition
416
. 
The analysis of the Merger cases was confined to cases judged under Council 
Regulation 139/2004 (cases under Council Regulation 4064/89 were ignored). For 
this analysis, we collected information on a total of 2405 cases (merger cases with last 
decision dated from 01/01/2004 to 11/10/2011 and published on the Commission‘s 
online database until 11/10/2011), 2221 of which were Phase I cases, 47 were Phase II 
cases and 58 were withdrawn or aborted cases (the remaining 79 cases fell in none of 
these categories. Those were cases for which Phase II proceedings were initiated, but 
no Phase II decision has yet been concluded, cases referred to national competition 
authorities under Article 4(4) etc.). The analysis was confined to 822 cases (out of a 
total of 2405 cases), for which an English version of the decision was available on the 
Commission‘s online database, and the decision included some useful information on 
the Commission‘s rationale (for 146 cases no English version of the decision was 
available and for 1437 cases the decision was either a typical statement of exemption 
or no decision was published on the database). In 55 of those cases some form of 
quantitative techniques was employed. Table 1 provides a summary of this 
information. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
For the analysis of the antitrust and cartel cases we collected information on a 
total of 120 cases (antitrust and cartel cases with last decision dated from 01/01/2004 
to 11/10/2011 and published on the Commission‘s online database until 11/10/2011). 
The analysis was confined to 83 of those cases, for which an English version of the 
Commission‘s decision was available on the Commission‘s online database (for 16 
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cases no English version of the decision was available, and for 21 cases no decision 
was included in the database). In 9 of those cases some form of quantitative 
techniques was employed (plus one more case in which the use of a quantitative 
technique is mentioned in the text, but no details are provided).
417
 Table 2 provides a 
summary of this information. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
5.2. Methodology 
For each case we first searched the decision texts using keywords related to the 
previously analysed quantitative techniques (such as ―regression‖, ―demand analysis‖, 
―correlation‖ etc.). The complete list of keywords used can be found in the Appendix . 
We then read in detail the passage where such keywords were used to establish 
whether a quantitative technique was employed.  
It should be noted that very often the Commission‘s decisions only present 
general descriptions of the techniques used and all the technical details are being 
omitted, when these were deemed to contain sensitive and confidential information. 
We spend a considerable amount to time trying to categorize the techniques used 
correctly based on the available information. 
Finally, each time a reference to a quantitative technique was identified, we 
assigned an ―opinion‖ score, that represents how heavily the technique weighted in 
the Commission‘s decision. The scale of the ―opinion‖ score varies from one 
(implying that the Commission discarded entirely the argumentation posed by the 
technique) to five (implying the Commission found the quantitative technique very 
convincing and used it as a basis to reach a conclusion), as shown on Table 5. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
5.3. Analysis of Econometric Techniques 
Classifying all the quantitative techniques into three broad categories (statistical tests, 
demand analysis and other techniques), we believe that is interesting to see their 
evolution over time. Figure 1 presents the percentage use of the different quantitative 
categories over time. Statistical test were very pervasive in 2004 (used in 83% of all 
the cases utilizing some kind of quantitative technique), but their ―dominance‖ has 
diminished over time and they have been overtaken by demand analysis. Other 
techniques usage has fluctuated over time, but in general they are the ones least used 
overall. 
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[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 2 depicts in percentage terms the purpose for which these quantitative 
techniques are utilized. As we can see from the graph the most common purposes of 
use are market definition (52%) and pricing behavior (22%), followed by market 
structure (17%), non-pricing behavior (8%) and assessment of efficiencies (1%). 
Given that market definition is one of the first questions usually answered in any 
merger or antitrust case and that most cases are usually centered around issues on how 
firms used their pricing decisions as a strategic variable our findings are not that 
surprising. 
 
[Figure 2] 
  
More interesting is to see the cross-tabulation of the different techniques used 
for each purpose as presented in Table 3. Statistical tests are primarily used for market 
definition and market structure purposes, whereas demand analysis is the preferred 
method when analyzing pricing behaviour. Other techniques are mainly used when 
analyzing efficiencies or non-price behaviour.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
Figure 3 presents the percentage use of the various quantitative techniques. 
Price correlation (28%) is the most commonly used technique, followed closely by 
price determinant regressions (21%) and the SSNIP test (15%). Industry specific 
model simulation (12%) and demand estimation for differentiated products (9%) are 
the next most popular. Is should be noted here however, that in most cases where data 
is available and some quantitative techniques are used, firms often employ multiple 
techniques to prove an argument. So the use of the different techniques should be seen 
more as complements (a firm would use both an easy to calculate price correlation 
and a more complicated demand estimation to demonstrate a close relationship 
between two products for example), rather than as substitutes. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
Finally, we turn to the opinions expressed by the EC for each technique as 
indicated in the decisions‘ text and codified by us on a scale from 1 (the worst) to 5 
(the best). Looking at the broad categories, statistical tests have an average 3.1 
opinion score, whereas demand analysis has a 3.4 and other techniques 3.6 average 
score. However, none of the mean scores are statistically different from each other 
based on a formal test of means. 
We explore this relationship further, through the following econometric 
framework: 
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where          is the score that we assigned based on the EE decision text 
commenting on the statistical technique used i,                 is a binary 
indicator that equals one if the technique i belongs to this category, similarly 
                is a binary indicator that equals one if the technique i belongs to 
this category,  are binary indicators for year, purpose of the techniques 
used, case for which it was used (merger, antitrust or cartel) and particular type of 
technique used respectively, and    is the econometric error term. The coefficient on 
                and                 indicate whether the opinion expressed by 
the EC in a decision would be higher or lower compare to the opinion expressed for 
the omitted category, which is the                   in this case. 
Table 4 presents the results. Column 1 simply regresses the two dummies for 
the two broad categories (                and                ) on the 
opinion‘s score, without any further controls. Results indicate that using either a 
                or                 would both increase the opinion expressed 
by the EC compare to using only a                  technique. However, only the 
coefficient on                 is significant at the 10%, indicating a weak 
conditional correlation. In column 2 we add controls for the different years in order to 
capture any common factors that might have changed over time (such as the advent of 
new quantitative techniques or changes in the EC‘s opinion) and that could affect the 
opinions‘ expressed. Both coefficients remain positive, but none of them is 
statistically significant now. In column 3 we add further controls for the purpose of 
the technique used, whereas in column 4 we also control for the case in which the 
techniques were used, i.e. whether it was a merger, antitrust or cartel case. Results 
seem largely unchanged with the coefficients fluctuating, but not being significantly 
different from zero. In column 5 we present our most complete specification where 
we additionally control for the particular technique used. As you can see from the last 
row of the table the model‘s fit is quite good (50%). Both coefficients are positive, but 
the only one significant now is the coefficient on the                , indicating 
that, everything else held constant, the use of demand analysis techniques compare to 
statistical tests would increase the EC‘s opinion by 1.2 points, or some 38% on 
average. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Looking at the evidence overall, such as the evolution of the use of these 
techniques over time, as well as the econometric analysis just described, one would be 
tempted to say that quantitative techniques used for antitrust analysis are shifting 
away from simple statistical tests and towards more sophisticated, more detailed 
analytical frameworks. Both economic theory and econometric techniques have 
progressed at a fast pace over the last two decades and graduate economic students 
(typically employed to perform quantitative analyses as the ones described above) 
 110 
have now both a wider toolbox available and better computers on which they can 
perform more sophisticated analysis. 
However, one has to be careful at drawing definitive conclusions so early. As 
we discussed above, these techniques are more complements than substitutes. We 
think the common view is that by presenting an argument using different techniques 
(both descriptive and more complicated) the EC would be more convinced about the 
underlying robustness of the phenomenon. Moreover, the econometric evidence 
presented above treats the quantitative technique chosen as exogenous to the opinion 
expressed. However, one can think of many reasons why statistical tests might score 
low compare to the other techniques, but the underlying reason is not the ―weakness‖ 
of the technique itself, but some other underlying factor, such as lack of data or lack 
of knowledge on how to use the available data more effectively. This is the first 
attempt to describe and codify the evolution and impact that quantitative techniques 
have on competition cases in general and certainly there are a lot of aspects still open 
for research. We like to believe though that this is a very interesting topic for future 
research, as quantitative techniques have become an integral part of almost any 
competition case nowadays. 
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Appendix  
The complete list of keywords used in all cases is as follows: econometric, regression, 
quantitative, technique, empiric, simulat, Bertrand, Cournot, logit, SSNIP, correlation, 
stationarity, cross-section, hedonic, co-integration, causality, residual, diversion, 
statistic, AIDS, elasticity, non-transitory, co-movement, scedastic, envelopment, 
robust, bidding, algorithm, dynamic price, price analys, price stud, price survey, price 
test, price concentration, demand analys, demand stud, demand survey, demand test, 
demand model, demand estimate, demand system, economic stud, economic analys, 
economic model, bidding stud, bidding analys, import penetration, critical loss, time 
series, panel data, speed of adjustment, discrete choice, stock market. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Number of cases (decisions)
PHASE I
Art. 6(1)(a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Art. 6(1)(b) 220 276 323 368 307 225 253 231 2203
Art. 6(1)(b) with conditions and obligations 12 15 13 18 19 13 14 4 108
Total Phase I Decisions 232 291 336 386 326 238 267 235 2311
PHASE II
Art. 8(1) (Allowed mergeres) 2 2 4 5 9 0 1 2 25
Art. 8(2) with conditions and obligations (Allowed mergers) 4 3 6 4 5 3 2 0 27
Art. 8(3) (Blocked mergers) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
Art. 8(4) (Blocked mergers) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Phase II Decisions 7 5 10 10 14 3 3 3 55
Total Phase II ALLOWED mergers [Sum of Art. 8(1) and Art. 8(2)] 6 5 10 9 14 3 3 2 52
Total Phase II BLOCKED mergers [Sum of Art. 8(3) and Art. 8(4)] 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
WITHDRAWN
Withdrawn (Phase I) 3 6 7 5 10 6 4 7 48
Aborted / withdrawn (Phase II) 2 3 2 2 3 2 0 1 15
Total Withdrawn and Aborted 5 9 9 7 13 8 4 8 63
TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE TABLE OF MERGER DECISIONS
Source: Authors’ calculations based on all publicly available versions of European Commission decisions on merger cases, concluded by the Commission from
01/01/2004 to 11/10/2011.
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
CARTEL CASES
Total number of cases concluded by the Commission 7 6 7 8 7 6 6 1 48
Cases for which decisions in English are available 6 6 5 7 6 4 1 1 36
Cases in which quantitative techniques were employed 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
OTHER ANTITRUST CASES
Total number of cases concluded by the Commission 15 8 7 14 7 8 9 4 72
Cases for which decisions in English are available 9 7 5 5 6 7 7 1 47
Cases in which quantitative techniques were employed 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 7
ALL CASES (Cartel and other Antitrust aggregates)
Total number of cases concluded by the Commission 22 14 14 22 14 14 15 5 120
Cases for which decisions in English are available 15 13 10 12 12 11 8 2 83
Cases in which quantitative techniques were employed 2 1 0 3 1 1 2 0 10
TABLE 2 - DESCRIPTIVE TABLE OF ANTITRUST AND CARTEL DECISIONS
Source: Authors’ calculations based on all publicly available versions of European Commission decisions on antitrust and cartel cases, concluded by the Commission
from 01/01/2004 to 11/10/2011.
statistical tests demand analysis other techniques
efficiencies' assessment 0 0 1
market definition 32 23 0
market structure 16 0 2
non-price behaviour 1 0 7
pricing behaviour 8 12 3
TABLE 3 - CROSS-TABULATION OF QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUE AND 
PURPOSE OF USE
Source: Authors’ calculations based on all publicly available versions of European Commission 
decisions on merger, antitrust and cartel cases, concluded by the Commission from 01/01/2004 to 
11/10/2011. For each case we first searched the decision texts using keywords related to the 
previously analysed quantitative techniques. We then read in detail the passage where such 
keywords were used to establish whether a quantitative technique was employed and for what 
purpose. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable opinion score opinion score opinion score opinion score opinion score
Demand Analysis 0.249 0.166 0.303 -0.168 1.232*
(0.243) (0.265) (0.240) (0.251) (0.710)
Other Techniques 0.493* 0.442 0.906* 0.487 0.578
(0.293) (0.294) (0.487) (0.552) (0.739)
Year Dummies no yes yes yes yes
Purpose Dummies no no yes yes yes
Case Dummies no no no yes yes
Technique Dummies no no no no yes
Observations 105 105 105 105 105
R-squared 0.022 0.165 0.300 0.410 0.502
TABLE 4 - ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF EU CC OPINION ON DIFFERENT QUANTITATIVE 
TECHNIQUES
Source: Authors’ calculations based on all publicly available versions of European Commission decisions on merger, antitrust and
cartel cases, concluded by the Commission from 01/01/2004 to 11/10/2011.
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at
1%.
Opinion 
Score
Interpretation
1 The technique was discarded
2 Strong objections were raised on aspects of the technique and the 
technique had no significant impact on conclusions
3 The technique was taken into consideration as evidence, albeit with 
reservations
4 The technique was taken seriously into consideration as evidence, 
however it was not solely relied upon to reach a conclusion
5 The technique was very convincing and constituted a solid basis for a 
conclusion
TABLE 5 - OPINION SCORE SCALE
Source: Authors' definitions.
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